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ABSTRACT 
 
 
This dissertation explores the association between the emotions of envy and jealousy and 
the figure of the sole ruler, which is discernible in even the oldest ancient Greek literary texts. 
These emotions—most easily identified by the Greek words phthonos and zêlos, but in many 
cases left unnamed on account of an enduring social stigma—are overwhelmingly negative and 
often dangerous in the works of Homer, Hesiod, Sophocles, and Herodotus, and this is especially 
true when a ruler is involved. When a ruler acts out of envy or jealousy, there are never direct 
positive effects for others, and the only instance in which envy or jealousy aimed at a ruler can 
be considered to produce a societal benefit is when it originates from the divine realm. In such 
circumstances, it reestablishes proper order by punishing the overly arrogant. There are various 
scenarios in which envy, jealousy, and rulership appear in combination, and the widening range 
of permutations in the literature of the fifth century B.C. (and beyond) reflects a heightened 
anxiety about the precariousness of one-man rule. Already in the works of Homer and Hesiod, it 
is readily apparent that envy and jealousy typically relate to issues of honor. Accordingly, many 
rulers attract the envy of their subjects (particularly of potential rivals), and conversely, many 
rulers exhibit jealousy in their attempts to maintain their position or their status. In the classical 
period, arguments about why specific individuals do not and why people in general should not 
envy rulers become increasingly prevalent, as does the idea that overly powerful individuals 
provoke the jealousy of the gods. There are also depictions of rulers who internalize the 
commonplace that they are wont to incur envy to such a degree that they either become 
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excessively cautious and fearful or they dismiss any opposition on the grounds that it stems from 
envy. In the world of epic, while envy and jealousy were already regarded as untoward and 
potentially destabilizing emotions, monarchy was still a perfectly acceptable and widespread 
form of rule. Over time, however, with the Athenians’ hatred of tyranny burgeoning and their 
influence growing, the association between the emotions of envy and jealousy and rulership was 
invoked more and more frequently, as democrats and oligarchs alike could use it to justify their 
distrust of tyranny, and thus the increasingly negative perceptions of tyranny contributed in turn 
to the further vilification of envy and jealousy.  
 
 
 
  1 
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
 
To date, there have been no in-depth studies of the relationship between envy and 
jealousy and the figure of the sole ruler in ancient Greek literature. Greek authors commonly 
depicted tyrants and kings as jealous individuals who were often simultaneously the object of 
envy among their constituents.1 In many instances, these emotions relate to issues of honor and 
reputation. Thus we can see why the Greeks believed that envy and jealousy played a significant 
role in shaping the actions and behavior of rulers, since they were often characterized as being 
especially preoccupied with their image and status. Although the Greeks recognized that envy 
and jealousy could bring about positive effects in select situations, they focused on the potential 
and tendency of these emotions to be detrimental and even dangerous. The association between 
sole rulers and the emotions of envy and jealousy predated the widespread antagonism toward 
tyranny that developed toward the end of the archaic period, but as their antagonism increased, 
the Greeks had this association at their disposal to help justify their position. 
 
1. Historical background 
 
Tyranny in ancient Greece played a significant role both in shaping the history of the 
archaic period and in influencing political thought throughout the classical period and beyond. 
Many city-states experienced tyranny firsthand in the archaic period, but even after it had faded 
to the peripheries of mainland Greece, it nevertheless remained prominent in political discourse 
                                                
1 For the similarities and differences between envy and jealousy (as we understand them in English), see p. 22-28. 
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as a theoretical alternate to democracy and oligarchy. The phenomenon of tyranny thus provides 
an excellent opportunity to explore what the ancient Greeks thought about the nature of one-man 
rule, the nature of political power more generally, and even the very nature of man.  
The origins of the words turannos and turannis are not Greek. They first entered the 
Greek language sometime in the seventh century, and the earliest extant use appears in the poetry 
of Archilochus, who presents tyranny as something upon which most men look favorably or 
covetously, rather than with contempt.2 Although one might acquire a tyranny by violent 
measures, Archilochus nevertheless depicts it as a source of prestige for the man who succeeds in 
attaining one.3 Not until Solon’s poetry, written in the first half of the sixth century, do we 
encounter these words being used in an obviously negative context. Like Archilochus, Solon 
indicates awareness that many men desire to be tyrant, but he sternly cautions against this, 
depicting tyranny as a catalyst for ruin.4 In the works of the Athenian tragedians of the fifth 
century, turannos often simply means “king,” although the playwrights do seem to recognize the 
negative connotations the word is capable of carrying, and they occasionally exploit this 
meaning.5 Similarly, Herodotus too is familiar with the word’s negative associations. He uses 
turannos and basileus more or less interchangeably in some cases, but notably, turann- words 
appear in the speeches of Otanes and Socles as they argue against one-man rule.6  Evidently, the 
terms were not yet unequivocally and universally negative, but authors in the fifth century could 
easily utilize their pejorative sense if and when they wanted to. 
                                                
2 Parker (1998), 150-52. For a discussion of the fragment in which turannis first appears, see p. 5-6. All dates 
referring to the events or literature of ancient Greece are B.C. unless noted otherwise. 
3 Anderson (2005), 204.  
4 Parker (1998), 156.   
5 Idem, 160. 
6 Idem, 164. 
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 The shift in the meaning of turann- words from neutral to negative was induced by the 
changing political milieu: the decades leading up to and following the Persian Wars effected a 
most notable change in attitudes and thus in semantics as well. In the 540s, more tyrants began 
looking abroad to Persia for support, rather than to their own city-states (or networks of elites in 
other nearby city-states), and this detachment bred a certain amount of resentment at home.7 
Hippias of Athens forged a strong enough connection with the Persian court that after the 
Spartans deposed him from Athens, he eventually made his way to Persia and subsequently led 
Darius’ men to Marathon in 490. Especially given Hippias’ role in matters, the Persian Wars 
were bound to affect the Athenians’ attitudes toward tyranny, as many of them viewed their 
success in resisting the Persians as a validation of the institution of democracy over that of 
autocracy.8  
The Persian Wars not only had an impact on how tyranny was regarded moving forward 
in time, but they influenced how the Greeks thought about and represented tyrannies in the past 
as well.9 For example, the Athenians were eager to show themselves as staunchly opposed to 
tyranny, despite the fact that they had acquiesced to living under one for several decades. At 
some point before the Persian Wars, they commissioned a statue group to be placed in the agora, 
glorifying Harmodius and Aristogeiton as tyrannicides, even though they neither killed the actual 
tyrant nor ended the tyranny.10 In 477/6, almost immediately after putting an end to the second 
invasion, the Athenians commissioned a replacement for the statue group, which Xerxes had 
seized and removed to Persia.11 The original commission speaks to their dedication to revising 
Athenian history, but the alacrity with which they replaced the stolen statue indicates a dramatic 
                                                
7 Anderson (2005), 211. 
8 Lavelle (1993), 13. 
9 Lewis (2009), 11-12.  
10 The exact date of the statue group by Antenor is debated. See Taylor (1981), 34-36. 
11 Idem, 37. 
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and even more vehement imperative: it was crucial that they have a tangible symbol of their anti-
tyranny ideology and that they represent Harmodius and Aristogeiton (and thus the dêmos itself) 
as the city’s liberators.12 
 In addition to events relating to the Persians, around the same time (ca. 525-480) there 
was an increase in civic awareness in the city-states of mainland Greece, and this too contributed 
to a general shift in attitudes toward tyranny.13 Although it is unlikely that archaic tyrants viewed 
themselves as genuine and deliberate champions of the people, in order to stay in power, many 
had begun to pay more attention to the needs of the people, thus inadvertently paving the way to 
a more democratic form of government.14 While previously, the masses typically had few to no 
political rights, under tyrants they grew accustomed to having slightly more influence. Naturally, 
over time they began agitating for more, and this desire factored into the changing political 
environment and a shift in how they viewed tyranny.  
 Despite the fact that tyranny was not prevalent in the classical period except on the 
fringes of mainland Greece and many city-states were oligarchic throughout, there was a 
continuing preoccupation with and anxiety about tyranny, particularly in Athens, where pro-
democracy and anti-tyranny sentiments were intimately entwined. It is not difficult to find 
evidence of this anxiety. In addition to erecting the two statue groups honoring the tyrannicides, 
the Athenians granted to their descendants the privileges of sitêsis (meals in the Prytaneion, paid 
for at public expense), ateleia (freedom from taxes), and prohedria (special seating at public 
events).15 Before meetings of the assembly began, a curse was uttered against aspiring tyrants, 
and if a man was found guilty for attempted tyranny or for treason, he could be put to death or 
                                                
12 Lavelle (1993), 58; Ober (2003), 217. 
13 Anderson (2005), 211.  
14 Lewis (2009), 27. 
15 Raaflaub (2003), 66. 
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permanently banished along with his family.16 We find further evidence of continued 
ruminations about tyranny in the literary constitutional debates in Herodotus’ Histories and 
Euripides’ Suppliants, which focus on the dichotomy between tyranny and democracy, despite 
the fact that democracy and oligarchy were the more viable alternates in the fifth century.  
Sara Forsdyke outlines three main factors that help account for the continuing 
prominence of tyranny in fifth-century political thought. First, the anti-tyranny rhetoric used by 
the elites of the archaic period was appropriated by supporters of democracy, as they found the 
negative stereotypes of tyranny useful in articulating the positive qualities of democracy; decades 
after the Peisistratids were expelled from Athens, Athenians continued to dwell upon tyranny, 
largely on account of its usefulness as an ideological foil to democracy. Second, dislike and 
distrust of tyranny was shared by democrats and oligarchs alike (yet they managed to adapt 
arguments relating to tyranny to disparate ends). Third, conflict with the Persians prompted 
authors such as Aeschylus and Herodotus to cast events as a clash of political convictions.17 
Throughout the fifth century, various individuals as well as the city of Athens itself were 
compared to tyrants, demonstrating both the versatility of tyranny as a concept and the fact that 
tyranny still occupied a place in the forefront of many Greeks’ minds. 
As mentioned above, the earliest extant use of a turann- word appears in the poetry of 
Archilochus. The narrator writes: 
οὔ µοι τὰ Γύγεω τοῦ πολυχρύσου µέλει, 
 οὐδ᾽ εἷλε πώ µε ζῆλος, οὐδ᾽ ἀγαίοµαι 
 θεῶν ἔργα, µεγάλης δ᾽ οὐκ ἐρέω τυραννίδος· 
 ἀπόπροθεν γάρ ἐστιν ὀφθαλµῶν ἐµῶν. 
 
“I do not care for the things of Gyges, rich in gold, and envy has not yet seized me, and I 
do not wish to emulate the deeds of the gods, and I do not love a great tyranny: for that is 
far from my eyes.” (Fr. 19 West) 
                                                
16 Idem, 70. 
17 Forsdyke (2009), 237. 
  6 
The fact that the first instance of turannis appears in conjunction with words related to envy 
(zêlos, agaasthai) indicates that tyranny was associated with what David Konstan and N. Keith 
Rutter have termed “rivalrous emotions” from very early on.18 The speaker is emphatic about 
denying that he desires riches or tyranny, which points to the idea that, generally speaking, they 
are intrinsically worthy of envy. Moreover, the use of the verb erân, which connotes powerful 
desire, suggests that tyranny is something that naturally evokes strong emotions—even in the 
case of the speaker, whose choice of verbs crescendos from dispassionate impartiality with a 
negated form of melein to passionate disavowal with a negated form of erân. 
In the classical period, authors such as Herodotus and Plato continued to expand upon the 
relationship between sole rulers and envy. A second passage that clearly illustrates the 
connection between tyranny and phthonos comes from Herodotus’ constitutional debate. After 
protesting that monarchy is a fundamentally flawed institution on the grounds that a monarch is 
not held accountable to anyone, Otanes identifies hubris and phthonos as the root of the tyrant’s 
evil deeds: 
καὶ γὰρ ἂν τὸν ἄριστον ἀνδρῶν πάντων στάντα ἐς ταύτην τὴν ἀρχὴν ἐκτὸς τῶν ἐωθότων 
νοηµάτων στήσειε. ἐγγίνεται µὲν γάρ οἱ ὕβρις ὑπὸ τῶν παρεόντων ἀγαθῶν, φθόνος δὲ 
ἀρχῆθεν ἐµφύεται ἀνθρώπῳ. δύο δ᾽ ἔχων ταῦτα ἔχει πᾶσαν κακότητα· τὰ µὲν γὰρ ὕβρι 
κεκορηµένος ἔρδει πολλὰ καὶ ἀτάσθαλα, τὰ δὲ φθόνῳ· καίτοι ἄνδρα γε τύραννον 
ἄφθονον ἔδει εἶναι, ἔχοντά γε πάντα τὰ ἀγαθά· τὸ δὲ ὑπεναντίον τούτου ἐς τοὺς πολιήτας 
πέφυκε. φθονέει γὰρ τοῖσι ἀρίστοισι περιεοῦσί τε καὶ ζώουσι, χαίρει δὲ τοῖσι κακίστοισι 
τῶν ἀστῶν, διαβολὰς δὲ ἄριστος ἐνδέκεσθαι. 
 
“Putting even the best of all men into this rule would push him beyond his accustomed 
thoughts. For hubris is bred in him from the good things at hand, while phthonos grows 
in man from the start. Having these two [traits], he has every evil: for he does many 
wicked things, some, having been filled with hubris, and others, having been filled with 
phthonos. And yet a tyrant ought to be a man free from phthonos, since he has all good 
things, but he becomes by nature the opposite of this against the citizens. For he feels 
phthonos toward the best men because they excel and [even] exist, and he delights in the 
worst of the citizens, and is the best at giving ear to slander.” (3.80.3-4) 
 
                                                
18 For Homer’s use of agaasthai in conjunction with envy and jealousy, see p. 44-45. 
  7 
Whereas Archilochus’ fragment suggests that the tyrant’s position is one envied by many, in 
Otanes’ view, the tyrant himself feels phthonos toward others, and this drives him to commit 
outrages against his people.19 Otanes presents phthonos as something innate among all men, yet 
especially prominent in the figure of the tyrant. 
 In the Republic, Plato makes clear once again that the tyrant is by nature an envious man. 
Socrates asks, ἀποδώσοµεν τῷ ἀνδρὶ καὶ ἃ τὸ πρότερον εἴποµεν, ὅτι ἀνάγκη καὶ εἶναι καὶ ἔτι 
µᾶλλον γίγνεσθαι αὐτῷ ἢ πρότερον διὰ τὴν ἀρχὴν φθονερῷ, ἀπίστῳ, ἀδίκῳ, ἀφίλῳ, ἀνοσίῳ καὶ 
πάσης κακίας πανδοκεῖ τε καὶ τροφεῖ (“Shall we also attribute to [the tyrant] what we said before, 
that he is necessarily phthoneros, untrustworthy, unjust, friendless, unholy, and a host and nurse 
of every evil, and that he becomes more so than before, on account of his rule?” Resp. 580a). His 
interlocutor, Glaucon, responds that no intelligent person would contradict him in saying so. The 
placement of phthoneros at the beginning of Socrates’ long list of adjectives emphasizes its 
importance: the tyrant is many things, but being envious and/or jealous is first and foremost 
among those qualities.20 
The aim of the present study is to determine the range of ways in which envy and 
jealousy manifest themselves in relation to the figure of the sole ruler in ancient Greek literature. 
It will examine Greek attitudes toward these emotions, specifically in political and civic 
contexts; in what ways and in what circumstances people exhibited them (and with what 
consequences); and how authors utilized them in characterizing various figures or conveying 
political agendas. Owing to the constraints of time and space, I have chosen to focus primarily on 
the texts of Homer (including the Homeric Hymns), Hesiod, Sophocles, and Herodotus, since 
these represent a variety of genres from different points in time that complement one another 
                                                
19 For a more detailed discussion of this passage, see p. 115-17. 
20 For more about tyrants in Plato’s Republic, see p. 160-62. 
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especially well. Epic poetry reveals a great deal about the values and ideals of Greek society, as 
it showcases the world of heroes and the immortal realm. Although Hesiod’s Works and Days 
focuses largely on the more mundane lives of working men in the Age of Iron, it too has a 
didactic purpose: to educate Perses (and whoever else encounters the poem) not only about 
agriculture but also about morality, including the motivational and detrimental effects of envy. 
Like epic, tragedy draws from the world of myth, but it also provides insight into less official 
attitudes, such as those of women and other politically marginalized individuals.21 Sophocles in 
particular among the Athenian tragedians was interested in exploring human psychology through 
his characters, making his plays a rich study in emotional experience. Whereas both epic and 
tragedy deal with legendary figures, set in a mythical past, historiography deals with historical 
figures: Herodotus describes real people, real events, and the real world (or at least as his own 
understanding of these).22 The subject of his work also presents ample opportunity to reflect on 
the nature and examples of one-man rule.23 Thus, by bringing together material from the works 
of Homer, Hesiod, Sophocles, and Herodotus, this study will provide a cross-section of and a 
window into the complexity of Greek views about envy, jealousy, and rulership. 
 
2. Why should we study emotions? 
 
There has been an increasing focus on the study of ancient emotions among classicists in 
recent years, and this is paralleled by the trend among historians to consider more seriously the 
influence of emotions on human motivation and activity. Prior to this movement, which began 
with Lucien Febvre in the mid-twentieth century but which picked up momentum in the United 
                                                
21 Konstan (2005), 48-49. 
22 Sternberg (2005b), 17.  
23 While envy and jealousy at times enter into Thucydides’ narrative, in general the subject matter does not so easily 
lend itself to discussions of sole rulers, making Herodotus a better choice for this study. 
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States in the 1980s, emotions were typically relegated to the sidelines of historical study or even 
dismissed as immaterial.24 This neglect is somewhat understandable, in light of the various 
difficulties inherent in the study of emotions (to be discussed in section 4 below), but the benefit 
we stand to gain by considering emotions as part of our exploration of the history and culture of 
a civilization surely outweighs those challenges. A society is made up of individuals and each 
person experiences emotions; although it would be far-fetched to argue that the average person’s 
emotions have a discernible effect on his or her society, the emotions of the people in sum (as 
well as the emotions of prominent individuals) can at times serve as an intense and powerful 
force, and denying this leaves us with a somewhat inadequate explanation of human history.  
For example, scholars who study capitalism have demonstrated that emotions have a 
tangible effect on people’s economic choices.25 The expansion of the modern American 
consumer economy depended in large part on changing attitudes toward envy in the early 
twentieth century.26 Whereas before, the prevailing belief was that envy was a grave sin and that 
people should be content with their assigned lot in life, in the 1910s and 1920s, increasing 
secularism and a rise in mass-produced goods gave way to the view that envy was an acceptable 
and sometimes even beneficial emotion.27 This view in turn enabled the growth in consumerism 
that we have witnessed over the past century in America, and envy continues to be a driving 
force for the spending habits of many Americans today. 
We can also observe the power of emotions in the field of law: in criminal trials, where 
relatives of murder victims make statements about the impact the crime has had on their lives; in 
criminal codes, where the defendant’s state of mind can at times mitigate or intensify the gravity 
                                                
24 Matt and Stearns (2014), 3-4. 
25 Idem, 9.  
26 Matt (2003), 7. 
27 Idem, 4-5. 
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of the crime; or in civil law, where legislators must decide what sorts of conduct the law should 
govern.28 In fact, at the very beginning of her introduction to the first anthology concerning 
emotions and the law, The Passions of Law, Susan Bandes states unequivocally, “Emotion 
pervades the law.”29 The essays in her collection focus not on whether emotions ought to play 
any role in the law, but rather on the questions of which emotions should be privileged and taken 
into consideration in which legal contexts.30 Indeed, it is not by accident that the fullest 
discussion of emotions in Aristotle’s works occurs in the Rhetoric, since he conceives of 
emotions as useful tools that a skilled orator ought to understand. If emotions contribute to 
decisions within the economic and legal realms, for example, our inclusion of them in the study 
of a civilization’s history and culture will only expand and enrich our understanding.  
Historically, one of the most fundamental debates in the study of emotions is whether 
they are universal. Charles Darwin believed that certain expressive features had basic 
communicative value and thus were innate and universal.31 Following in his footsteps, Paul 
Ekman argues that the same facial expressions are associated with the same emotions 
everywhere, and that this constitutes evidence of universality.32 One of the main objections 
raised in response to Ekman’s theory, however, is that he does not give enough consideration to 
the eliciting conditions of these emotions. While the facial expressions of people from different 
societies may reveal a striking similarity, the circumstances prompting them to make those 
expressions can vary widely from individual to individual and from society to society.33 
Moreover, Anna Wierzbicka takes issue with Ekman’s use and privileging of English 
                                                
28 Bandes (1999), 3-6. 
29 Idem, 1.  
30 Idem, 7. 
31 Konstan (2006), 9. 
32 Ekman (1973), 219. 
33 Cairns and Fulkerson (2015), 3; Konstan (2006), 18. 
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terminology to label what he argues are universal emotions. She contends that speakers of 
different languages do not necessarily understand or describe emotions in the same ways; in her 
view, Ekman’s use of English terms is therefore reductive and inadequate.34 In order to minimize 
the interference of our own cultural biases and associations with particular terms, Wierzbicka 
advocates for the use of emotional scripts. Scripts lessen our dependence on specific terminology 
by describing in basic terms the assessment of a scenario from the point of view of the person 
feeling the emotion.35 I shall return to and expand upon the merits of a script-based approach in 
my subsequent discussion of the difficulties of studying emotions (section 4). 
At this point in time, most scholars who study emotions—psychologists, anthropologists, 
historians, etc.—agree that emotions are not universal, but that they are socially and culturally 
conditioned.36 According to appraisal theory (which refers to a category of separate but related 
theories, rather than one particular theory), emotions involve a cognitive component, which is 
susceptible to cultural influence.37 The idea that eliciting conditions and people’s appraisals for 
any given emotion can vary from one culture to the next gives us all the more reason to pay 
attention to emotions as we examine the history and literature of different civilizations: we 
cannot simply assume that our own society’s emotional norms and experiences are identical to 
those of societies located elsewhere in space or time. 
 
3. What are emotions? 
 
 The issues of defining precisely what we mean by the term “emotion” and of delineating 
between emotions and other related phenomena have sparked an ongoing debate among scholars 
                                                
34 Wierzbicka (1999), 169.  
35 Idem, 272. 
36 Matt and Stearns (2014), 2; Sanders (2014), 3. 
37 Konstan (2006), 22-24; Ben-Ze’ev (2000), 49-58. 
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of various disciplines. In fact, there is such a lack of consensus about the meaning of the term 
that some are in favor of eliminating the word from psychology entirely.38 In a similar vein, 
philosopher Paul Griffiths argues that “the general concept of emotion is unlikely to be a useful 
concept in psychological theory,” explaining that emotions do not have enough in common with 
each other to help us differentiate between emotions and other psychological phenomena.39  
The word “emotion” entered into the English language in the seventeenth century as a 
term denoting physical agitation, but it gradually became established as a term that could refer to 
mental states in the eighteenth century.40 Over the course of the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries, it gained currency as a technical term in the fields of psychology, medicine, sociology, 
and anthropology.41 The issue is not that we cannot come up with a definition for the term 
“emotion”; the issue is that, with definitions abounding, we cannot agree on one, and this is not 
entirely surprising if we take into account the evolution of the word. Douglas Cairns and Laurel 
Fulkerson advise, however, that we not focus too much energy on this lack of consensus: 
The absence of a single and definitive set of criteria for membership of the category 
“emotion” is a significant feature of the phenomena under investigation, not something to 
be eliminated through redefinition…All the problems with the definition of “emotion” in 
English…are inherent in the enterprise of studying phenomena of this type. It is 
important that “emotion” cannot be essentialized; the answer is not to redefine it until it 
can.42 
 
In light of these words of caution, it seems to me imprudent to attempt my own definition of the 
term “emotion,” but instead I will offer several put forward by others, to illustrate the diversity of 
approaches.43 In antiquity, Aristotle defined emotions (pathê) in the following way: ἔστι δὲ τὰ 
πάθη δι’ ὅσα µεταβάλλοντες διαφέρουσι πρὸς τὰς κρίσεις οἷς ἕπεται λύπη καὶ ἡδονή, οἷον ὀργὴ 
                                                
38 Dixon (2012), 338. 
39 Griffiths (1997), 14. 
40 Dixon (2012), 343.   
41 Ibid.   
42 Cairns and Fulkerson (2015), 7-8. 
43 I will, however, discuss basic working definitions of envy and jealousy below (see p. 23). 
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ἔλεος φόβος καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τοιαῦτα, καὶ τὰ τούτοις ἐναντία (The emotions are the things on 
account of which men change and differ in their judgments [and] that are accompanied by pain 
and pleasure, such as anger, pity, fear, and all other such things, as well as their opposites, Rh. 
1378a19-22).44 In his (modern) philosophical study, Peter Goldie defines an emotion as “a 
complex state, relatively more enduring than an emotional episode, which itself includes various 
past episodes of emotional experience, as well as various sorts of disposition to think, feel, and 
act, all of which can dynamically interweave and interact.”45 Psychologists Stanley Schacter and 
Jerome Singer conclude that “emotional states may be considered a function of a state of 
physiological arousal and of a cognition appropriate to this state of arousal.”46 
 The bipartite nature of Schachter and Singer’s definition in particular points to yet 
another reason why scholars have been unable to agree on a definition: emotions can be studied 
on a variety of different levels, and accordingly, it is difficult to incorporate all of these 
approaches into a single definition. On the biological level, emotions have to do with the limbic 
system and the amygdala in particular, but we do not need a scientific background to observe the 
physiological side of emotions, such as a racing heart, rapid breathing, sweating, or flushed 
cheeks. On the psychological level, emotions involve cognition and evaluation, and on the 
sociological, the norms and expectations of the society around us. This study will be more 
concerned with the psychological and sociological aspects of envy and jealousy, although I 
certainly do not intend to suggest that other approaches are less useful. It would simply be 
impossible in a study of this sort to do justice to them all, especially given the nature of the 
evidence we have from the ancient world.   
                                                
44 The importance of cognition to Aristotle’s definition will be discussed below (p. 16-17). 
45 Goldie (2000), 11. 
46 Schachter and Singer (1962), 20. 
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 William James advanced one of the earliest modern theories of emotion in 1884, when he 
published an article entitled “What is an emotion?” Although quickly rebutted, it established a 
firm stance against which others could react, and in doing so, it indirectly laid the foundations for 
appraisal theory. James, who trained to be a physician but later became a philosopher, argued 
that emotions and the perception of the physiological disturbances resulting from our awareness 
of an “exciting fact” in our surrounding environment are one and the same.47 Thus we feel sad 
because we cry; we do not cry because we are sad. Moreover, James posited that every living 
creature is predisposed or essentially programmed to react in predictable ways to certain stimuli, 
which suggests that he believed emotions to be universal. For example, he wrote, “No woman 
can see a handsome little naked baby without delight.”48 James later collaborated with a Danish 
psychologist, C. G. Lange, whose work was similar, and the theory became known as the James-
Lange theory.49 Criticism was swift and diverse in the following years: it did not clearly 
delineate between emotions and non-emotions, it failed to explain how to distinguish among and 
identify emotions (an accelerated pulse, for example, is not specific to only one emotion), it 
overlooked the role of cognition, etc.50 While the James-Lange theory certainly has significant 
issues, parts of it, such as the idea that emotions have a certain basis in physiology, have 
continued to influence modern theories.51 
 In contrast to the James-Lange theory of emotion, appraisal theory, which increased in 
prominence starting in the 1960s with the work of Magda Arnold, holds that emotions are 
typically elicited by an appraisal or evaluation. These appraisals need not be prolonged or even 
                                                
47 James (1984), 128. 
48 Idem, 130. 
49 Calhoun and Solomon (1984), 125. 
50 Dixon (2012), 342. 
51 Cf. Schachter and Singer’s definition above, p. 13. 
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deliberate; in fact, in many cases, they are instantaneous and subconscious.52 One of the most 
significant advantages of appraisal theory is its ability to explain variations among collective 
cultural responses and among individual responses to the same event (as well as variations 
among a particular person’s responses to a given event but at different points in time) by pointing 
to different underlying appraisals of the event.53 Whereas James believed that humans (and in 
fact, all creatures) tend to respond to stimuli in predictable ways, appraisal theory maintains that 
it is our evaluation of events rather than events themselves that prompt emotional responses, and 
because evaluations can vary widely (based on value systems, personal experiences, etc.), there 
are very few one-to-one correspondences by which we can anticipate an exact emotional 
response from a given situation.54 Moreover, it is important to note that appraisals can happen on 
both automatic, unconscious levels and on deliberate, conscious levels. Multiple appraisals can 
occur simultaneously, and it is sometimes the case that when a person’s emotional response 
seems maladaptive or irrational, multiple conflicting appraisals are at work.55 In this way, 
appraisal theory also has an advantage over motivational theories of emotion, which posit that 
emotions are designed to further a person’s interests and therefore can be started and stopped at 
will, but which cannot satisfactorily explain the erratic or compulsory aspects of emotions.56  
There is a general consensus among modern proponents of appraisal theory that 
appraisal-emotion relationships are universal: if a person interprets a situation in a certain way, 
he or she will feel the emotion that is universally associated with that interpretation.57 This does 
not, however, mean that emotions themselves are universal (as discussed above), since the same 
                                                
52 Eidinow (2016), 87. 
53 Roseman and Smith (2001), 4. 
54 Idem, 6. 
55 Idem, 9. 
56 Idem, 5. 
57 Idem, 18. 
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set of eliciting conditions will not necessarily trigger the same emotion(s) in peoples of all 
cultures and times. Just as different situations can lead to the same appraisal (e.g., many different 
situations can prompt us to feel that we have been slighted), different people can have different 
appraisals of the same situation (e.g., one person may feel slighted in a given situation, while 
another may not). The relationship between the appraisal and the emotion is predictable (e.g., if 
we consider ourselves slighted, we typically experience anger), but the relationship between the 
situation and the appraisal is less predictable. Thus, while appraisal theory expects appraisal-
emotion relationships, it allows for and helps explain cultural and personal differences in 
emotional experience. For example, upon hearing news of the passing of a loved one, individuals 
may experience emotions in different combinations or to a different degree based on their own or 
their society’s beliefs (i.e. their evaluations) about death and the afterlife. Death is universal, but 
beliefs about and reactions to it are not.58 
While appraisal theory has gained momentum over the past few decades, its origins far 
predate the twentieth century. Richard Lazarus, a leading psychologist who helped to advance 
appraisal theory in the second half of the twentieth century, described Aristotle’s approach to 
emotions as more or less compatible with appraisal theory.59 Aristotle viewed judgments and 
beliefs as fundamental to emotions, which he conceived of as responses to our own 
interpretations of the external world.60 For example, according to Aristotle, anger is a longing for 
revenge on account of an insult that is undeserved, but if a man thinks he has been wronged 
justly, he does not feel anger (Rh. 1378a30-32; 1380b16-18). In order to distinguish whether the 
                                                
58 For a more comprehensive overview of the theories mentioned here, including the work of Darwin, Ekman, James, 
Arnold, and others, see Eidinow (2016), 80-101. 
59 Konstan (2006), 21. 
60 Idem, xii, 27. 
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insult is warranted, he must make a judgment; thus he cannot feel anger without judgment.61 
Aristotle was not alone in antiquity in regarding mental processes as a key determinant of 
emotions. The Epicureans thought that pathê had a basis in one’s beliefs, and that these beliefs 
could be true or false, personal or socially conditioned.62 Since the beliefs upon which these 
emotions were built could in fact be valid, the Epicureans admitted that some emotions in some 
cases could be appropriate.63 The Stoics, however, rejected all emotions. They believed that 
pathê were impulses (hormai) to which people could choose to yield, but that once initiated, they 
tended to obscure reason.64 In accordance with these ancient views regarding emotions and 
cognition, the present study is predicated upon the tenets of appraisal theory. Indeed, if emotions 
were as straightforward and predictable as James’ argument about predispositions indicates that 
they are, studying the emotions of another culture would be far less interesting, since they would 
be identical to our own. 
 
4. Limits and difficulties of studying emotions 
 
In addition to the difficulties introduced by the lack of an agreed-upon definition of the 
term “emotion” and the history of various competing theories, there are several other factors that 
complicate the study of emotions (both ancient and modern) in general and the study of envy and 
jealousy in particular that deserve mention and consideration. First, we do not have any 
unfiltered or unmediated material, and this is true for the study of emotions in any given time 
period. Even in firsthand accounts such as diaries or autobiographies, authors shape the 
expression of their feelings in accordance with (or at least with awareness of) cultural norms and 
                                                
61 Fortenbaugh (1975), 14.  
62 Konstan (2006), 32. 
63 Caston (2012), 8.  
64 Idem, 7; Konstan (2006), 69. 
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personal ideas about how they want to represent themselves, and they may be doing this 
subconsciously, if not consciously.65 But such firsthand accounts are relatively uncommon in 
ancient Greek literature, and what we do have should be treated with just as much care and 
caution as firsthand accounts, if not more. For example, certain texts may be prescriptive rather 
than descriptive: they set out the emotional ideals or rules of a society, which do not necessarily 
reflect the actual emotional experiences of the people within that society.66 This is particularly 
important to keep in mind when studying Plato and Aristotle, whose writings have great value 
for those studying ancient Greek emotions, but whose views at times seem to diverge from those 
of their contemporaries and/or predecessors.67  
Another difficulty of studying emotions that affects scholars of antiquity and modernity 
alike is the tendency of emotions to occur in clusters rather than individually, which complicates 
the identification of the various emotions at work.68 A perfect example of this is Achilles’ feud 
with Agamemnon in the Iliad. We should not expect a conflict that spans the better part of an 
entire epic poem to boil down to a single emotion, and indeed it involves many: jealousy (after 
Agamemnon threatens to take Briseis but before he follows through), envy (after he does), pride, 
anger, contempt, etc.69 In some instances, it may be beyond our reach to identify the precise 
combination of emotions that someone is experiencing. This clustering tendency does, however, 
enable us to study constellations of related emotions and to learn to look for one where its 
associates appear.   
                                                
65 Cairns and Fulkerson (2015), 8; Matt (2014), 44. 
66 Matt (2014), 45. 
67 Konstan (2006), xi. Aristotle’s beliefs about envy, jealousy, and tyranny will be discussed in Chapter 5 (see p. 
165-82). 
68 Ben-Ze’ev (2000), 4.  
69 For more about the conflict between Achilles and Agamemnon, see p. 48-50). 
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Envy and jealousy in particular can also be challenging to identify on account of the 
social taboo surrounding them. As we will see, many instances of envy and jealousy do not 
contain any mention of these emotions by name. As an argument from silence, this fact alone 
cannot prove that the ancient Greeks were reluctant to admit to feelings of envy and jealousy, but 
when coupled with evidence from Attic oratory, a clear picture of this stigma emerges. Roughly 
seventy percent of phthon- words in the extant speeches of Athenian orators can be classified as 
accusations, repudiations, or exhortations against phthonos.70 The ancient Greeks considered 
these emotions detrimental and potentially dangerous, as well as just plain unbecoming. As for 
the idea of being unbecoming, we need only look to our society. In modern times, the idea exists 
that individuals who are prone to envy and jealousy are insecure, which is generally agreed to be 
a negative attribute. While psychological research has not been able to prove that there is a 
substantial positive correlation between these emotions and low self-esteem, the belief persists, 
reinforced especially in works of fiction.71 On account of such associations, people typically do 
not confess feelings of envy and jealousy readily, and sometimes they are even slow to admit to 
themselves that what they are feeling might be envy or jealousy. 
The negative characterization of envy and jealousy helps explain why there are so few 
firsthand admissions of such sentiments in Greek literature, and this paucity highlights a crucial 
reason why scholars who are interested in studying these emotions must go beyond a purely 
lexical approach. If we were to pay attention only to the instances in which words such as 
phthonos or zêlos appear, we would pass over many scenarios in which these emotions are 
clearly described but not explicitly named, and we would emerge with a very limited view of 
                                                
70 More specifically, ninety-eight out of 139 appearances are accusations, repudiations, or exhortations against 
phthonos (Sanders 2014, 82). 
71 Ben-Ze’ev (2000), 286-87. Indeed, it is not necessarily true that a jealous person must also be insecure. While 
some feel jealousy because they are insecure, others feel it simply because it feels good to be recognized as being 
special in some way (i.e. by having a special relationship with another person) (Farrell 1980, 552). 
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ancient Greeks’ attitudes toward and experiences with envy and jealousy. Lexical studies are 
indeed helpful as a starting point, and they can also provide us with interesting statistical 
information (such as the classification of phthon- words in oratory, mentioned above), but we 
cannot rely on them alone if we wish to gain the fullest possible understanding.  
We must also be careful not to take the absence or relative scarcity of a word to mean that 
the concept itself was unknown or foreign, a conclusion to which a lexical approach can 
sometimes contribute. For example, Konstan has explained the lack of a Greek word 
corresponding to our notion of pride, namely, pleasure in one’s accomplishments (or the 
accomplishments of one’s close friends or family), by arguing that the ancient Greeks did not 
have such a sentiment.72 Cairns agrees that no such term exists, but he argues that the 
phenomenon itself did, pointing to the example of Achilles’ ghost in the Odyssey, who delights 
in Odysseus’ report of his son’s deeds at Troy (11.538-40).73 Another illustration of why we 
should not expect the existence of a term to prove the existence of a concept is that of 
schadenfreude. Originally a German word, it has been absorbed into multiple other languages 
precisely because speakers of those languages recognized it as a familiar phenomenon. Thus it 
would be inaccurate to say that prior to the introduction of the word into their own language, 
non-German speakers had no concept of taking pleasure in another’s misfortune. 
In contrast to a purely lexical approach, which would cause us to pass over many cases in 
which specific terms are not present, a script-based approach enables us to see more clearly the 
range of emotional experiences that appear in the texts of other languages. Scripts are simply 
descriptions of situations that are commonly associated with a particular term.74 Since these 
descriptions consist of general appraisals of situations, they are inherently cognitive in nature, 
                                                
72 Konstan (2006), 90. 
73 Cairns (2008), 56-57. 
74 Idem, 46. 
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which is in keeping with the emphasis that appraisal theory places on cognition.75 For the present 
study, I have employed a lexical approach in the initial stages of examining texts, but overall, I 
rely more extensively on scripts (which have in turn been generated by analyzing examples that 
contain specific emotion terms). 
As mentioned above, another advantage of using a script-based approach is that it helps 
us minimize the transfer of our own culture’s associations with a particular term.76 There are few 
(if any) emotions for which there is a perfect one-to-one correspondence between our English 
terms and ancient Greek terms (or in fact, terms in any other language).77 Nevertheless, it is only 
natural to impart our own connotations of an English word to a word in another language that 
appears to be more or less equivalent, but this can be misleading. For example, the prototypical 
scenario for jealousy among modern English speakers is one of romantic or sexual jealousy, but 
obviously not every case of jealousy is of this nature.78 Someone who is upset at the prospect of 
losing his or her dominance in a given field to an up-and-coming colleague can be described as 
jealous, and by referring to the appropriate script (“jealous of my position”), we can avoid 
confusion regarding the nature of the case at hand and clarify that there is no romantic or sexual 
element involved.79 
Despite the challenges and caveats of studying emotions, there is still much that we can 
learn, and these difficulties can actually function as somewhat of a roadmap, helping to keep us 
going in the right direction. The fact that we have no raw, unfiltered data serves as a reminder to 
think critically about expressions of emotion and to explore the possibility of ulterior motives or 
attempts at self-fashioning. The tendency of emotions to occur in clusters means that we can 
                                                
75 Kaster (2005), 8-9. 
76 Wierzbicka (1999) 272. 
77 Kaster (2005), 7; Konstan (2006), 16. 
78 Ben-Ze’ev (2000), 290. 
79 “Jealous of my position” is one of the scripts identified by Sanders (2014, 39). 
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identify families or related groups of emotions; then, when one of these emotions appears, we 
will be prepared to discern others, even if not referred to by name. The reluctance to admit to 
feeling certain negative emotions highlights the inadequacy of the lexical approach, thus 
encouraging us to dig deeper. Mixing together the study of emotions and the study of literature 
may not be the most straightforward endeavor, but it will assuredly enrich our understanding of 
ancient Greek society.  
 
5. Envy and jealousy 
 
Before going into more detail about the nature of envy and jealousy, I would like to 
address briefly the idea that emotions constitute prototypical categories, rather than binary ones. 
As we have already seen, there is no simple definition of what an emotion is, and similarly, there 
is no simple definition of any particular emotion, although that is precisely what I will attempt to 
provide in what follows. What we refer to as “happiness,” “anger,” or “grief” has any number of 
different appearances and manifestations, and it is difficult, if not impossible, to boil all of those 
down into a single description or set of diagnostic criteria. Certain categories are binary, or all-
or-nothing: for instance, either you are a first-born child or you are not a first-born child, either 
you are Rh positive or Rh negative, either you are a college graduate or you are not a college 
graduate, etc. Emotions, however, represent prototypical categories, which are far more flexible, 
and membership is determined by the degree of similarity to a central (or prototypical) case.80 
For this reason, in my general treatment of the nature of envy and jealousy, I will make abundant 
use of words such as “typically,” “usually,” and “often.” We will undoubtedly encounter cases 
that do not fit our basic working definitions but that fall under the headings of envy or jealousy 
nevertheless.  
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In everyday speech, many people use the English terms “envy” and “jealousy” more or 
less synonymously.81 My usage of these terms, however, denotes two different (albeit closely 
related) emotions, and I adhere to the basic definitions set out in Ed Sanders’ Envy and Jealousy 
in Classical Athens: A Socio-Psychological Approach. Sanders identifies three requisite 
conditions for each. Envy occurs when a person judges that 1) someone else has a certain 
possession or quality; 2) the person him or herself does not have this same possession or quality; 
and 3) this situation is wrong.82 Jealousy occurs when a person judges that 1) he or she has an 
exclusive relationship with a certain other person or possession; 2) he or she is at risk of losing 
either that exclusivity or the entire relationship; and 3) that risk stems from the existence (or 
perceived existence) of a rival for that other person or possession.83  
A few additional notes about the nature of envy and the nature of jealousy are necessary. 
Envy is rooted in social comparison.84 People are more likely to envy those whom they consider 
peers or to whom they are in some way similar, because social comparison arises more naturally 
with them and they are of greater emotional significance.85 Of course, it is possible to feel envy 
toward anyone, especially since envy arises on account of the subject’s own perception of 
grounds for comparison between him or herself and the other person.86 This social comparison 
and the involvement of another person are two of the primary factors that set envy apart from 
greed or covetousness: while greed and covetousness are focused on gaining something desirable, 
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83 Idem, 26. 
84 Ben-Ze’ev (2000), 284. 
85 Idem, 285; Sanders (2014), 15.  
86 Indeed, the Greek commonplace that constituents feel envy toward their ruler shows that envy can transcend the 
limits of one’s peer group. This in turn suggests that such constituents may perceive an innate similarity among all 
humans that the elevation of an individual to the status of ruler cannot erase, and this similarity provides the grounds 
for comparison and thus for feeling envy. Along similar lines, Cairns notes that people can still feel a strong 
conviction that equality is possible, even when objectively, there is a significant disparity between themselves and 
the person toward whom their envy is directed (2003, 240).  
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envy necessarily involves a person who has something desirable.87 We can, however, 
differentiate between two categories of envy, depending on whether one’s ultimate goal is to 
acquire the desired possession or quality oneself or to deprive the person toward whom envy is 
directed of that possession or quality. Sanders calls the former scenario “covetous envy” and the 
latter “begrudging envy.”88 While helpful, these labels suggest more of a binary classification 
than a spectrum. I will at times make use of these labels for clarification purposes, but it is 
important to recognize both that these objectives (i.e. the desire to acquire and the desire to 
deprive another) can coexist and that in any given case, the English term “envy” on its own does 
not specify which (if either) objective is dominant.  
An additional qualification about envy will again make clear the judiciousness of 
regarding emotions as representing prototypical rather than binary categories. If an uninvolved 
and unbiased third party should judge the situation and come to the same conclusion (i.e. that the 
disparity between the two people is wrong) as the person experiencing envy, it ceases to be 
(purely) envy, but rather, it shades into indignation.89 In the modern sense of the word, 
indignation represents a sort of anger about the breach of social norms or values.90 This goes 
back to Aristotle’s distinction between indignation (to nemesan) and envy (phthonos): according 
to Aristotle, indignation is the pain we feel at seeing someone succeed who does not deserve it 
(Rh. 1386b9-11), whereas envy has no regard for issues of merit (Rh. 1386b16-20).91  
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90 Ibid. 
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In the modern English understanding of jealousy, the focus is typically animate: a person 
is concerned about the possibility of losing a special relationship with another person.92 It is, 
however, entirely possible to be jealous over inanimate entities as well, and this is not 
uncommon in Greek literature. In the example mentioned above in which someone is “jealous of 
my position” and fears losing his or her dominance in a given field, the focus (namely, an 
exclusive reputation) is not animate.93 Indeed, this is by far the most common type of jealousy 
that sole rulers exhibit in Greek literature. On the other hand, jealousy over a person does not 
need to be romantic or sexual in nature, although this is precisely the type of jealousy that many 
English speakers imagine when they come across the word “jealousy.”94 It is also important to 
emphasize that the rival party, the third requisite condition for jealousy, can be real, imagined, or 
hypothetical.95 The crux of the matter is whether an individual is concerned about and afraid of 
losing something or someone to a possible rival. A person may feel jealous if he or she suspects 
that his or her spouse has been unfaithful; the feeling of jealousy is real, regardless of whether 
that romantic rival is. Conversely, if a person’s spouse is having an affair but he or she is 
completely unaware of it, he or she will not feel jealousy. Jealousy involves a rival of some sort, 
but that rival does not need to be real or specific. Even the focus in jealousy need not be real: a 
person can easily imagine that he or she has a special relationship with someone (or that he or 
she has a special reputation, etc.) that is objectively nonexistent.96  
                                                
92 Ben-Ze’ev (2000), 291. I am using the term “focus” to mean the desirable thing or person concerning which envy 
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jealousy (for which I will use the term “object”). 
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the emotion from being considered jealousy.   
94 Goldie (2000), 224; Ben-Ze’ev (2000), 290.  
95 Goldie (2000), 225. 
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As mentioned above, envy has an element of social comparison at its core. Even so, envy 
does not necessarily involve actual competition.97 For example, people may envy a king for his 
riches, but they cannot hope to contend with him in any concrete way. Jealousy, on the other 
hand, is concerned with competition and the fear of loss to a rival; in many cases, it is an 
emotion felt more personally or more intensely than envy.98 While people may envy a king for 
his riches, they will not take it personally when they (inevitably) fail to acquire equal riches or to 
deprive the king of his wealth. If, however, a king takes an interest in someone’s significant 
other, it will most likely affect him or her in a very personal way, giving rise to jealousy. Such 
was the case for Aristogeiton after Hipparchus, brother of the tyrant Hippias, made known his 
interest in Harmodius, according to Thucydides (6.54.2-3).99  
Moreover, envy and jealousy often differ in terms of the specificity of the focus. With 
envy (and especially with covetous envy), the issue at hand is the perception of our relative 
inferiority to another; our concern is often less about the specifics of the focus in question, since 
in many cases, we would be content if we should acquire something comparable, even if we do 
not acquire that particular one.100 For example, if a man envies his neighbor for the new car he 
bought, he does not necessarily want his neighbor’s car, but rather, a comparable car of his own. 
With jealousy, however, our concern is very much about a particular focus, and in many cases, 
we would not be wholly satisfied with a replacement. If a woman is jealous because she suspects 
that her beloved husband is having an affair with another woman, she will not likely be appeased 
by the introduction of a new man who pays special attention to her. 
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Another commonly cited difference between envy and jealousy is the number of involved 
parties: envy is a typically two-party emotion (A envies B), whereas jealousy is typically a three-
party emotion (A is jealous because A is concerned about losing B to C).101 This characterization 
breaks down somewhat in various cases; for example, do we still consider jealousy a three-party 
emotion if B is not an actual person? In such a case, perhaps it would be more accurate to 
describe it simply as a triangular relationship.102 Moreover, as stated above, the rival (and 
sometimes even the relationship with the focus) in jealousy can be imagined, and it is for this 
reason that Goldie prefers to view jealousy as “directed towards a narrative—a sequence of 
events—which can be perceived, remembered, or imagined by the jealous person, and which 
includes lover and rival, and possibly the jealous person as well.”103 The distinction between the 
two emotions based on the number of involved parties is not entirely dependable, but it does 
nevertheless illustrate an obvious difference between prototypical cases. While it is possible to 
feel envy toward a person because of another person (perhaps, for example, you envy your friend 
because he or she has a significant other and you do not) and it is possible to feel jealousy over 
something inanimate, the prototypical case of envy has something inanimate as its focus and the 
prototypical case of jealousy has a person as its focus. As mentioned above, however, given the 
nature of this study and its focus on the political realm, most of the cases of jealousy that we will 
see can be categorized as “jealous of my position,” and as such, the focus is inanimate (and 
abstract): power or rule. 
While envy and jealousy differ in these ways, they are nevertheless more similar than 
dissimilar. Both are considered complex or blended emotions, and although scholars disagree 
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about the exact components, there is a significant amount of overlap in the suggestions for each, 
including covetousness, admiration, hostility, anger, and resentment.104 Envy and jealousy both 
point to a similar emotional state, namely, an elevated concern about what one has, especially in 
relation to what others have, focused either on the desire for gain (or for another’s loss, in the 
case of begrudging envy) or the fear of loss.105 It is in part on account of their similarities and 
their ability to occur simultaneously that English speakers often conflate the terms, using them as 
synonyms. The close association between the two is hardly unique among English speakers; for 
instance, phthonos too can be used to indicate envy in one context and jealousy in another, or 
even a blend of the two.  
 
6. Existing scholarship 
 
The three most extensive treatments of envy and jealousy in Greek literature are Peter 
Walcot’s Envy and the Greeks: A Study of Human Behavior (1978), David Konstan and N. Keith 
Rutter’s Envy, Spite and Jealousy: The Rivalrous Emotions (2003), and Ed Sanders’ Envy and 
Jealousy in Classical Athens: A Socio-Psychological Approach (2014). Walcot provides an 
overview of envy in Greek literature that spans over a millennium, from Homer to Boethius, and 
sheds light on many important points about envy, such as that the Greeks believed that men were 
naturally envious and that envy is inextricably linked to honor.106 With over a millennium to 
cover in just over one hundred pages, however, Walcot’s study does not go into as much detail as 
one might hope. For instance, he does not include quotations in the original language. Moreover, 
his explanation that phthonos is typically translated as “envy” and zêlos as “jealousy” and that 
the two function in more or less the same way that their English counterparts do is appealing yet 
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105 Idem, 29; Ben-Ze’ev (2000), 281.  
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ultimately too simplistic.107 Subsequent scholarship has emphasized that it is a rare case indeed 
when two emotion terms in different languages map precisely onto one another.108 Nevertheless, 
Walcot’s work identifies key passages and astutely calls attention to the central role envy plays 
in the social interactions of the ancient Greeks. 
Originating from a conference in 2001, Konstan and Rutter’s edited volume explores the 
“rivalrous emotions” of envy, spite, and jealousy in mostly author-based and genre-based studies. 
As is the case with many edited volumes, this volume has no central thesis and there are certain 
differences in approach, but it nevertheless represents a substantial advancement in our 
understanding of these emotions in Greek literature. Most significant for the present study are 
Simon Goldhill and Thomas Harrison’s contributions on tragedy and Herodotus, respectively. 
Goldhill finds that while envy and jealousy often enter into the rhetoric of explaining other 
characters’ actions in tragedy, they do not drive the plot or pervade the action.109 In contrast, 
Harrison argues that envy is the principal motivating force of historical action in Herodotus’ 
Histories, when interpreted to include both the desire for tyranny and imperial expansion as well 
as the more routine agonistic rivalry of the Athenians.110 Homer is almost entirely absent from 
this volume, however, and one contributor even comments on the dearth of references to envy in 
Homer’s works.111 Nevertheless, Homer’s epics have much to tell us about the range of scenarios 
involving envy and jealousy in ancient Greece. We ought not to let the relative scarcity of 
explicit terminology denoting envy and jealousy in Homeric texts convince us otherwise.  
Sanders’ Envy and Jealousy in Classical Athens: A Socio-Psychological Approach relies 
heavily on the use of scripts to remedy the limitations of a lexical approach. He identifies twelve 
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different scripts for phthonos and five for zêlos, concluding that phthonos represents nearly all 
the English scripts for both envy and jealousy and is thus by far the most important Greek 
emotion term corresponding to English envy and jealousy.112 While certainly illuminating, this 
level of complexity and differentiation can, however, become more of a hindrance than a help. In 
some cases, I believe it is counterproductive to try to identify one particular script as the “correct” 
one, since envy and jealousy are complex emotions and it seems likely that many situations 
involve more than one of these scripts. Sanders’ contribution to our understanding of how the 
ancient Greeks experienced these emotions is undoubtedly significant—his observation that envy 
and jealousy are not only often suppressed but also transmuted and disguised is especially 
striking—but by limiting his focus to Athenian authors of the classical period (and by not 
including a conclusion), he provides ample opportunity for others to build upon his work.113  
 Numerous other books have laid a foundation for and called attention to the study of 
ancient emotions, both in general and regarding particular emotions. N. R. E. Fisher’s Hybris: A 
Study in the Values of Honour and Shame (1992) and Douglas Cairns’ Aidos: The Psychology 
and Ethics of Honour and Shame in Ancient Greek Literature (1993) are prime examples of in-
depth terminological-based studies focused on concepts of emotional import; as the titles 
emphasize, both of these concepts are intimately entwined with honor (and dishonor), with 
which envy and jealousy also have a close relationship. Shortly after editing the volume on 
rivalrous emotions, Konstan published The Emotions of the Ancient Greeks: Studies in Aristotle 
and Greek Literature (2006), which remains the most comprehensive treatment of ancient Greek 
emotions thus far. Konstan provides an overview of the development of various theories of 
emotion, including Darwin’s initial claim that certain expressions were universal and functioned 
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to communicate with other members of one’s community, Ekman’s expansion upon Darwin’s 
work, Wierzbicka’s critique of Ekman’s theories, and the emergence of modern appraisal 
theory.114 Taking Aristotle as his starting point for discussion of each emotion, Konstan 
acknowledges where Aristotle’s definitions diverge from his predecessors and contemporaries. 
One may wonder, however, whether it is prudent to assume a later author’s texts as a benchmark 
against which to measure those of earlier authors, thus allowing them to influence our 
interpretation of earlier works, or whether it might be better to proceed chronologically and then 
evaluate the question of consistency between earlier and later writers afterward. 
On the Roman side, Robert Kaster’s Emotion, Restraint, and Community in Ancient 
Rome (2005) is innovative in its application of the script-based approach within the field of 
classics, pointing out once again the shortcomings of a purely lexical approach. Ruth Caston’s 
The Elegiac Passion: Jealousy in Roman Love Elegy (2012) examines jealousy in a very 
different context than the one the present study aims to explore, but her methodology and her 
findings about elegiac jealousy are nevertheless relevant and instructive. For instance, she too 
cautions against adopting an exclusively lexical approach and she suggests that we instead pay 
close attention to references to related emotions, since jealousy has a tendency to go unnamed, 
especially in the early stages before it has been fully recognized.115  
 
7. Outline of chapters  
 
This chapter has laid the groundwork for the subsequent examination of primary source 
material by providing an overview of the study of emotions as it relates to the ancient Greek 
world. In sum, the present work is predicated upon the idea that emotions are not universal but 
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are culturally and socially conditioned, which appraisal theory both accommodates and explains. 
Moreover, we cannot assume that our modern English terms “envy” and “jealousy” correspond 
precisely to the ancient Greek terms phthonos and zêlos, and so in order to minimize cultural 
interference, I will make use of various scripts. My overall approach, however, is a combination 
of lexical and script-based approaches, which I believe will enable us to maximize our 
understanding of Greek attitudes toward envy, jealousy, and rulership, despite the inherent 
challenges of studying emotions. 
 The second chapter surveys passages in the texts of Homer, the Homeric Hymns, and 
Hesiod that relate to envy and jealousy, both with and without the involvement of ruling figures. 
In epic, envy and jealousy are depicted as primarily negative emotions that can have damaging 
consequences for both those who feel them and those toward whom they are directed, although 
in his discussion of the two types of Eris, Hesiod makes an unusual case for the potential benefits 
of envy in the economic sphere. These authors also shed light on the intimate relationship 
between envy, jealousy, and honor, as well as the fact that anyone can succumb to these 
emotions: gods, goddesses, men, women, etc. The third chapter covers the tragedies of Sophocles, 
with special emphasis on the power struggles and perceived threats to rulership seen in the 
Theban plays. Envy and jealousy may not constitute the primary catalyst for action, but they 
certainly influence the direction the tragedies take. These emotions contribute in a significant 
way to the characterization of several rulers; moreover, they at times account for their behavior 
at critical junctures. The fourth chapter examines envy, jealousy, and one-man rule in Herodotus’ 
Histories, which is replete with accounts of sole rulers (both Greek and non-Greek) and their 
actions, often paired with assessments of motivation and intent. Taken in sum together with 
Otanes’ speech in the constitutional debate, which lays bare the association between phthonos 
  33 
and tyranny, the examples of kings and tyrants who act out of envy or jealousy issue a somber 
warning about the volatility and dangers inherent in one-man rule. Herodotus also provides a 
striking picture of divine phthonos, which can function as an agent for reestablishing justice in 
the case of especially arrogant individuals, but which is also known to strike at random, thus 
serving as a reminder of human vulnerability. The final chapter assesses how Plato and 
Aristotle’s fourth-century depictions of envy and jealousy compare with those found in earlier 
texts, in addition to drawing conclusions from the preceding chapters. 
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CHAPTER 2: HOMER AND HESIOD 
 
 
Our exploration of the relationships between the emotions of envy and jealousy and sole 
rulership begins, as many studies do, with Homer, the Homeric Hymns, and Hesiod. At the 
estimated time of the composition of the Iliad and the Odyssey in the second half of the eighth 
century, the word turannos (and cognates) had not yet entered the Greek language, as the first 
known occurrence appears in the poetry of Archilochus in the middle of the seventh century.1 
Nevertheless, Homer’s texts offer insight into the diversity of scenarios in which envy and/or 
jealousy emerge, both in relation to ruling figures and in general. By casting a wide net (i.e. 
going beyond the political realm) in this early material, we will gain a fuller understanding of the 
range of these emotions’ eliciting conditions, involved parties, and manners of expression 
(including commonly associated words), which will facilitate a more fruitful study of later 
material.  
 As we will see in the texts of Homer, the Homeric Hymns, and Hesiod, envy and jealousy 
are far-reaching emotions that affect mortals and immortals alike. Mortals feel these emotions 
toward other mortals, immortals feel them toward other immortals, and immortals also feel them 
toward mortals, yet we do not find expressions of mortal envy or jealousy directed toward 
immortals, likely because these would be construed as acts of hubris. Significantly, none of the 
instances that we will examine in this chapter contain personal admissions of feeling envy or 
jealousy, but the poets nonetheless alert us to their presence in subtle ways. This absence of 
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personal admissions reinforces the idea that ancient Greeks generally considered these emotions 
to be disgraceful or even dangerous, which we can also see in various instances of anti-envy 
rhetoric. While Hesiod acknowledges that envy can be productive or beneficial in certain 
circumstances, he simultaneously hints at its potential for causing conflict. Thus the overall 
presentation of these emotions is a negative one. 
 
Part I: Homer (Iliad and Odyssey) 
 
1. Phthonein: envy- and jealousy-free cases? 
 
The first definition of phthonein listed in the LSJ is “[to] bear ill-will or malice, grudge, 
be envious or jealous.” The verb also has a secondary meaning of “[to] refuse from feelings of 
envy or ill-will, grudge,” as well as simply “[to] grudge, refuse to grant a thing.”2 Various 
scholars have favored this last definition in translating Homeric uses of the verb, noting that they 
have little, if any, connection to envy. Phthonein appears twice in the Iliad and seven times in the 
Odyssey, with one additional use of epiphthonein in the latter. A. F. Garvie cites these statistics 
and then states unequivocally that the verb has “nothing to do with envy in Homer.”3 Indeed, 
some instances of the verb are used with negation to indicate that someone does not object to 
something, but even in these cases, the appearance of phthonein nonetheless suggests that envy, 
jealousy, or ill-will of a related kind is a plausible reaction, albeit one that those specific 
characters do not feel.  
In Odyssey 6, Nausicaa asks her father to prepare a wagon for her so that she can go to 
the river to wash her clothes. The narrator indicates that she is too shy to name her impending 
marriage as a motive for wanting to launder her clothes, but Alcinous nevertheless understands 
                                                
2 LSJ s.v. II.1, II.2. 
3 Garvie (1994), 99. See also Steiner (2010), 159. 
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and replies, Οὔτε τοι ἡµιόνων φθονέω, τέκος, οὔτε τευ ἄλλου (“I do not deny you mules, my 
child, or anything else,” Od. 6.68).4 Alcinous is not envious of his daughter, since she does not 
have a possession or quality that he wants for himself. Moreover, he is not a jealous father; he is 
not overly possessive of his daughter or reluctant to see her married, which we see quite clearly 
in his later interactions with Odysseus. Alcinous’ response does not even suggest begrudging 
refusal (i.e. denying someone something on the grounds that it is in some way contrary to one’s 
own interests), given that he has plenty of resources and thus no logistical reason to deny his 
daughter’s request.5 He uses a negated form of phthonein to emphasize his kindness and open-
mindedness, showing that he has no reason to begrudge Nausicaa’s request, but this verb choice 
nonetheless serves as a reminder that others in his place might in fact have an emotional response 
that could lead them to object.  
When Odysseus later comes to Alcinous’ palace, he tells of his travels, but eventually he 
pauses and expresses his wish to retire for the evening. Alcinous urges him to continue, to which 
Odysseus responds, εἰ δ’ ἔτ’ ἀκουέµεναί γε λιλαίεαι, οὐκ ἂν ἐγώ γε / τούτων σοι φθονέοιµι καὶ 
οἰκτρότερ’ ἄλλ’ ἀγορεῦσαι, / κήδε’ ἐµῶν ἑτάρων (“but if you desire to hear still more, I would 
not refuse to tell you also of other, more pitiful troubles than these, those of my companions,” Od. 
11.380-82).6 Although it is possible in this case to imagine that Odysseus might exhibit 
begrudging refusal—he is, after all, weary from his trials and tribulations—he is nothing but 
polite to his host, knowing full well that the Phaeacians have much to offer him in the way of 
gifts and transport. Odysseus uses a negated form of phthonein like Alcinous does in Odyssey 6, 
showing that he does not begrudge what is asked of him. Both of these are examples of litotes; 
                                                
4 This is one of the examples cited in the LSJ as meaning “[to] grudge, refuse to grant a thing” (s.v. II.2). 
5 Begrudging refusal is one of the scripts identified by Sanders (2014, 37-38). 
6 This is the first example cited in the LSJ as meaning “[to] refuse from feelings of envy or ill-will, grudge” (s.v. 
II.1). 
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by negating the opposite of their present frame of mind, they are emphasizing their generosity of 
spirit. We ought not to characterize these situations as disassociated from envy, jealousy, or ill-
will altogether, but rather, as emphatic denials of any such sentiments. 
The compound verb epiphthonein appears in Odyssey 11, and its context appears to be 
unrelated to any emotion at first glance. The ghost of Teiresias advises Odysseus, ὅν τινα µέν κεν 
ἐᾷς νεκύων κατατεθνηώτων / αἵµατος ἆσσον ἴµεν, ὁ δέ τοι νηµερτὲς ἐνιψει· / ᾧ δέ κ᾽ 
ἐπιφθονέοις, ὁ δέ τοι πάλιν εἶσιν ὀπίσσω (“Whomever of the dead corpses you allow to go near 
the blood, he will speak unerringly: but whomever you deny, he will go back again,” Od. 11.147-
49). Epiphthonein is used here as an antonym to ean, a verb with no obvious emotional 
component, and so we might expect that epiphthonein is not intended to imply any sort of 
emotional investment in this scenario either. Clearly, however, the act of initially denying certain 
ghosts is emotionally fraught for Odysseus, especially when it comes to his mother (Od. 11.87-
89). He does not exhibit typical signs of envy, jealousy, or ill-will, but Teiresias’ use of the verb 
epiphthonein at the very least acknowledges the possibility that deciding among the ghosts could 
be more emotionally taxing than ean alone suggests. Moreover, while this is not a traditional 
case of jealousy, it does present the basic components of jealousy. Odysseus possesses a limited 
amount of sacrificial blood that will enable him to converse with ghosts. We can consider this 
opportunity to communicate to be a kind of relationship. There is a finite amount of sacrificial 
blood and there are presumably more ghosts wishing to speak to Odysseus than he can initially 
permit to drink the blood. Thus we can consider the subset of ghosts whom Odysseus prevents 
from drinking to be a rival party that poses a threat to his ability to establish a relationship with 
the privileged ghosts, and above all with Teiresias, whose advice he has come to seek. 
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 These three examples contain the strongest possible evidence for the argument that 
phthonein in Homer is devoid of any association with envy and jealousy. Even in these cases, 
however, we can still discern the potential for an element of emotion. Alcinous and Odysseus 
both couple their use of phthonein with a negation, but in doing so, they are acknowledging the 
possibility that another person in their place could easily feel and act differently. Alcinous does 
not stand in the way of his daughter’s preparation for marriage, but a more possessive father 
might; a father could also object because he does not want anyone else to handle his mules or 
simply because he wants them to be available at any moment for his own use. Odysseus 
perseveres through his weariness to continue his tale in order to please his host, but a less 
disciplined man might not put another’s desires ahead of his own. In the case of Odysseus’ 
journey through the underworld, phthonein still retains a kernel of the underlying sense of 
jealousy: when someone is jealous, he or she wants to keep and guard what is his or her own. 
The sacrificial blood is a limited resource and Odysseus cannot give it out unsparingly; his initial 
stinginess is motivated by necessity, but his outward behavior (i.e. holding the ghosts at bay with 
his sword, Od. 11.48-50) does bear resemblance to how a jealous person might act. Thus even in 
these seemingly neutral examples of phthonein, we can see that its presence suggests that an 
emotional stance is possible, despite the fact that the characters in question do not personally 
exhibit envy or jealousy. Various scholars translate negated forms of phthonein in Homeric texts 
as “to not object” or “to not mind,” but I do not believe we should be so quick to divorce the root 
meaning of the verb. 
 
  
  39 
2. Phthonein: discernible envy and jealousy 
 
In other instances of phthonein, it is difficult to deny the possibility of envy or jealousy. 
The two appearances of phthonein in the Iliad occur in the exchange between Hera and Zeus in 
Book 4. In the aftermath of Paris and Menelaus’ duel, Zeus suggests that Menelaus might take 
back Helen and depart with the Greeks, with Troy left unharmed. When Hera protests, Zeus 
cautions her that Troy is dear to him, so if Troy is to be demolished, she should not object in the 
future if he destroys a city she cherishes. Hera responds that there are three cities she holds dear 
and that Zeus can sack them if they incur his hatred. She continues, τάων οὔ τοι ἐγὼ πρόσθ’ 
ἵσταµαι οὐδὲ µεγαίρω. / εἴ περ γὰρ φθονέω τε καὶ οὐκ εἰῶ διαπέρσαι, / οὐκ ἀνύω φθονέουσ’, 
ἐπεὶ ἦ πολὺ φέρτερός ἐσσι (“I do not stand in defense of these cities and I do not begrudge [you]. 
For if I bear ill-will and do not allow you to sack them, I gain nothing by bearing ill-will, since 
you are far stronger,” Il. 4.54-56). The phthonos that Hera claims she will not feel toward Zeus if 
he sacks these cities is closer to jealousy (as it relates to Hera’s potential loss of something dear), 
but it seems likely that she already feels another sort of phthonos toward him, one that is closer 
to envy: she envies his power and influence over how events transpire. She goes on to insist that 
it would not be right if her efforts to aid the Greeks amounted to nothing, because she too is a 
god of the same pedigree as Zeus, and in addition, she is his wife (Il. 4.57-61). As noted 
previously, envy stems from social comparison.7 Hera is clearly engaging in a comparison of 
Zeus and herself: while she acknowledges that he is stronger (φέρτερός, 4.56), she points out 
they have the same lineage, which she evidently feels entitles her to a certain amount of power 
and prestige. The fact remains, however, that Zeus is preeminent among immortals, and Hera 
faces the possibility that his most beloved city may emerge triumphant, despite her best efforts. 
                                                
7 Ben-Ze’ev (2000), 284; Sanders (2014), 15. 
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Hera’s speech suggests that she feels unfairly disadvantaged (in terms of authority), which is in 
keeping with the requiste conditions of envy outlined previously.8 
Several other points in the exchange between Hera and Zeus deserve mention as well. 
First, Hera expands upon her statement that she does not hold a grudge (οὐδὲ µεγαίρω, 4.54) by 
explaining that she will not gain anything by bearing ill-will (οὐκ ἀνύω φθονέουσ’, 4.56). As she 
uses them, the verbs megairein and phthonein function more or less synonymously. Megairein 
derives from megas and thus the LSJ lists as the verb’s first definition “[to] regard as too great,” 
from which it is easy to see how the verb came to indicate the possibility of envy (“[to] grudge 
one a thing as too great for him”).9 This verb appears more frequently in Homer’s works than in 
later literature, but it is nevertheless important to be aware of its connotations of envy in order to 
evaluate its appearances with a more critical eye.10 Second, we can see the beginning of an 
association between phthonos and strife words. In the lines leading up to Hera’s response 
(quoted above), Zeus says, ἕρξον ὅπως ἐθέλεις· µὴ τοῦτό γε νεῖκος ὀπίσσω / σοὶ καὶ ἐµοὶ µέγ᾽ 
ἔρισµα µετ᾽ἀµφοτέροισι γένηται (“Do as you wish: may this quarrel not become a cause of strife 
between us later,” Il. 4.37-38).11 He then issues his warning about destroying cities dear to each 
of them. As we will see, words relating to eris are frequently suggestive of phthonos.  
In the Odyssey, phthonein appears several times in scenarios involving the suitors and 
Odysseus in his beggar’s disguise. In Odyssey 17, the suitor Antinous reproaches the swineherd 
for bringing Odysseus to the feast. Telemachus responds to Antinous by encouraging him to be 
generous and emphasizing that he does not begrudge the beggar (οὔ τοι φθονέω, Od. 17.400). In 
this interaction, phthonein is surely intended to make a point about jealousy. It is not unlikely 
                                                
8 See p. 23. 
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10 Sanders (2014), 49-50.  
11 It appears that the difference between neikos and erisma here is a matter of the intensity of feelings (Hogan 1981, 
29 note 13).  
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that the man of the house might balk at feeding another mouth, especially when his household is 
already strained by the presence of many guests. Telemachus’ use of ou phthonein puts this idea 
to rest: he is not jealously guarding his resources to avoid losing them to an unwanted third party. 
He welcomes the beggar, who is not unwanted in his view, and thus he does not begrudge him. 
More significantly, Odysseus uses phthonein twice in his response to provocation by Irus, 
an actual beggar. Irus orders Odysseus to leave before he is dragged out from the house in 
disgrace, threatening, ἀλλ᾽ ἄνα, µὴ τάχα νῶϊν ἔρις καὶ χερσὶ γένηται (“But get up, lest a quarrel 
arise quickly between us and our hands,” Od. 18.13). Irus’ language contains parallels to Zeus’ 
words to Hera in Iliad 4 (quoted above): both use negative purpose clauses and the verb 
gignesthai, and both focus on strife-related nouns (eris or erisma) in the nominative. Moreover, 
in both cases, the interlocutor’s response contains a form of phthonein. Odysseus answers Irus:  
δαιµόνι’, οὔτε τί σε ῥέζω κακὸν οὔτ’ ἀγορεύω,  
οὔτε τινὰ φθονέω δόµεναι καὶ πόλλ’ ἀνελόντα.  
οὐδὸς δ’ ἀµφοτέρους ὅδε χείσεται, οὐδέ τί σε χρὴ  
ἀλλοτρίων φθονέειν· δοκέεις δέ µοι εἶναι ἀλήτης  
ὥς περ ἐγών, ὄλβον δὲ θεοὶ µέλλουσιν ὀπάζειν. 
 
“Sir, I do not do or say anything bad to you, and I do not begrudge someone taking even 
a lot and giving it to you. This threshold will accommodate both of us, and there is no 
need for you to envy what another has: you seem to me a wanderer, like me, and the gods 
are the ones who grant prosperity.” (Od. 18.15-19) 
 
It would not be inappropriate to translate οὔτε…φθονέω (18.16) as simply “I do not object.”12 In 
all likelihood, however, its appearance here does relate to envy. Odysseus uses it with a negation 
to demonstrate that he does not feel envy, while simultaneously insinuating that a lesser man 
might feel differently: he is describing the prospect of a beggar watching another beggar receive 
a generous portion, a situation that would naturally prompt comparison and negative feelings of 
being treated unequally. The use of ou phthonein is deliberate: while Odysseus himself does not 
                                                
12 Steiner (2010), 159. Similarly, Lombardo translates, “I don’t mind” (2000, 276). 
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feel envy, his expressed lack of envy serves to highlight the fact that Irus does feel envy, thus 
characterizing him in a negative light.13 The second appearance of phthonein in this passage 
(οὐδέ τί σε χρὴ / ἀλλοτρίων φθονέειν, 18.17-18) is clearly associated with an emotional state. 
Irus is a greedy and selfish figure in whose behavior we can see an overlap of jealousy and envy: 
he is jealous in the sense that he feels entitled to exclusive begging rights at the suitors’ feasts, 
and when Odysseus’ appearance in beggarly disguise puts an end to that exclusivity, Irus feels 
envy toward Odysseus for the share he has received. While Odysseus comments that there is no 
need for Irus to feel phthonos at the prospect of sharing his turf with another beggar, Irus 
obviously does, at least in Odysseus’ reading of the situation. In sum, while it is not entirely 
incorrect to translate most instances of ou phthonein as “to not object,” there are several places 
where the question of envy or jealousy does enter into the equation, making “to not envy” or “to 
not begrudge” a more accurate rendering. In turn, such examples once again raise the question of 
whether it is advisable elsewhere to excise the root meaning of the word so completely. 
 
3. Beyond the lexical approach: envy, jealousy, and the gods 
 
With only ten appearances, phthonein is a relatively uncommon verb in the Iliad and the 
Odyssey. We would be mistaken, however, to take the small number of appearances to mean that 
envy and jealousy were not emotions with which Homeric characters were intimately familiar. 
One of the main reasons we do not find more phthon- words in Homer’s works (and in Greek 
literature in general) is that it was by and large socially unacceptable to admit to feeling phthonos, 
despite the agonistic nature of ancient Greek society.14 Accordingly, examples of people 
accusing others of exhibiting phthonos are far more common than examples of people admitting 
                                                
13 For a further discussion of the negative characterization of Irus and the parallels between his behavior and that of 
the suitors, see Levine (1982), 200-4. 
14 Sanders (2014), 5. 
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to feeling it themselves.15 Moreover, on account of the complex nature of envy and jealousy, 
individuals are sometimes slow to realize and identify that what they are feeling is, in fact, envy 
or jealousy.16 For these reasons, we must go beyond a lexical study in order to gain a fuller 
understanding. In what follows, I shall survey key passages that seem to me to contain overt 
notes of envy or jealousy but that do not have phthon- words; some of these include words that 
are often associated with phthonos, while others reveal no particular verbal clues.  
Let us begin with the gods. In Odyssey 5, Calypso gives several examples of immortals 
feeling jealousy toward other immortals. When Hermes brings a message to Calypso from Zeus, 
bidding her to send Odysseus on his way, she responds: 
Σχέτλιοί ἐστε, θεοί, ζηλήµονες ἔξοχον ἄλλων, 
οἵ τε θεαῖς ἀγάασθε παρ’ ἀνδράσιν εὐνάζεσθαι 
ἀµφαδίην, ἤν τίς τε φίλον ποιήσετ’ ἀκοίτην. 
ὣς µὲν ὅτ’ Ὠρίων’ ἕλετο ῥοδοδάκτυλος Ἠώς, 
τόφρα οἱ ἠγάασθε θεοὶ ῥεῖα ζώοντες,  
ἧος ἐν Ὀρτυγίῃ χρυσόθρονος Ἄρτεµις ἁγνὴ 
οἷς ἀγανοῖς βελέεσσιν ἐποιχοµένη κατέπεφνεν. 
ὣς δ’ ὁπότ’ Ἰασίωνι ἐϋπλόκαµος Δηµήτηρ,  
ᾧ θυµῷ εἴξασα, µίγη φιλότητι καὶ εὐνῇ 
νειῷ ἔνι τριπόλῳ· οὐδὲ δὴν ἦεν ἄπυστος 
Ζεύς, ὅς µιν κατέπεφνε βαλὼν ἀργῆτι κεραυνῷ. 
ὥς δ’ αὖ νῦν µοι ἄγασθε, θεοί, βροτὸν ἄνδρα παρεῖναι. 
 
“You are cruel, gods, jealous beyond others, you who begrudge goddesses for openly 
sleeping beside men, if she makes one her dear lover. Just as when rosy-fingered Dawn 
chose Orion, at that time you gods who live easy begrudged her, until, in Ortygia, pure, 
golden-throned Artemis attacked and slew him with gentle arrows. And just as when fair-
haired Demeter, having yielded to her desire, slept with Iasion in love and lay with him in 
a thrice-plowed field: Zeus was not without knowledge of this for long, who struck with a 
bright thunderbolt and slew him. So now you begrudge me, gods, for admitting a mortal 
man.” (Od. 5.118-29) 
 
                                                
15 Idem, 35. 
16 Caston (2012), 12. Caston has suggested that this is true of jealousy in the context of Latin literature. Given that 
there is significant overlap between the emotions of envy and jealousy, I find this idea convincing in relation to 
Greek envy as well.   
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Calypso uses forms of the verb agaasthai three times in this passage to refer to the male gods’ 
resentment of female goddesses sleeping with mortal men (5.119, 5.122, 5.129); in addition, she 
calls the gods zêlêmônes (5.118). It is difficult to find an appropriate English equivalent for 
agaasthai here, because Calypso does not actually describe what she perceives to be the exact 
motivations of the male gods for their behavior. Nevertheless, while there are various ways to 
render her use of agaasthai into English, there seems to be a general consensus that the best 
translation for zêlêmônes is “jealous.”17 Moreover, the LSJ provides only one definition for 
zêlêmôn (“jealous”), citing as an example this passage from the Odyssey.18 Indeed, the male gods 
should not be envious of the female goddesses for their relations with mortals, since the male 
gods have had plenty of their own trysts with mortals. Rather, they seem to feel that it is 
inappropriate for immortals to develop actual relationships with mortals, and perhaps they feel 
slighted in such cases because they themselves have been overlooked. In other words, the male 
gods may feel that it is their exclusive right to form relationships with the female goddesses, and 
in the examples Calypso cites, that exclusivity is being threatened, and so what they are feeling is 
jealousy. In reality, Calypso is exaggerating by comparing her situation to that of Dawn and 
Demeter, since her lover is in no danger of being killed by the gods.19 Regardless, her 
interpretation of all three scenarios sufficiently indicates that the gods are capable of (and 
perhaps even prone to) feeling jealousy toward each other.  
 The gods experience envy and jealousy not only in relation to other immortals, but also in 
relation to mortals, who make occasional references to this in passing. When Telemachus visits 
                                                
17 For comparative purposes (italics all my own): Lattimore translates, “You are hard-hearted, you gods, and jealous 
beyond all creatures beside, when you are resentful toward the goddess for sleeping openly with such men” (2007, 
91). Fagles translates, “You unrivaled lords of jealousy—scandalized when goddesses sleep with mortals” (1997, 
156). Lombardo translates, “You gods are the most jealous bastards in the universe—persecuting any goddess who 
ever openly takes a mortal lover” (2000, 73). 
18 LSJ s.v. ζηληµοσύνη.  
19 de Jong (2001), 132. 
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Sparta, Menelaus laments that he would have built a home in Argos for Odysseus after his return 
from Troy and they would have been close friends through old age, if not for a god’s 
intervention: ἀλλὰ τὰ µέν που µέλλεν ἀγάσσεσθαι θεὸς αὐτός, / ὃς κεῖνον δύστηνον ἀνόστιµον 
οἶον ἔθηκεν (“But I suppose a god himself must have begrudged him these things, who made 
only him wretched [and] without a homecoming,” Od. 4.181-82). Penelope also uses a form of 
agaasthai in reference to the gods when she is reunited with Odysseus: θεοὶ δ’ ὤπαζον ὀϊζύν, / οἳ 
νῶϊν ἀγάσαντο παρ’ ἀλλήλοισι µένοντε / ἥβης ταρπῆναι καὶ γήραος οὐδὸν ἱκέσθαι (“But the 
gods gave us suffering, who begrudged us the ability to enjoy our youth and arrive at the 
threshold of old age, all the while remaining beside each other,” Od. 23.210-12). In both of these 
cases, due to the lack of elaboration, it is difficult to categorize whether the characters perceive 
the gods to be feeling envy, jealousy, or some combination of the two. Nevertheless, mortals in 
Homer are aware of the potential for receiving negative attention from the gods on account of 
these emotions. 
 The most extended description of a Homeric god feeling envy or jealousy comes in Iliad 
7, when Poseidon complains to Zeus about the wall the Greeks are constructing. Poseidon says: 
 Ζεῦ πάτερ, ἦ ῥά τίς ἐστι βροτῶν ἐπ’ ἀπείρονα γαῖαν 
ὅς τις ἔτ’ ἀθανάτοισι νόον καὶ µῆτιν ἐνίψει; 
οὐχ ὁράᾳς ὅτι δ’ αὖτε κάρη κοµόωντες Ἀχαιοὶ 
τεῖχος ἐτειχίσσαντο νεῶν ὕπερ, ἀµφὶ δὲ τάφρον 
ἤλασαν, οὐδὲ θεοῖσι δόσαν κλειτὰς ἑκατόµβας; 
τοῦ δ’ ἤτοι κλέος ἔσται ὅσον τ’ ἐπικίδναται ἠώς· 
τοῦ δ’ ἐπιλήσονται τὸ ἐγὼ καὶ Φοῖβος Ἀπόλλων 
ἥρῳ Λαοµέδοντι πολίσσαµεν ἀθλήσαντε.20 
 
“Father Zeus, is there anyone among mortals on the boundless earth who still will tell 
their purpose and plan to the immortals? Do you not see that the long-haired Achaeans 
built a wall inland from the ships, drove a ditch around it, and did not give renowned 
                                                
20 It should be noted that Zenodotus, Aristophanes, and Aristarchus all considered this exchange between Poseidon 
and Zeus to be an interpolation. Kirk agrees that it was likely an addition by a follower of Homer (1990, 289). Even 
if this is the case, no objections have been made on the grounds that Poseidon’s complaint is somehow unbefitting of 
a god, which suggests that such behavior would have struck the ancient Greek audience as entirely plausible. 
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hecatombs to the gods? Now surely the glory of this will reach as far as dawn spreads 
over [the earth]: but people will forget the one that Phoebus Apollo and I built, toiling for 
the hero Laomedon.” (Il. 7.446-53) 
 
Poseidon begins by lamenting the alleged tendency of men to act without disclosing their 
motives to the gods, citing as an example the fact that the Greeks did not perform a sacrifice 
before beginning construction. In the ancient Greek world, the offering of sacrifices amounted to 
a signal that the involved parties did not intend to compete with the gods; in this way, they could 
avoid incurring their ill-will.21 Without this, Poseidon feels that the kleos of his and Apollo’s 
wall (and presumably his own kleos as well, by extension) is being threatened. Given that 
Poseidon ends his complaint by focusing on the renown of his wall, it seems possible that his 
objection about the lack of sacrifice could actually be an attempt to disguise the real crux of the 
issue: Poseidon views the situation as a zero-sum game and is jealous that the prominence of the 
Greeks’ wall might eclipse the fame of his own. Similar to the way in which Hera claims that she 
will not feel phthonos if Zeus destroys her beloved cities (although she probably already does 
envy him), Poseidon seems to be attempting to distance himself from being associated with 
jealousy, and he does so by starting off with an objection on the grounds of impiety.22  
Many of the scenarios involving envy or jealousy in Homer’s works derive from issues 
concerning honor, glory, and fame, which is in keeping with the fact that Homeric society was so 
agonistic and acutely preoccupied with reputation.23 We have already seen one example of the 
connection between phthonos and honor in Hera’s interactions with Zeus in Iliad 4. Hera’s 
                                                
21 Implicit in the concept of sacrifice is an acknowledgment of the hierarchy in which gods are superior to mortals. 
The act of sacrifice reaffirms this hierarchy and in doing so, indicates that mortals are aware of their place and do 
not aim to challenge that dynamic. One of the ways in which Hesiod marks the Age of Silver as inferior and remiss 
in their duties is by describing how they fail to serve the gods and make sacrifices: οὐδ᾽ ἀθανάτους θεραπεύειν / 
ἤθελον οὐδ᾽ ἔρδειν µακάρων ἱεροῖς ἐπὶ βωµοῖς, / ᾗ θέµις ἀνθρώποις κατὰ ἤθεα (they were neither willing to serve 
the gods nor to make sacrifices on the holy altars of the blessed ones, as is right for men [to do] according to custom, 
Op. 135-37). This establishes Zeus’ justification for destroying them (Op. 138-39). 
22 This is analogous to Sanders’ statement that envy is often misrepresented as a desire for justice (2014, 23). 
23 Scodel (2008), 6. 
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speech is unmarked by specific verbal cues relating to honor, but her emphasis on pedigree and 
her marriage to Zeus reveals that she is worried about her relative status: she can tolerate the idea 
of losing her favorite cities as long as Zeus loses his as well, but it would be an insult to her 
honor if his beloved Troy stands tall while her efforts to aid the Greeks amount to nothing. In the 
case of Poseidon in Iliad 7, the connection between jealousy and fame is clearer, as he complains 
about how the kleos of the Greeks’ wall will obliterate the memory of his own. The prominence 
of honor, glory, and fame (indicated by words such as timê, kleos, and kudos) in situations of 
envy and jealousy will become more evident in the next section. 
 
4. Beyond the lexical approach: envy, jealousy, and kings 
 
 Now that we have seen that Homer’s gods are capable of feeling envy and jealousy both 
toward each other and toward mortals, let us move on to envy and jealousy among men—and 
specifically cases in which kings or leaders are involved. 
In the Iliad, Thersites takes issue with kings and envies the perks of their positions. He 
infamously targets Agamemnon in Iliad 2, but the narrator also informs us that he has established 
a habit of quarreling (νεικείεσκε, Il. 2.221) with Achilles and Odysseus. Although Thersites 
briefly praises Achilles in his invective against Agamemnon, he does so only to further his point 
about the magnitude of Agamemnon’s offenses; he then promptly turns on Achilles as well, 
criticizing him for his inaction.24 The tipping point for Thersites’ ire is the booty Agamemnon 
has amassed and how that has been made possible by the toil of other men (himself included). He 
calls out, πλεῖαί τοι χαλκοῦ κλισίαι, πολλαὶ δὲ γυναῖκες / εἰσὶν ἐνὶ κλισίῃς ἐξαίρετοι, ἅς τοι 
Ἀχαιοὶ / πρωτίστῳ δίδοµεν, εὖτ’ ἂν πτολίεθρον ἕλωµεν (“Your huts are full of bronze, and there 
are many choice women in your huts, whom we Achaeans give to you first of all whenever we 
                                                
24 Kirk (1985), 142. 
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seize a city,” Il. 2.226-28). Judging from this, we can safely infer that (at least part of) what 
Thersites is feeling is envy: Agamemnon has something, Thersites does not, and Thersites feels 
that the situation is wrong, on the grounds that he has expended effort and yet that effort has 
resulted only in the enrichment of another. 
In his response to Thersites’ criticism, Odysseus warns him, ἴσχεο, µηδ᾽ ἔθελ᾽ οἶος 
ἐριζέµεναι βασιλεῦσιν (“Restrain yourself, and do not yearn to contend by yourself with kings,” 
Il. 2.247). In light of the association we have already seen between eris and situations relating to 
envy and jealousy, Odysseus’ use of the verb erizein suggests that he regards Thersites’ outburst 
as resulting from envy. The presence of oios is also interesting. While it is possible that 
Odysseus means that Thersites is outnumbered by the kings whom he insults, he could equally be 
trying to impress upon Thersites that Thersites is alone and unaided by the other soldiers, who do 
not share his disillusionment with kings or the wealth gap. The second possibility seems more 
likely, given that Odysseus elsewhere makes statements aimed at protecting kings’ positions.25 
Indeed, scholars have argued that the Iliad as a whole (as well as the Odyssey) can be read as an 
attempt to legitimize the rule of the elite.26 Thus it is not surprising to find examples of rhetoric 
that discourages competing with or envying the rich and powerful, a topic to which I will return 
in section 5 below.  
Some men, like Thersites, envy kings. Conversely, some kings feel envy and/or jealously 
guard their resouces and prestige, and Achilles is one such king. The quarrel between Achilles 
and Agamemnon involves a complex mixture of emotions—pride, anger, contempt, etc.—and it 
goes beyond the scope of the present study to examine and identify the precise role of each one 
                                                
25 Cf. Il. 2.203-6. 
26 Morris (1986), 125. 
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(if indeed such an identification is even possible).27 It seems clear enough, however, that envy is 
one of the emotions at work. The quarrel is repeatedly referred to as an eris: the narrator names it 
as such as early as line 8 of the first book. Athena also calls it an eris (1.210), and Nestor warns 
Achilles not to erizemenai with Agamemnon (1.277). I am not suggesting that in every case 
where there is eris, there is envy or jealousy, but rivalry does frequently raise the question of 
these emotions.28 Indeed, as we have seen, there are many cases in which eris words occur when 
envy or jealousy is present. 
In addition to the fact that the clash between Achilles and Agamemnon carries the name 
of eris, timê is the central issue at stake—another concept frequently associated with envy and 
jealousy. Achilles points out that he did not come to Troy in order to take vengeance on any of 
the Trojans for wronging him personally, but in order for Agamemnon to win honor for himself 
and for Menelaus (ὄφρα σὺ χαίρῃς, / τιµὴν ἀρνύµενοι Μενελάῳ σοί τε, 1.158-59). Achilles, 
however, feels dishonored (atimos, 1.171), as he has done more than his fair share of the fighting, 
yet he always comes away with far lesser prizes than Agamemnon (1.163-68). The quickness 
with which Achilles recounts this inequality after the confrontation begins suggests not only that 
he has been engaging in the sort of social comparison in which envy is rooted, but also that this 
has been a source of bitterness for quite some time. Thus, while the seizure of Briseis pushes 
Achilles to the breaking point, from Achilles’ perspective, it is only the crowning example of 
Agamemnon’s established habit of taking more than what he deserves. Despite the fact that it 
was the norm for commanders to take a greater share when sacking cities, this has nevertheless 
caused Achilles to harbor long-standing resentful and envious feelings toward Agamemnon.29 
                                                
27 For other treatments of the emotional stakes of the quarrel, see Cairns (1993), 98-103; Fisher (1992), 151-53. 
28 Sanders (2014), 54. 
29 Part of what Achilles is feeling can be categorized as indignation at Agamemnon’s decision to seize Briseis (for 
the difference between envy and indignation, see p. 24). Indeed, Nestor must agree that Agamemnon’s proposed 
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Achilles never says outright that he envies Agamemnon—which is not surprising, given 
how few figures in Greek literature make such confessions—but he exhibits trademark signs of 
envy. In Achilles’ prayer to his mother, he laments, ἦ γάρ µ᾽ Ἀτρεΐδης εὐρὺ κρείων Ἀγαµέµνων / 
ἠτίµησεν· ἑλὼν γὰρ ἔχει γἐρας, αὐτὸς ἀπούρας (“For wide-ruling Agamemnon, the son of Atreus, 
dishonored me. For he seized and now holds my prize, having taken it himself,” 1.355-56).30 
What Achilles is feeling goes beyond simple envy, for the person he envies is the one who 
caused him to be without, but nevertheless, his words point to the very definition of envy: 
Agamemnon now has something Achilles does not, and Achilles feels that this situation is wrong. 
Moreover, he identifies the crux of the matter as one of honor, which is often a central issue in 
feelings of envy.31  
Even aside from his interactions with Agamemnon, Achilles appears to be prone to 
jealousy. When he agrees to allow Patroclus to lead the Myrmidons into battle, he warns him, εἰ 
δέ κεν αὖ τοι / δώῃ κῦδος ἀρέσθαι ἐρίγδουπος πόσις Ἥρης, / µὴ σύ γ’ ἄνευθεν ἐµεῖο λιλαίεσθαι 
πολεµίζειν / Τρωσὶ φιλοπτολέµοισιν· ἀτιµότερον δέ µε θήσεις (“even if the loud-thundering 
spouse of Hera allows you to win glory, do not yearn to fight the war-loving Trojans without me: 
you will make me more dishonored,” Il. 16.87-90). The earlier part of these lines can be 
construed as a warning motivated by concern for Patroclus’ well-being, but the later part reveals 
that Achilles’ own reputation is weighing heavily upon his mind as well. This is clear from his 
use of both kudos and atimoteros. He fears that if Patroclus gets carried away and goes beyond 
                                                                                                                                                       
action is out of line, as he urges him not to take Briseis (1.275-76). But Nestor also tells Achilles to calm down and 
to stop trying to contend with a king, since kings deserve a greater part of the spoils (1.277-79). The suggestion that 
Achilles’ reaction is excessive reveals that a Greek audience would have considered some amount of it to be 
motivated by envy, rather than by indignation alone. 
30 Interestingly, despite the fact that Achilles’ words are intended for Thetis alone and presumably no one else 
overhears, Thersites repeats line 1.356 in his abuse of Agamemnon at 2.240. Thersites is clearly envious, and we can 
perhaps take his repetition of Achilles’ words as another nod (albeit a subtle one) in favor of the idea that envy is a 
contributing factor in Achilles’ quarrel with Agamemnon. 
31 It is difficult to deny the possibility that Achilles feels some amount of sexual jealousy over losing Briseis to 
Agamemnon. If present, however, this sexual jealousy certainly takes a backseat to his envy regarding honor.   
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warding off the immediate threat of Hector burning the ships, the glory Patroclus will obtain will 
come at the expense of his own, and he is jealous at the prospect of diminished glory. The 
situation is further complicated by the issue that if Patroclus should push the Trojans back well 
beyond the ships, this would signal to the Greeks that they no longer have such great need of 
Achilles.32 Achilles faces a number of complex considerations in deciding whether to allow 
Patroclus to fight, but nonetheless it seems likely that jealousy over Patroclus’ glory relative to 
his own is an important contributing factor. 
The prospect of glory again looms large as Achilles chases down Hector, and the narrator 
describes the situation: λαοῖσιν δ’ ἀνένευε καρήατι δῖος Ἀχιλλεύς, / οὐδ’ ἔα ἱέµεναι ἐπὶ Ἕκτορι 
πικρὰ βέλεµνα, / µή τις κῦδος ἄροιτο βαλών, ὃ δὲ δεύτερος ἔλθοι (But god-like Achilles was 
shaking his head at the soldiers, and he would not allow them to hurl sharp javelins at Hector, 
lest someone win glory from his throw and Achilles come second, Il. 22.205-7).33 Achilles feels 
that it is his exclusive right to do battle with and kill Hector, and he cannot tolerate a Greek rival 
for the glory attached to defeating Hector. Few would argue that Achilles’ desire to avenge 
Patroclus by killing Hector personally is unjustified or inappropriate, but this instance 
nevertheless reinforces the idea that Achilles is widely and jealously preoccupied with his own 
glory. Together with Achilles’ own words several hundred lines earlier, rebuking Apollo for 
robbing him of great glory by leading him away from the battle (ἐµὲ µὲν µέγα κῦδος ἀφείλεο, Il. 
22.18), the narrator’s observation that it is out of concern for his own glory that Achilles does not 
want anyone else to participate underscores the importance of glory in determining Achilles’ 
actions. He genuinely cares for Patroclus, both while alive and after death, but at no point does 
regard for improving or safeguarding his own reputation leave Achilles’ mind. 
                                                
32 Scodel (2008), 18.  
33 de Jong (2012), 111. 
  52 
In contrast to Achilles, Odysseus does not seem to exhibit particularly jealous or envious 
behavior, but he demonstrates awareness that kings are wont to incur the envy of others. 
Speaking among the Phaeacians, he describes how his companions thwarted their own 
homecoming after being assisted by Aeolus: 
οἱ δ’ ἕταροι ἐπέεσσι πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἀγόρευον, 
καί µ’ ἔφασαν χρυσόν τε καὶ ἄργυρον οἴκαδ’ ἄγεσθαι, 
δῶρα παρ’ Αἰόλου µεγαλήτορος Ἱπποτάδαο· 
ὧδε δέ τις εἴπεσκεν ἰδὼν ἐς πλησίον ἄλλον· 
“῍Ω πόποι, ὡς ὅδε πᾶσι φίλος καὶ τίµιός ἐστιν 
ἀνθρώποις, ὅτεών τε πόλιν καὶ γαῖαν ἵκηται. 
πολλὰ µὲν ἐκ Τροίης ἄγεται κειµήλια καλὰ 
ληίδος· ἡµεῖς δ’ αὖτε ὁµὴν ὁδὸν ἐκτελέσαντες 
οἴκαδε νισσόµεθα κενεὰς σὺν χεῖρας ἔχοντες. 
καὶ νῦν οἱ τάδ’ ἔδωκε χαριζόµενος φιλότητι 
Αἴολος. ἀλλ’ ἄγε θᾶσσον ἰδώµεθα ὅττι τάδ’ ἐστίν, 
ὅσσος τις χρυσός τε καὶ ἄργυρος ἀσκῷ ἔνεστιν.” 
 
“But my companions spoke with words among themselves, and they said that I was 
bringing gold and silver home, gifts from the great-hearted Aeolus, son of Hippotas. And 
someone would speak in this way, looking to another next to him, ‘Oh shame, that this 
man is dear to and honored by all men, whenever he comes to their city and land. He is 
bringing many beautiful treasures from the plunder of Troy, but we on the other hand, 
although having completed the same expedition, are coming home with empty hands. 
And now Aeolus, favoring him in friendship, gave these things to him. Come, quickly, let 
us see what these things are, how much gold and silver is in the bag.’” (Od. 10.34-45) 
 
Like Thersites (and Achilles, to some degree), Odysseus’ companions allegedly take umbrage at 
the fact that they have undergone the same trials and tribulations, yet they are coming away 
without anything to show for it. Much of their speech focuses on material wealth, but they are 
also upset about the disparity in honor between Odysseus and themselves. This is clear from the 
beginning of their complaint, as they point out that Odysseus is honored (timios, 10.38) by all. 
Honor is marked in part by gifts of material goods, and thus the men (reasonably) equate their 
lack of gifts from hosts such as Aeolus with their lack of honor. The men are not necessarily 
upset by any unusual stinginess on Odysseus’ part—elsewhere, he is praised for his generosity 
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and fairness—but they find the whole gift exchange among kings upsetting, as they are left out 
of it.34 Unlike the episode with Thersites, however, this scene is Odysseus’ own perception of 
what happened once he himself fell asleep, and there is no comment from the omniscient narrator. 
Even if we assume that he has embellished the account to portray himself in a flattering light (i.e. 
as a decorated and honored man), the idea that a king’s companions might envy his gifts needs to 
appear plausible to Odysseus’ Phaeacian audience, and indeed, there is nothing improbable about 
such a scene.35 This passage is crucial in establishing the belief that a king may easily incur envy 
on account of his position and attendant privileges, regardless of his actual behavior and 
treatment of his constituents.  
 
5. Beyond the lexical approach: anti-envy rhetoric 
 
Odysseus is not the only one who is aware of the potential envy kings often invite. 
Throughout the Iliad and Odyssey, we find numerous examples of what can be considered anti-
envy rhetoric. For example, after the initial confrontation between Achilles and Agamemnon, 
Nestor counsels Achilles, µήτε σὺ Πηλείδη ἔθελ’ ἐριζέµεναι βασιλῆϊ / ἀντιβίην, ἐπεὶ οὔ ποθ’ 
ὁµοίης ἔµµορε τιµῆς / σκηπτοῦχος βασιλεύς, ᾧ τε Ζεὺς κῦδος ἔδωκεν (“You, son of Peleus, do 
not yearn to contend with a king, since a sceptered king does not ever have a similar share of 
honor, to whom Zeus gave glory,” Il. 1.277-79). There is a striking resemblance between the first 
quoted line of Nestor’s warning and that of Odysseus to Thersites in Iliad 2: both contain an 
imperative of ethelein in conjunction with erizemenai, with either the singular or plural of 
basileus as the dative object of erizemenai. This similarity reinforces the possibility that envy 
could be involved, at least from Nestor’s point of view. Moreover, we also see the appearance of 
                                                
34 de Jong (2001), 252. For accounts of Odysseus’ merits as a ruler, see Od. 4.687-91, 5.8-12.  
35 For the possibility that Odysseus is deliberately shaping the episode to show himself in a flattering light, see de 
Jong (2001), 252. 
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two words from the honor, glory, and fame category—timê and kudos—whose presence makes it 
all the more likely that Nestor perceives envy as playing a significant role in Achilles’ reaction.36 
Nestor’s insistence that one ought not to compare oneself with kings belongs to a group of 
conventional expressions about Zeus’ support of kings.37 The primary aim of such statements is 
to legitimize and preserve a king’s control, but there may also be a second, related aim: to ward 
off envy. These goals are related, in that the security of a king’s position depends in part on 
minimizing the envy of his constituents and preventing that envy from prompting action. By 
reminding Achilles of Zeus’ support for Agamemnon, Nestor is trying to stop what he perceives 
as Achilles’ envy from upending the status quo in the Greek army.  
In the Odyssey, Menelaus employs some skillful anti-envy rhetoric when Telemachus and 
Peisistratus arrive in Sparta. Telemachus marvels at the riches of the palace, suggesting that 
perhaps the halls of Zeus are similar. Menelaus begins his speech in response:  
Τέκνα φίλ’, ἦ τοι Ζηνὶ βροτῶν οὐκ ἄν τις ἐρίζοι· 
ἀθάνατοι γὰρ τοῦ γε δόµοι καὶ κτήµατ’ ἔασιν· 
ἀνδρῶν δ’ ἤ κέν τίς µοι ἐρίσσεται, ἠὲ καὶ οὐκί,  
κτήµασιν. ἦ γὰρ πολλὰ παθὼν καὶ πόλλ’ ἐπαληθεὶς  
ἠγαγόµην ἐν νηυσὶ καὶ ὀγδοάτῳ ἔτει ἦλθον· 
 
“Dear children, surely no one of mortals could contend with Zeus, for his houses and 
possessions are immortal. But of men, someone may contend with me in possessions, or 
not. For I brought them in ships and came in the eighth year, after suffering many things 
and wandering a great deal.” (Od. 4.78-82) 
 
While at first glance it may seem that Menelaus is just trying to be modest, the repetition of 
forms of erizein at the beginning of his speech—one in reference to the gods and one in 
reference to men—hints that he is primarily concerned with avoiding envy, both immortal and 
                                                
36 The juxtaposition of timê and kudos indicates that they are related but distinct concepts. Zeus grants kudos (a 
divine favor of sorts) to the king, which then results in timê among men. For a more detailed treatment of the 
distinctions among timê, kudos, and kleos see Scodel (2008), 22-30.  
37 For other examples of the idea that Zeus is involved in appointing or otherwise endorsing kings, see Il. 2. 204-6, 
Od. 1.386-90. 
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mortal. Menelaus immediately addresses and dismisses Telemachus’ comparison, in order to 
ward off divine envy; it would be dangerous to leave such a comment go unanswered, as it could 
be construed as a challenge to the gods.38 He then continues in such a way as to dispel mortal 
envy as well. The strange construction of his statement that someone of men might be able to 
compete with him (but perhaps not) reveals a certain indifference. Menelaus has no desire to 
compete in this regard, and he emphasizes that his riches came to him at great personal cost: not 
only was he forced to wander on his way home, but his brother was killed in the meantime (4.91-
92). He states pointedly, ὣς οὔ τοι χαίρων τοῖσδε κτεάτεσσιν ἀνάσσω…ὧν ὄφελον τριτάτην περ 
ἔχων ἐν δώµασι µοῖραν / ναίειν, οἱ δ’ ἄνδρες σόοι ἔµµεναι, οἳ τότ’ ὄλοντο / Τροίῃ ἐν εὐρείῃ, 
ἑκὰς Ἄργεος ἱπποβότοιο (“So I am the owner of these possessions, although surely not 
rejoicing…Would that I lived in my house, having a third part of these things, and that those men 
were safe, who perished at that time in wide Troy, far from Argos, grazed by horses,” Od. 4.93-
99). At this point in his life, Menelaus just wants to avoid phthonos and eris entirely. After all, 
the last time someone envied him, he lost his wife and thus the Trojan War began.  
 
6. Iliad and Odyssey summary 
 
In sum, we have seen that ou phthonein in the Iliad and Odyssey can at times be used to 
emphasize the absence of envy or jealousy, but that it would be inaccurate to say that there is no 
connection to envy or jealousy at all. In these cases, it functions to characterize certain 
individuals as generous and selfless. At other times, it indicates the possibility of envy or 
jealousy, such as when it occurs in relation to the suitors in the Odyssey. Given that phthonein 
and its compounds only appear ten times in these texts, however, it is highly beneficial to 
supplement a lexical study by paying attention to context and to semantically related terms. 
                                                
38 de Jong (2001), 94.  
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Certain words, such as eris, erizein, and agaasthai occur frequently in scenarios related to envy 
and jealousy and can thus serve as markers, but it is also possible for these emotions to be 
present without any particular verbal signs. It would be erroneous to take the relative absence of 
phthonein to mean that envy and jealousy did not play a notable role in the Homeric world, 
especially in light of the fact that there was a particular discomfort or shame surrounding them. 
Indeed, no one is immune to these emotions. Homeric gods feel envy and jealousy, both in 
relation to each other and to mortals. Likewise, men also exhibit these sentiments, with some of 
the most salient examples involving kings either on the experiencing or the receiving end. In 
both the divine and mortal realms, many (if not all) of the cases of envy and jealousy ultimately 
stem from concerns about honor and glory, with words such as timê, kleos, and kudos often 
alerting us to such concerns as the cause of tension. There is already an awareness of the 
tendency of kings to feel and to incur envy and/or jealousy, and we can identify rhetoric that was 
likely meant to help avert these potentially destructive emotions. 
 
Part II: The Homeric Hymns 
 
The Iliad and Odyssey have been dated to the second half of the eighth century on the 
basis of their language, while the Homeric Hymns likely belong somewhere between 700 and 
500.39 In spite of differences in date and authorship, the passages in the Hymns relating to envy 
and jealousy are thematically akin to those found in the Iliad and Odyssey, but there are slight 
variations in vocabulary.  
As is the case in the Iliad and Odyssey, the noun form phthonos does not appear in the 
Hymns. The verb phthonein is also absent in the Hymns, but there are three instances of the 
                                                
39 Janko (1982), 228-31; Richardson (2010), 1. 
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adjective aphthonos, which does not appear anywhere in the Iliad or Odyssey.40 In the Hymn to 
Apollo, Apollo assures the Cretan men that sheep will be abundant (ἄφθονα, 536) at Delphi, 
despite the constant sacrifices. The adjective appears twice in the Hymn to Earth. The narrator 
first describes how the man whom Earth honors is blessed and possesses all things in abundance 
(τῷ τ’ ἄφθονα πάντα πάρεστι, 8), and then addresses Earth as a generous deity (ἄφθονε δαῖµον, 
16). In the last example, the fact that Earth is personified allows for the possibility of an 
emotional stance: the goddess could just as easily be withholding and jealously possessive of her 
resources, but she happens to be generous instead. None of these contexts indicates an acute 
relation to envy or jealousy, but a lingering connection is nevertheless embedded within the 
adjective itself: if there is an abundant supply of something, people are less likely to succumb to 
jealousy and more likely to share, because there is plenty to go around. Aphthonos should not be 
taken in these cases to mean something about the emotional state of the involved parties, but the 
linguistic relationship still implies that if the situations were reversed (e.g. if sheep were scarce), 
the emergence of phthonos would be a distinct possibility. 
While the Hymns contain fewer phthon- words than the Iliad and Odyssey, they have a 
higher incidence of zêl- words. In the Hymn to Demeter, Metaneira’s daughter promises the 
disguised Demeter that if she looks after Metaneira’s infant son, she will receive gifts that will 
incite envy in other women (τίς σε ἰδοῦσα γυναικῶν θηλυτεράων / ζηλώσαι· τόσα κέν τοι ἀπὸ 
θρεπτήρια δοίη, 167-68), and Metaneira subsequently reiterates the offer (222-23). The enviable 
nature of the gifts is mentioned to underscore how much Metaneira cares for her son and wants 
to find a proper nurse; thus we can see a subtle nod toward a positive function of envy, namely to 
provide an indication of the worth of an item or of the honor that possessing the item signifies. 
                                                
40 Aphthonos appears at Hes. Op. 118, indicating that the word was in fact in existence in roughly the same time 
period as when the Iliad and Odyssey were composed.  
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This is the only example in the texts examined thus far that involves mortal women and envy. It 
may not reveal much about female envy in isolation, but it does at least demonstrate that envy 
affects both men and women alike.  
Another zêl- word appears in the Hymn to Apollo, when Leto is in the throes of labor. By 
Hera’s design, Eileithyia, the goddess of childbirth, has not learned of Leto’s condition: 
Ἥρης…µιν ἔρυκε / ζηλοσύνῃ ὅ τ᾽ ἄρ᾽ υἱὸν ἀµύµονά τε κρατερόν τε / Λητὼ τέξεσθαι 
καλλιπλόκαµος τότ᾽ ἔµελλεν (Hera kept her away out of jealousy that fair-haired Leto was about 
to bring forth a blameless and mighty son at that time, 99-101).41 Zêlosunê appears only here in 
Greek literature.42 The LSJ entry for zêlosunê directs us to the entry for zêlos, the primary 
definition of which is “jealousy.” I believe, however, that Hera’s zêlosunê is a blend of envy and 
jealousy: envy over the fact that Leto is about to have a “blameless and mighty” son while Hera 
herself does not, and jealousy over the fact that she does not have the exclusive title of mother of 
all Zeus’ children. At any rate, zêlos and zêloun are also absent in the Iliad and Odyssey. The 
only zêl- words in the Iliad and Odyssey are zêlêmôn, which is the adjective that Calypso applies 
to the male gods (Od. 5.118), and duszêlos, which appears in Odysseus’ explanation to Alcinous 
of why he did not come with Nausicaa to the palace (Il. 7.307).43 It seems imprudent to draw 
general conclusions about the relatively higher occurrence of phthon- words in the Iliad and 
Odyssey and the relatively higher occurrence of zêl- words in the Hymns, but it is interesting to 
note nonetheless. More significantly, the types of situations in which we find words from either 
group remain more or less constant among these texts.  
                                                
41 Scholars have translated zêlosunê both ways. Evelyn-White translates as “envy” (1914, 331), while West 
translates as “jealousy” (2003, 79). 
42 Richardson (2010), 97. 
43 Odysseus says that people are duszêloi in judgment. He seems to be suggesting that he did not wish to accompany 
Nausicaa to the palace because their appearance together in public would cause people (especially her suitors) to 
circulate rumors about them out of envy and/or sexual jealousy.   
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Let us now turn to the examples of envy and jealousy in the Hymns that are not marked 
by either phthon- or zêl- words. As we have just seen, Hera’s envy and jealousy emerge early in 
the Hymn to Apollo, and they resurface later in the so-called “Pythian” part of the hymn 
(although the episode itself occurs at an earlier point in time).44 Before establishing his sanctuary 
at Delphi, Apollo has to slay the serpent residing there, which once nursed Typhaon, Hera’s 
monstrous offspring. Hera bore Typhaon after Zeus gave birth to Athena from his head, and 
Hera’s speech on that occasion provides insight into her emotional state. She addresses the other 
immortals: 
κέκλυτέ µευ πάντες τε θεοὶ πᾶσαί τε θέαιναι, 
ὡς ἔµ᾽ ἀτιµάζειν ἄρχει νεφεληγερέτα Ζεὺς 
πρῶτος, ἐπεί µ᾽ ἄλοχον ποιήσατο κέδν᾽ εἰδυῖαν· 
καὶ νῦν νόσφιν ἐµεῖο τέκε γλαυκῶπιν Ἀθήνην, 
ἣ πᾶσιν µακάρεσσι µεταπρέπει ἀθανάτοισιν· 
αὐτὰρ ὅ γ᾽ ἠπεδανὸς γέγονεν µετὰ πᾶσι θεοῖσι 
παῖς ἐµὸς Ἥφαιστος ῥικνὸς πόδας ὃν τέκον αὐτὴ 
 
“Listen to me, all you gods and goddesses, how cloud-gathering Zeus begins to dishonor 
me first, after he made me his wife, I who know my duties. And now, unaided by me, he 
has given birth to bright-eyed Athena, who is distinguished among all the blessed 
immortals. But my son, crooked-footed Hephaestus, whom I bore myself, has come to be 
a weakling among all the gods.” (311-17) 
 
Hera is upset in the immediate sense on account of the birth of Athena, but the broader issue in 
question is one of honor, which she makes clear through her use of atimazein. As is the case in 
the example above involving Leto and Eileithyia, both envy and jealousy are likely involved here. 
Hera is jealous because Zeus has procreated without her, proving that their relationship does not 
have the exclusivity she would like. Adding to her frustration is envy, on the grounds that Zeus 
has produced a child who is distinguished (µεταπρέπει, 315) while she herself has failed to 
produce a comparable child, and so she decides to try again. Hera likely regards the production 
                                                
44 Richardson (2010), 127. 
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of illustrious offspring as a reflection of one’s own status and is thus fixated on what she 
perceives as her undeserved inferiority, an assessment that lies at the heart of envy.45 
The birth of gods and how they established their powers and spheres of influence are 
common themes in the Hymns, and accordingly, we sometimes see tension rising as gods 
struggle to find their niche. In the Hymn to Apollo, Apollo goes to Telphusa, at the foot of Mt. 
Helicon, and begins building the foundations for a temple. The nymph Telphusa advises him to 
build elsewhere, citing traffic noise as a reason to avoid that location. The narrator reveals, Ὣς 
εἰποῦσ᾽ Ἑκάτου πέπιθε φρένας, ὄφρα οἱ αὐτῇ / Τελφούσῃ κλέος εἴη ἐπὶ χθονὶ µηδ᾽ Ἑκάτοιο 
(Speaking in this way, she persuaded the mind of the Far-shooter, in order that Telphusa herself 
might have glory in the land, and not the Far-shooter, 275-76). Telphusa is jealous and therefore 
loathe to share her sanctuary with another deity, so she resorts to deception in order to maintain 
exclusive worship in the region. When Apollo returns, having realized her plan, he boldly stakes 
his claim. He asserts, ἐνθάδε δὴ καὶ ἐµὸν κλέος ἔσσεται, οὐδὲ σὸν οἴης (“Here my glory too will 
exist, not yours alone,” 381). Kleos is Apollo’s priority as well, and his reaction—covering 
Telphusa with stones and establishing his own altar—can be attributed in part to anger about 
being deceived, but it can also be attributed to envy. If anger had been the only emotion he felt, 
he could have stopped after covering her with stones. The placement of his altar, however, not 
only demotes Telphusa’s status as the exclusive recipient of worship at that site, but it also 
promotes his own status, and this suggests that he is experiencing some amount of covetous envy 
in addition to anger. 
We see another example of a deity struggling to establish his domain in the Hymn to 
Hermes. Hermes makes it known relatively early in the hymn that he aims to put himself on 
equal footing with Apollo, declaring to his mother, ἀµφὶ δὲ τιµῆς / κἀγὼ τῆς ὁσίης ἐπιβήσοµαι ἧς 
                                                
45 Ben-Ze’ev (2000), 282. 
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περ Ἀπόλλων (“As for honor, I too will achieve the rites that Apollo has,” 172-73).46 He then 
grows agitated at the thought of being challenged, and he threatens that if “the son of very 
glorious Leto” (Λητοῦς ἐρικυδέος υἱός, 176) comes after him, he will plunder Apollo’s temple at 
Delphi (176-81).47 The threat of sacrilege in conjunction with Hermes’ stated goal of achieving 
the same rites reveals Hermes’ heightened preoccupation with Apollo’s honor and glory: Hermes 
is only a baby and much younger than Apollo, but he is obviously envious of his older brother’s 
status. Nevertheless, after the matter of the stolen cows is settled, Hermes behaves charitably 
toward Apollo. When Apollo marvels at and asks about his lyre, Hermes responds, εἰρωτᾷς µ᾽ 
Ἑκάεργε περιφραδές· αὐτὰρ ἐγώ σοι / τέχνης ἡµετέρης ἐπιβήµεναι οὔ τι µεγαίρω. / σήµερον 
εἰδήσεις (“You question me very carefully, Far-shooter, but I am not at all jealous of you 
entering into my skill. You will learn it today,” 464-66). While Hermes uses a negated form of 
megarein to mean that he does not begrudge Apollo’s interest in the lyre, the choice of this verb 
nonetheless indicates that this scenario could potentially trigger jealousy.48 Accordingly, his 
denial of such a sentiment is intended to emphasize his kindness and generosity toward Apollo. 
These passages once again demonstrate the connection between feelings of envy and 
jealousy and issues of honor and glory. In this way, they are thematically compatible with the 
ones discussed from the Iliad and Odyssey, although the vocabulary varies slightly. The Hymns 
reveal a possible preference for zêl- words over phthon- words, but we can still look to terms 
relating to timê, kleos, and kudos to help identify potential situations of envy and jealousy. 
  
                                                
46 Richardson (2010), 182.  
47 Some scholars have taken ἐρικυδέος as a transferred epithet that in sense applies to Apollo himself (Evelyn-White 
1914, 377). Others have translated it as modifying Leto (West 2003, 127). Either way, this once again points to 
Hermes’ preoccupation with the superior status of Apollo and Leto relative to Hermes and his mother.     
48 Cf. Hera’s use of megairein at Il. 4.54 (see p. 39-40). 
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Part III: Hesiod 
 
Thus far, we have seen examples of kings and gods who feel jealousy in relation to their 
honor and glory, but not explicitly in relation to the security of their position. Hesiod’s Theogony 
presents the earliest clear examples of kings (here, in the immortal realm) jealously trying to 
solidify their control. Cronus swallows each of his children as they are born, and Hesiod explains 
his motive: ἵνα µή τις ἀγαυῶν Οὐρανιώνων / ἄλλος ἐν ἀθανάτοισιν ἔχοι βασιληίδα τιµήν (in 
order that no one else of the illustrious descendants of Uranus might hold kingly authority among 
the immortals, Th. 461-62). Cronus acts as he does because he is jealously protective of his status 
as king. Curiously, this is the first time that the fact of his kingship is stated explicitly.49 
Presumably, Hesiod’s audience would have been aware of this already, but it seems significant 
that his kingship is first highlighted within a context of jealousy. Moreover, Hesiod uses a 
slightly more circuitous phrase (ἔχοι βασιληίδα τιµήν) rather than saying simply “in order that no 
one else might be king” or “in order that no one else might seize power.” This once again points 
to the close association between jealousy and timê, now incorporating the element of kingship 
into the equation as well. While unusual, basilêis timê is not without precedent: in Iliad 6, 
Glaucus narrates the story of Bellerophon, in which a king gives Bellerophon his own daughter 
in marriage and half of his kingdom (τιµῆς βασιληΐδος ἥµισυ πάσης, 6.193). While there is no 
trace of jealousy in the case of Bellerophon and his new father-in-law, the juxtaposition of the 
adjective basileios and timê nevertheless reinforces the idea that kings have timê by virtue of 
their position, and as we have seen previously, many situations involving envy and/or jealousy 
can be traced back to issues of timê. 
 Zeus in turn exhibits similar behavior after becoming king of the gods. Rather than 
swallowing his children after they are born, however, Zeus swallows his wife. Hesiod explains, 
                                                
49 West (1966), 295. 
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τὼς γάρ οἱ φρασάτην, ἵνα µὴ βασιληίδα τιµὴν / ἄλλος ἔχοι Διὸς ἀντὶ θεῶν αἰειγενετάων ([Gaea 
and Uranus] advised him in this way, in order that no one else of the everlasting gods except 
Zeus might hold kingly authority, Th. 892-93). Many of the same words appear (ἵνα µὴ; 
βασιληίδα τιµὴν; ἄλλος ἔχοι), drawing a close parallel betwen Zeus’ situation and his father’s, 
once again indicating that Zeus acts as he does and follows Gaea and Uranus’ advice out of fear 
of losing his privileged status. He is, in a word, jealous. Given the two examples of Cronus and 
Zeus, it seems likely that the desire to safeguard his primacy and the stability associated with it 
was also a key factor in Uranus’ attempts to subdue his children, despite the lack of verbal cues 
(Th. 154-59).50 At any rate, Cronus and Zeus together provide ample proof that gods are not 
immune to feeling jealousy over issues of rulership. Moreover, the appearance of jealous 
behavior in the account of two of the earliest kingships in the Greek cosmos suggests that Hesiod 
and his contemporaries readily acknowledged that jealousy was a natural response to a perceived 
threat to one’s rule. These passages highlight the tendency among rulers to exhibit jealous 
behavior, thus priming the development of this association in later texts. 
 In addition to the Theogony’s examples of jealous behavior among the gods, Hesiod’s 
Works and Days reveals several important passages relating to the nature of envy among men. 
After calling upon the Muses and instructing Perses to listen carefully, Hesiod famously 
describes the two Erides: 
 Οὐκ ἄρα µοῦνον ἔην Ἐρίδων γένος, ἀλλ᾽ ἐπὶ γαῖαν 
εἰσὶ δύω· τὴν µέν κεν ἐπαινήσειε νοήσας, 
ἣ δ᾽ ἐπιµωµητή· διὰ δ᾽ ἄνδιχα θυµὸν ἔχουσιν. 
ἣ µὲν γὰρ πόλεµόν τε κακὸν καὶ δῆριν ὀφέλλει, 
σκετλίη· οὔ τις τήν γε φιλεῖ βροτός, ἀλλ᾽ ὑπ᾽ ἀνάγκης 
ἀθανάτων βουλῇσιν Ἔριν τιµῶσι βαρεῖαν. 
τὴν δ᾽ ἑτέρην προτέρην µὲν ἐγείνατο Νὺξ ἐρεβεννή, 
θῆκε δέ µιν Κρονίδης ὑψίζυγος, αἰθέρι ναίων, 
γαίης [τ᾽] ἐν ῥίζῃσι καὶ ἀνδράσι πολλὸν ἀµείνω· 
                                                
50 Clay (2003), 18. 
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ἥ τε καὶ ἀπάλαµόν περ ὁµῶς ἐπὶ ἔργον ἐγείρει· 
εἰς ἕτερον γάρ τίς τε ἴδεν ἔργοιο χατίζων 
πλούσιον, ὃς σπεύδει µὲν ἀρόµεναι ἠδὲ φυτεύειν 
οἶκόν τ᾽ εὖ θέσθαι· ζηλοῖ δέ τε γείτονα γείτων 
εἰς ἄφενος σπεύδοντ᾽· ἀγαθὴ δ᾽ Ἔρις ἥδε βροτοῖσιν. 
καὶ κεραµεὺς κεραµεῖ κοτέει καὶ τέκτονι τέκτων, 
καὶ πτωχὸς πτωχῷ φθονέει καὶ ἀοιδὸς ἀοιδῷ. 
 
There is not, as it turns out, a single kind of Eris, but on earth, there are two.51 Having 
understood it, a man would praise the one kind, but the other is blameworthy: they have 
separate dispositions. For the one, merciless, advances evil war and battle: no man loves 
her, but under compulsion and by the wills of the immortals, men honor this grievous 
Eris. The other, dark Night bore first, and the high-throned son of Cronus, dwelling in the 
ether, set her in the roots of the earth and made her much better for men: she stirs up even 
the helpless to work all the same. For seeing another man—a wealthy man—who exerts 
himself in plowing and planting and ordering his household, a man craves work: the 
neighbor emulates the neighbor who strives for wealth.52 This Eris is good for men. And 
potter begrudges potter and craftsman begrudges craftsman, and beggar envies beggar 
and singer envies singer. (11-26) 
 
We have already seen numerous examples of the appearance of eris (or related forms) in scenes 
involving envy or jealousy in the works of Homer, but here, Hesiod suggests a new type of 
relationship between the two: the good Eris rouses men to work hard by stirring up envy over 
their neighbors’ wealth. In this sense, both Eris and the associated envy seem advantageous and 
productive. Hesiod thus reveals a positive side of these phenomena that is not present when they 
appear in conjunction in Homeric texts.53 Significantly, however, the benefits occur within the 
economic realm, and the envy at work remains fairly private. In the political (and thus more 
public) realm, benefits of envy are nowhere to be seen.  
                                                
51 Some view this statement as a correction to or retraction of Hesiod’s remarks about the genealogy of a single Eris 
in the Theogony. I do not think the resolution of this issue has much bearing on the present study. At any rate, I find 
Clay’s argument convincing, namely that what Hesiod says of Eris in the Theogony is not wrong, but rather 
incomplete (2003, 7). 
52 To emphasize the causal relationship between the two, I have translated as if ἴδεν were a participle and χατίζων a 
finite verb.  
53 Eris can be positive in the sense that it offers an opportunity to win renown (Hogan 1981, 25, 34). Even so, I have 
not found Homeric examples that emphasize this aspect in scenarios involving envy or jealousy. Eris is still 
generally understood to be a negative entity (Gagarin 1990, 182 note 11). 
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Moreover, it is worth noting that even the good Eris is perhaps not always wholly 
positive. The use of the verb zêloun (23) may be innocent enough, but kotein and phthonein (25-
26) point strongly to ambiguity, as these verbs are not in keeping with the idea of an entirely 
good Eris.54 The fact that kotein appears in parallel with phthonein suggests that they can 
function more or less as synonyms, and so I have translated kotein here as “begrudge,” as I have 
done with phthonein in other instances. Elsewhere, however, kotein (and cognate forms) implies 
an element of anger or resentment that is not always present in phthonein, and it seems to 
indicate a level of emotion that is more intense than the prototypical case of envy. For instance, 
when Zeus debates whether he should save his son, Sarpedon, from dying by Patroclus’ hand, 
Hera cautions him that many of the immortals have sons on the battlefield, so if he saves 
Sarpedon, he will incite grim resentment (κότον αἰνὸν ἐνήσεις, Il. 16.449). This imagined 
situation fits the criteria for envy: certain immortals would no longer have their children, Zeus 
would have his, and the bereaved would (presumably) feel that the situation is wrong. It seems 
likely that they would feel something stronger than mere envy, however, given that Zeus himself 
would be responsible for creating the inequality; accordingly, we have kotos rather than 
phthonos.55 These lines thus signal that even the good Eris may have a darker side. 
Some scholars have found lines 25-26 problematic enough to merit removal, while others 
have attributed them to a failure on Hesiod’s part to maintain consistency.56 Still others have 
suggested that they are in reference to the bad Eris, but this seems unlikely.57 There is no 
indication that Hesiod has switched back to describing the first Eris. Michael Gagarin suggests 
instead that the lines are in fact as Hesiod intended, and the ambivalence they inject into the 
                                                
54 West (1978), 147.  
55 I agree with Sanders’ distinction that if an unbiased third party agrees that the inequality is wrong, it is no longer 
considered purely envy, and I believe that this applies here (2014, 23). 
56 For the former view, see Bona Quaglia (1973), 41-42 note 12. For the latter, see West (1978), 147. 
57 Sanders (2014), 40. 
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description of the good Eris reflects the intrinsic complexity of the thing itself.58 At any rate, 
lines 25-26, thought to be preexisting Greek proverbs, succinctly express the idea that men are 
prone to envying those with whom they have something in common. As we will see, this is a 
fairly widespread belief.59  
 Whereas there is some question about the positive versus negative nature of Hesiod’s use 
of the verb zêloun in line 23 (on account of its association with kotein and phthonein), the noun 
zêlos is unequivocally bad in line 195. In describing the fifth and final age of mankind, the Age 
of Iron to which he himself belongs, Hesiod forewarns: 
 Ζῆλος δ᾽ ἀνθρώποισιν ὀιζυροῖσιν ἅπασι 
δυσκέλαδος κακόχαρτος ὁµαρτήσει στυγερώπης. 
καὶ τότε δὴ πρὸς Ὄλυµπον ἀπὸ χθονὸς εὐρυοδείης 
λευκοῖσιν φάρεσσι καλυψαµένω χρόα καλὸν 
ἀθανάτων µετὰ φῦλον ἴτον προλιπόντ᾽ ἀνθρώπους 
Αἰδὼς καὶ Νέµεσις· τὰ δὲ λείψεται ἄλγεα λυγρὰ 
θνητοῖς ἀνθρώποισι· κακοῦ δ᾽ οὐκ ἔσσεται ἀλκή. 
 
Discordant, horrible Εnvy who rejoices in misfortune will walk beside all of miserable 
mankind. And at that time, Reverence and Indignation, veiling their fair frames with 
white cloaks, will go from the broad-wayed earth toward Olympus with the race of 
immortals, leaving behind mankind. Baneful pains will remain for mortal men, and there 
will be no defense against evil. (195-201) 
 
In the absence of reverence and indignation, envy will in time play a defining role among men of 
this age, and it is indeed an ugly one, associated with the bad Eris.60 The adjective kakochartos 
(“rejoicing in misfortunes”) points to another unbecoming facet of envy that has not thus far 
been emphasized: it is not only or not necessarily concerned with one’s own gain, but it is at 
times focused on another’s loss. For example, it would not be enough if a man experiencing this 
type of envy were to acquire as much property as the neighbor whom he envies has (or perhaps 
                                                
58 Eris is certainly not alone in having ambiguities and nuances in Hesiod’s depiction. Hesiod offers similarly 
complex portrayals of concepts such as dikê and aidôs (Gagarin 1990, 175-80). 
59 Cf. Hdt. 1.99.2 (see p. 120-21) and 7.237.2 (see p. 134-35). 
60 West (1978), 203. 
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he does not even want to acquire property for himself), but he would wish for his neighbor’s 
property to be decreased. The examples we have seen in Homer generally fall into the category 
of covetous envy, where the envious individual is intent on his or her own gain. Hesiod’s use of 
kakochartos, however, introduces the idea of begrudging envy, where the envious individual is 
intent on another’s loss.61 There is naturally some overlap between these categories, and the envy 
that runs rampant in the Age of Iron could easily fit into both; it seems clear, however, that it at 
least has the characteristics of begrudging envy. 
 The departure of reverence and indignation and the ubiquity of envy in the Age of Iron 
are essentially a guaranteed path to self-destruction, and these components elaborate on the 
annihilation of mankind by Zeus that Hesiod predicts (180). Whether they are in fact the very 
tools that will dismantle human society as Zeus looks on or they are the causes for anger that will 
incite Zeus to destroy mankind is unclear, but perhaps this is immaterial.62 Either way, zêlos is 
capable of conveying an emphatically negative meaning. While reverence and indignation are 
forces that work to prevent men from exhibiting inappropriate or immoral behavior, this envy 
(associated with the bad Eris) works in the opposite direction, driving men to act wickedly.63 
This passage about zêlos is unlike any found in the other texts discussed in this chapter. Homer 
generally steers clear of commenting on the moral nature of things such as envy or strife, 
whereas Hesiod does this throughout the Works and Days, and especially here in the description 
of the ages of man.64 Nonetheless, what Hesiod says about envy and about the two Erides is not 
incompatible with the related Homeric material.  
                                                
61 For the difference between begrudging and covetous envy, see p. 24; Sanders (2014), 38-39. 
62 For the idea that men will destroy themselves through their own behavior, see Beall (2005-2006), 172. For the 
idea that Zeus will destroy men as a punishment for their behavior, see Clay (2003), 38. 
63 West (1978), 204. 
64 Hogan (1981), 25. 
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 One final passage in the Works and Days deserves mention. Hesiod counsels Perses, 
ἔργον δ᾽ οὐδὲν ὄνειδος, ἀεργίη δέ τ᾽ ὄνειδος. / εἰ δέ κεν ἐργάζῃ, τάχα σε ζηλώσει ἀεργὸς / 
πλουτεῦντα· πλούτῳ δ᾽ ἀρετὴ καὶ κῦδος ὀπηδεῖ (Work is no disgrace, but idleness is a disgrace. 
If you work, soon the idle man will envy you as you become wealthy: excellence and renown go 
along with wealth, 311-13). Like Homer, Hesiod too sees a relationship between envy and 
renown (kudos): kudos is something worthy of being envied. Unlike Homer, however, Hesiod 
draws this connection explicitly by using a form of zêloun and kudos in close conjunction.65 
Interestingly, zêloun has a positive, desirable connotation here.66 Having already seen that zêlos 
can sometimes be harmful, we might expect Hesiod to advise Perses to avoid attracting the envy 
of other men, but instead, he holds up the envy of other men as an incentive for Perses to work 
hard.67 Envy may be dangerous to the man who is envied, but the very existence of that envy 
affirms that he has something worth having. 
In short, Hesiod’s Theogony offers several clear examples of kings acting out of jealousy 
to protect their rule. Each successive generation of gods witnesses such behavior, and only Zeus 
manages to secure and safeguard his position. These examples are consistent with what we find 
in the works of Homer and in the Homeric Hymns, especially insofar as they highlight the 
association between jealousy and issues of timê. The Works and Days, on the other hand, has 
more to say about envy than about jealousy. The connection between envy and eris, already 
discernible in the Homeric material, is made explicitly clear in the opening verses, but Hesiod 
also reveals the positive role envy can play by pairing it with the good Eris. Even the good Eris, 
                                                
65 Homer uses kudos in situations involving jealousy at Il. 16.87-90 and Il. 22.205-7, but there is no one word that 
explicitly indicates Achilles’ state of mind in either of these examples. These situations involve jealousy rather than 
envy, but the relationship with kudos should be clear nonetheless, since the things that prompt jealousy and the 
things that prompt envy are generally one and the same. 
66 West (1978), 234. 
67 This is similar to the way in which Metaneira and her daughter aim to persuade Demeter by promising gifts that 
will cause other women to feel envy (Hom. Hymn Dem.167-68, 222-23). 
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however, and so too the envy associated with it, can have unpleasant consequences. The overall 
picture Hesiod paints of envy in the Works and Days is more complex than Homer’s portrayal, 
especially in terms of discussion of its moral ramifications, but it is nevertheless compatible with 
the material found in the Iliad, Odyssey, and the Homeric Hymns. 
 
Conclusions and implications 
 
Envy and jealousy are not often referred to explicitly with terms such as phthonos or 
zêlos in the texts of Homer, the Homeric Hymns, or Hesiod, but this examination of thematically 
related passages has nevertheless revealed a constellation of associated words that can aid us in 
discerning their presence. These words include eris, timê, kleos, kudos, kotos, megairein, and 
agaasthai. None of these words alone (or even in conjunction) can serve as a conclusive 
identification of envy or jealousy, but such is the elusive nature of studying emotions in the first 
place. If we hold a positive admission of an emotion by the individual him or herself as the gold 
standard of certainty, surely we will not get very far, for literary figures seldom make such direct 
statements about their emotional state. The appearance of these associated words, however, 
points to the likely and logical expectation of envy and/or jealousy.  
 This chapter has surveyed envy and jealousy broadly, rather than looking strictly at 
instances relating to the political sphere, and as a result, we have been able to observe a clear 
correlation between struggles over honor, glory, and fame, and envious or jealous behavior, 
especially among the gods. The gods are certainly not immune to feelings of envy and jealousy, 
which influence not only their relations with one another but also their dealings with humans. 
Envy and jealousy affect all groups—gods, humans, men, women, the powerful, the powerless, 
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etc.—and in multiple ways, for individuals not only grapple with their own feelings but they also 
face the consequences of envy and jealousy felt by those around them. 
 Despite the broader scope of this chapter, these texts contain key passages relating to 
kings’ experiences with envy and jealousy. We have seen examples of men feeling envy toward 
kings (e.g. Thersites in the Iliad and Odysseus’ companions in the Odyssey), of kings feeling 
jealousy over maintaining their reputations and/or positions (e.g. Achilles in the Iliad and Cronus 
and Zeus in the Theogony), and of kings demonstrating awareness that they are prone to incur the 
envy of others (e.g. Odysseus and Menelaus in the Odyssey). It may be premature to conclude 
that such instances constitute patterns and are representative of Greek beliefs about the nature of 
kingship, but they do establish significant precedents. 
 The Greeks viewed these emotions in a disagreeable light, and we can see this both from 
the absence of personal admissions of feeling envy or jealousy (and emphatic denials of the 
same), but also from the reactions to characters who exhibit tell-tale signs of them, even if they 
do not speak of them explicitly. Thersites is immediately rebuked and beaten for criticizing 
Agamemnon, which he does out of envy. Odysseus laments how his companions jeopardized 
their homecoming by meddling with the bag given to him by Aeolus, which they also do out of 
envy. Even Telemachus, who does not seem to envy Menelaus’ riches personally but 
nevertheless marvels at them, is met with a response from Menelaus that deliberately discourages 
envy. Moreover, these examples (among others) indicate that the Greeks not only found these 
emotions unbecoming, but that they considered them dangerous as well. Thersites’ envy must be 
silenced or else he could possibly foment widespread rebellion among the Greek forces. The 
envy of Odysseus’ companions’ causes an even further delayed homecoming. Menelaus speaks 
as he does because he is well aware that incurring the envy or jealousy of others (and especially 
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that of the gods) can lead to devastation. Even Hesiod, who is the first to emphasize the potential 
good that can come of envy, simultaneously showcases its darker, destabilizing side. Indeed, 
Homer, the Homeric Hymns, and Hesiod depict envy and jealousy as primarily negative 
emotions that can have deleterious consequences for both those who feel them and those toward 
whom they are directed. 
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CHAPTER 3: SOPHOCLES 
 
 
1. Why tragedy? 
 
As a genre that dramatizes and brings to life characters in the throes of crisis, tragedy has 
much to offer to a study of emotions. While ancient Greeks experienced other genres, such as 
epic, oratory, and even historiography, in performative contexts as well, tragedy provides 
especially vivid depictions of interpersonal relations and first-person confessions that provide 
insight into characters’ state of mind. A number of factors contribute to this vividness, such as 
the use of different meters, the presence of multiple speaking actors, and the fact that dialogue 
and revelations unfold in real time.1 We may not be able to recover certain elements of the 
original performances (gestures, voice intonation, etc.), but the emotional power inherent in the 
texts themselves—which resonates in the audience’s own emotional experience—is in large part 
responsible for the continued performance of Greek tragedy in the modern period. Indeed, 
tragedy was recognized in antiquity for its ability to evoke strong emotions among audience 
members. According to Aristotle, tragedy characteristically elicits pity and fear, which in turn 
produce katharsis (Poet. 1449b24-28), although scholars have argued that these are not the only 
emotions that audiences tend to feel while in the theater.2 In addition to the aforementioned 
factors that contribute to vividness, another way in which tragedy draws its audience in is by 
prompting them to pay close attention to various characters’ mental states. Felix Budelmann and 
Pat Easterling have argued that theater makes use of the natural human tendency to make 
                                                
1 Griffin points to musical variety as one of the key novelties that tragedy has to offer in comparison with Homeric 
epic (1998, 56). 
2 Konstan argues that audiences often feel a sense of triumph and exultation as well (1999). 
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inferences about the motivations and intentions of the people around us, and that tragedians at 
times incorporated signals to encourage viewers to pay attention to what may be going through 
various characters’ minds.3 For example, the attempts of the chorus to make sense of Cassandra’s 
visions in Aeschylus’ Agamemnon invite the audience to do so as well.4 Similarly, Creon’s 
opening speech in Sophocles’ Antigone makes clear his belief that a man’s rule will expose his 
true self (175-77), which in turn prompts spectators to consider what his subsequent words and 
deeds reveal about him.5 
On a more macroscopic level, tragedians crafted their works so as to prompt 
contemporaries to reflect on important issues and themes, such as honor, piety, and family 
relations (to name a few). Tragedians and other poets were regarded as de facto teachers on any 
number of topics; indeed, poetry constituted an integral part of children’s education.6 Whereas 
some authors like Hesiod were at times quite direct about their didactic aims, however, 
tragedians tended to offer lessons by raising questions and stimulating debate.7 The subject 
matter of tragedy belongs to the world of myth, situated somewhere in the distant past, but 
tragedians nonetheless adapted it skillfully to suit their purposes, creating a blend of the fictive 
and the real. Indeed, Josiah Ober and Barry Strauss have noted the bidirectional influence and 
parallels between tragedy and oratory, a genre that deals with actual living beings: both utilize 
rhetoric and have the betterment of the community as their ultimate goal.8 The difference 
                                                
3 Budelmann and Easterling (2010), 292. Homeric epic also prompts audiences to speculate about characters’ mental 
states. This is a result of various narratological techniques such as the inclusion of direct speeches, the presentation 
of characters who make inferences about one another’s motives, and the limited information made available by an 
omniscient narrator. With tragedy, however, audiences must be all the more adept at interpreting characters’ 
behavior on their own, since the narrators of epic are no longer present to supplement their knowledge. For more 
about the mind-reading and mental states of Homeric characters, see Scodel (2014). 
4 Budelmann and Easterling (2010), 295-98. 
5 Idem, 299. 
6 Goldhill (1986),140-42. 
7 Blundell (1989), 5-6, 273. 
8 Ober and Strauss (1990), 248. 
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between tragedy and oratory, as they describe it, is that “one tries to persuade the audience to 
engage in a specific political action, the other to persuade the audience of a more general, more 
ideal, but no less political truth.”9 
 
2. Tragedy and politics 
 
There has been much debate about the relationship between tragedy and politics in recent 
decades. It is important to note that nearly all extant tragedies and fragments of tragedy were 
composed with an Athenian audience in mind. Moreover, not all tragedians were Athenians, but 
Athenians were credited with all of the plays that have come down to us in their complete form.10 
Thus the study of Greek tragedy inevitably has an Athenocentric bias. Goldhill has made the case 
that, since the Great Dionysia was a civic occasion—including a depositing of the tribute in the 
theater and a parade of state-educated war orphans—we ought to consider tragedies within this 
particular context, although we should not expect to find any sort of straightforward propaganda: 
tragedy examines and questions Athens’ civic ideology.11 Indeed, Christopher Pelling has called 
for a more flexible understanding of ideology, one that is robust enough to make room for 
exploration and debate. He argues that what some scholars today view as subversion of 
democratic values is in fact part of the natural civic discourse that tragedy brings to life.12 In 
response to Goldhill’s assertion that the Dionysia was a democratic occasion in Athens, Jasper 
Griffin has argued vehemently that while there was a temporal coincidence of the flourishing of 
Athenian tragedy and of democracy, there is nothing fundamentally political or democratic about 
                                                
9 Ibid. 
10 Scodel (2010), 2-6. 
11 Goldhill (1986) 76-78. 
12 Pelling (1997), 224-25, 234-35. 
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tragedy as a whole.13 This serves as a good reminder. The surviving tragedies were all produced 
after the development of Athenian democracy, but the genre itself first appeared at some point 
during the Peisistratid tyranny.14 Moreover, there is no evidence that the archon responsible for 
assigning choruses to playwrights did so with any political motives in mind.15 Griffin does, 
however, admit that while tragedy does not necessarily have any connection to politics, we can 
in fact see political messages and currents in some—dare I say many—plays.16 In this regard, 
Griffin and Goldhill’s claims are not necessarily incompatible, as Goldhill acknowledges that 
some plays do not contain any conspicuous political or democratic material. Griffin seems to err 
on the side of being overly cautious and pessimistic: the Dionysia of the classical period can still 
be democratic without requiring that every single tragedy present pro-democratic ideology. 
While Griffin’s arguments are helpful to keep in mind, we should not let them stop us from 
analyzing tragedy to learn about Athenian political values, nor do I think Griffin himself would 
advocate for such abstention.   
Others have gone further than Goldhill and made the claim that tragedy is an inherently 
political genre. Jean-Pierre Vernant considers the language and structure of tragedy to reflect its 
historical (and therein political) context, as they present a tension between the legendary heroic 
age and the reality of the polis.17 Like Vernant, Victoria Wohl devotes much attention in her 
examination of Euripides’ tragedies to formal, aesthetic choices (such as the trajectory of the plot, 
the use of song, etc.), while still acknowledging the fruits borne of a historicizing approach, such 
                                                
13 Goldhill (1990), 114; Griffin (1998), 47, 60. Griffin also takes issue with numerous other scholars’ claims, which 
I will not discuss here. I believe that his response to Goldhill is illustrative of his tendency to carry what one says to 
the extreme. 
14 Osborne (1993), 36. 
15 Idem, 34.  
16 Griffin (1998), 60. 
17 Vernant sees tension in the relationship between the tragic hero, who, despite using relatively more contemporary 
language, represents the mythical past, and the chorus, whose members, despite using the more archaic language of 
lyric, often represent the civic community of the present (1988, 24-25). 
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as Goldhill’s. She argues that political undertones can be found even in the most ostensibly 
apolitical of Euripides’ plays, giving the Alcestis as an example: death is understood to be 
universal (thus mirroring democratic society), yet Admetus manages to avoid it and even gain 
back his wife by means of elite privilege.18 While it goes beyond the scope of the present study 
to evaluate comprehensively whether the same holds true for tragedy in general, the idea that 
politics so thoroughly permeates the Euripidean corpus strengthens the rationale for using 
tragedy to examine political attitudes and debates.  
I have deliberately chosen to focus on tragedies that contain more explicit political 
material, although in accordance with Griffin’s point, I do not wish to give the impression that 
this sort of political messaging is blatant or ubiquitous. Not surprisingly, however, we do not 
have to search long to find relevant examples. Athenian tragedians were members of a 
community in which political participation was expected, and given their status among the 
cultural elite in addition, it seems reasonable to assume that they had opinions about 
developments or courses of action that would benefit the dêmos, which opinions were bound to 
influence their plays in turn.19 Richard Seaford notes that we see repeated examples in tragedy of 
the downfall of ruling families from myth, which hints at the possibility of a wider distribution of 
power in the future.20 This is not to say that what follows the downfall is necessarily democracy. 
Indeed, the establishment of democracy would possibly strike an Athenian audience as an 
incongruous ending for plays set in Thebes, which had an oligarchy in the fifth century.21 
Nevertheless, Seaford makes an important observation about the political trend that emerges in 
tragedy: if there is a change in the ruling situation, it tends to be the case that a dynasty is 
                                                
18 Wohl (2015), 8-18. 
19 Sommerstein et al. (1993), 13.  
20 Seaford (1994), 367. 
21 Seaford (2000), 42-43. 
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heading toward ruin. Conversely, the kings in tragedy who enjoy the greatest degree of stability 
(e.g. Theseus in Euripides’ Suppliants or Pelasgus in Aeschylus’ Suppliants) are those who have 
the strongest democratic leanings, which underscores the idea that monarchy in its purest and 
most traditional form is inherently precarious.22 
 
3. Existing scholarship 
 
 To date, several scholars have examined the role of envy and jealousy in tragedy, and the 
conclusions they offer vary considerably, particularly concerning the role of divine phthonos and 
of sexual jealousy. On the whole, they tend to downplay the importance of these emotions in 
tragedy, although some regard sexual jealousy as an exception and make the case that this type 
of jealousy does motivate the plot of several plays. In my view, however, both envy and jealousy 
(not only of the sexual variety but also of the “jealous of my position” variety) are influential 
emotions on the tragic stage, contributing to the forward momentum and emotional intensity of 
the play as well as to the representation of various characters and their mental activities.23  
In Greek Tragedy and the Emotions (1983), W. B. Stanford writes that it is mostly the 
gods who exhibit phthonos in tragedy, since its appearance among mortals would “make a 
person villainous” and thus men and women are not shown to possess it in any significant way, 
except in some cases of sexual jealousy.24 This is a strange justification, as tragedy surely does 
not shy away from depicting mortals as acting in villainous ways, even if the characters 
themselves cannot be delineated so neatly into the role of either protagonist or antagonist. 
Stanford also draws a distinction between phthonos and zêlos, noting that the latter appears more 
                                                
22 Fletcher (2010), 170, 173. For an overview of the anachronistic references to democratic attitudes and institutions 
in Theseus’ Athens (as depicted in Euripides’ Suppliants), see Wohl (2015), 90-91. 
23 For the “jealous of my position” script, see p. 21, 25; Sanders (2014), 39. 
24 Stanford (1983), 35. Stanford notes that phthonos is, however, present in characters who feel sexual jealousy, such 
as Clytemnestra, Deianeira, Hermione, and Medea.  
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frequently in Sophocles and Euripides than in Aeschylus, and that it sometimes indicates a 
milder, less insidious form of phthonos, or something akin to ambition.25 Indeed, in some 
circumstances zêlos indicates a more socially acceptable form of phthonos, but there are also 
cases where it seems to be roughly synonymous with it. As we will see, there are also numerous 
examples in Sophocles’ plays of mortals who experience envy and/or jealousy that are not 
explicitly marked with phthonos or zêlos words, and this once again highlights the benefits of 
going beyond a lexical approach.  
 On the topic of divine phthonos, Goldhill has a different view, pointing out in his 
contribution to Konstan and Rutter’s Envy, Spite and Jealousy (2003) that this is in fact generally 
absent from tragedy.26 When it comes to mortals, he acknowledges that envy and jealousy enter 
into the rhetoric of explaining why characters act in the ways they do, but concludes that “neither 
motivates a plot, dominates the action, or even receives extensive representation or debate.”27 
Even in the cases in which Stanford admits that sexual jealousy is a strong motivator (e.g. 
Sophocles’ Deianeira, Euripides’ Medea), Goldhill argues that jealousy alone is a paltry 
explanation for the action that ensues.28 While fifth-century audiences of tragedy were certainly 
aware of and familiar with rivalrous emotions such as envy and jealousy, it is Goldhill’s view 
that these emotions are relatively subdued in tragedy. I believe that Goldhill has overstated how 
little effect these emotions have: they may not be the principal driving force of the action, but 
they do make significant contributions to the characterization of various figures—and notably, of 
monarchs, whose actions often determine the outcome—thus establishing a pattern that sheds 
                                                
25 Idem, 44. 
26 Goldhill (2003), 169. Stanford and Goldhill’s views on divine phthonos are perhaps not incompatible if what 
Stanford means to say is that there is minimal phthonos in tragedy but that what little we do see is that of the gods, 
and if the point that Goldhill is making is that divine phthonos is relatively unimportant in tragedy, relative to its role 
elsewhere. The difference in their conclusions may also stem from a focus on different tragedians; Aeschylus and 
Euripides seem to place more of an emphasis on divine phthonos than Sophocles does. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Stanford (1983), 35; Goldhill (2003), 167. 
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light on contemporary political beliefs. Moreover, these emotions motivate actions and speeches 
that propel the plot forward and raise the stakes involved.  
 In The Emotions of the Ancient Greeks (2006), Konstan does not comment on the role of 
envy in tragedy, focusing instead on the relationship between envy and indignation, particularly 
in archaic poetry.29 Regarding jealousy, however, he distinguishes between two types according 
to our modern English understanding of the word, one pertaining to amorous contexts and 
another relating to issues of success or advantage.30 He focuses exclusively on the former and 
argues against the existence of sexual jealousy in ancient Greece, claiming, for example, that 
Euripides’ Medea acted not so much out of jealousy as out of anger over Jason’s lack of 
gratitude and broken oaths.31 This view is in contrast to those of both Stanford and Goldhill 
(Goldhill at least acknowledges its existence even if he argues against its overall import) and 
very much in contrast to that of Sanders in Envy and Jealousy in Classical Athens (2014). 
Sanders argues that phthonos is relatively rare in drama (both in tragedy and comedy), appearing 
only in short episodes that do not have much bearing on the development of the plot, with the 
exception of sexual jealousy, which he claims serves as a crucial determinant of several 
tragedies.32 Sanders quotes Goldhill (2003) and explicitly acknowledges that he himself 
attributes more than just a small role to envy and jealousy, but a broader treatment would 
establish this idea more securely. In his chapter on phthonos in tragedy and old comedy, Sanders 
discusses three tragedies: Sophocles’ Ajax and Euripides’ Hippolytus and Ion. He does not 
explain why he selected these and excluded others, but these are certainly not the only tragedies 
in which envy and jealousy are at work.  
                                                
29 Konstan (2006), 111-28. 
30 Idem, 220. 
31 Idem, 233. 
32 Sanders (2014), 118, 129. 
  80 
 This chapter will focus on envy and jealousy as they appear in relation to sole rulers in 
the tragedies of Sophocles, with supplemental material drawn from those of Aeschylus and 
Euripides for comparative purposes when possible.33 Sophocles’ Theban plays in particular have 
much to say about power dynamics and resulting conflicts. Moreover, Sophocles displays a 
penchant for exploring the psychological depths of his characters that makes his works especially 
rewarding for those interested in the study of emotions. Of course, this is not to say that the 
works of Aeschylus and Euripides are less rich, but the limitations of time and space do not 
allow for a comprehensive survey of all three major Athenian tragedians. While we cannot 
automatically assume that the patterns regarding envy and jealousy in Sophocles’ works run 
parallel to what we may find in those of Aeschylus and Euripides, they should at least be 
sufficient to establish a counterclaim to the idea that these emotions have little import in Greek 
tragedy as a whole.  
 
4. Power attracts the envy of others 
 
 In the discussion that follows, we will see a pattern of thinking emerge, namely that 
positions of power naturally attract the envy of others. This idea appears in both the actions and 
speeches of various characters, although characters generally do not admit to feeling envy 
                                                
33 I have chosen not to include the topic of sexual jealousy in the present discussion. Deianeira is the only character 
who seems to experience it in the works of Sophocles, and no political aspect is emphasized. It is worth noting, 
however, that it is Heracles’ position of power that affords him the license to do as he pleases and thus he acts in a 
way that sparks his wife’s jealousy. This may in fact be another variant of how rulership and phthonos coincide. In 
addition, Deianeira is perhaps especially susceptible to jealousy on account of her position as queen, for she has 
much to lose. Her jealousy need not be sexual or romantic in nature, since she may be concerned primarily for what 
the introduction of Heracles’ mistress into the house will mean for her own position (Carawan 2000, 203). Since 
there are relatively few examples of this particular manifestation, namely that a ruler’s power enables him to engage 
in behavior that causes his wife to retaliate out of phthonos, I will simply point it out but not dwell upon it at this 
time (cf. Hdt. 9.108-12). 
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themselves, which we also saw to be the case in the texts of the previous chapter.34 There is, 
however, a counterargument about why such envy is misguided that is just as prominent—if not 
more so—and much of the evidence for the existence of the idea that power attracts envy is 
located in refutations of it. This argument against the desirability of sole rulership does not 
appear in epic, but takes its beginnings in the poetry of Archilochus (Fr. 19 West) and Solon (Fr. 
32-33 West), increases in frequency throughout the fifth century (as we will see in the dramas of 
Sophocles as well as in those of Euripides), and subsequently finds fuller expression in Plato’s 
Republic (576c-80c) and Xenophon’s Hiero (see Appendix).35  
In order for feelings of envy to exist, there must first be something worth envying. This 
was as much common knowledge for the ancient Greeks as it is for us today. In Sophocles’ Ajax, 
the chorus, comprised of men from Salamis, confronts Ajax after hearing what they hope are 
fictitious rumors about what Ajax has done in the wake of losing the contest for Achilles’ armor. 
Loyal to their leader, they give him the benefit of the doubt and assume that what Odysseus is 
spreading is slander. They reason: 
 τῶν γὰρ µεγάλων ψυχῶν ἱεὶς 
οὐκ ἂν ἁµάρτοι· κατὰ δ᾽ ἄν τις ἐµοῦ 
τοιαῦτα λέγων οὐκ ἂν πείθοι. 
πρὸς γὰρ τὸν ἔχονθ᾽ ὁ φθόνος ἕρπει. 
 
                                                
34 Two of Sophocles’ characters make what can be considered firsthand admissions—but with zêloun, not phthonein. 
This suggests that they are trying to do away with any sort of negative connotation, but even with their use of the 
less intense verb, the qualified nature of their statements reveals a lingering insecurity about the appropriateness of 
their admissions. After realizing the magnitude of what he has done in his attempt to punish the Greek commanders, 
Ajax says to his young son, καίτοι σε καὶ νῦν τοῦτό γε ζηλοῦν ἔχω, / ὁθούνεκ᾽ οὐδὲν τῶνδ᾽ ἐπαισθάνῃ κακῶν 
(“Even now I have cause to envy you, since you perceive these misfortunes not at all,” Aj. 552-53). He does not say 
that he does in fact envy his son, but rather he acknowledges that he could potentially feel that way (Stanford 1981, 
130). Electra is more direct, but even her admission is tempered by what follows. In an argument with her sister, 
Electra declares, ζηλῶ σε τοῦ νοῦ, τῆς δὲ δειλίας στυγῶ (“I admire your sense, but I hate your cowardice,” El. 1027). 
She cannot help but issue a scathing insult in the same sentence, thus tearing her sister down more than praising her. 
35 Archilochus says that he does not care to be tyrant, although he does not provide an explanation (Fr. 19 West; see 
p. 5). Solon holds himself up as an example of someone who has successfully resisted the allure of tyranny, in one 
instance pointing to the loss of identity it would entail (Fr. 33 West), but in other fragments, his objections to 
tyranny have more to do with its effects on the city than on the tyrant. Homeric kings may be concerned to avoid 
envy (e.g. Menelaus in Od. 4; see p. 54-55), but they do not argue that kingship itself is problematic or undesirable. 
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“If one should aim at mighty spirits, he would not miss, but if someone should rumor 
such things against me, he would not be persuasive. For envy advances upon the one who 
has.” (Aj. 154-57) 
 
Prior to his night of madness, Ajax was an esteemed man—a renowned warrior and the son of 
Telamon, king of Salamis. Accordingly, the chorus paints him as belonging to the group of 
“haves,” whose members naturally suffer on account of envy more than the “have-nots” do.36 
The chorus also characterizes the men among whom these alleged rumors are swirling in an 
unflattering way: they are acting insolently (καθυβρίζων, 153) in their delight at Ajax’s expense, 
which the chorus understands to be a result of their phthonos (157). Thus we can see several 
important beliefs: the “haves” attract more envy than the “have-nots,” envy makes people more 
likely to believe slanderous reports, and envy can incite untoward behavior.  
 The madness of Ajax does not appear in Pindar’s (or Homer’s) reckoning of the story, but 
Pindar draws an explicit connection between envy and Ajax’s death, making a similar statement 
about how envy follows the powerful: ὄψον δὲ λόγοι φθονεροῖσιν, / ἅπτεται δ᾽ ἐσλῶν ἀεί, 
χειρόνεσσι δ᾽ οὐκ ἐρίζει. / κεῖνος καὶ Τελαµῶνος δάψεν υἱὸν, / φασγάνῳ ἀµφικυλίσαις (Words 
are a treat for the envious, and [envy] always clings to noble men, but does not contend with 
lesser ones. That devoured even the son of Telamon, piercing him with a sword, Nem. 8.21-23b). 
Elsewhere, Pindar blames the Greeks for Ajax’s suicide (Nem. 7.24-27); thus the phthonos that is 
responsible most likely belongs to the Greeks collectively, which led them to make the unfair 
judgment regarding Achilles’ armor.37 While different sources vary in terms of what they 
emphasize as the factors contributing to Ajax’s demise, it is nevertheless clear that Ajax was a 
                                                
36 The chorus’ mention of “the one who has” does not specify what it is that the person has. Generally speaking, this 
could refer to either material possessions or intangibles, but given that their focus here is on Ajax, it seems likely 
that they mean a person of high esteem or renown. Ajax is known for his martial abilities rather than for riches, as 
his epithets indicate: σακεσφόρῳ (shield-bearing, 19), ὠµοκρατὴς (strong-shouldered, 205), etc. 
37 Bulman (1992), 46. Sanders takes a different approach, drawing attention to the envy that Ajax feels toward 
Odysseus after the latter was awarded the armor (2014, 122-25). 
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figure beleagered by envy that stemmed from the elevated position he enjoyed and tried to 
maintain.38 
 Since sole rulers are the epitome of the “haves,” it follows naturally that they would 
attract a great deal of envy. In the Oedipus Tyrannus, when Teiresias reluctantly discloses that 
Oedipus himself killed Laius, Oedipus lashes out and accuses both Teiresias and Creon of having 
ulterior motives. He then takes a moment to reflect on the nature of his position: 
ὦ πλοῦτε καὶ τυραννὶ καὶ τέχνη τέχνης 
ὑπερφέρουσα τῷ πολυζήλῳ βίῳ, 
ὅσος παρ᾽ ὑµῖν ὁ φθόνος φυλάσσεται, 
εἰ τῆσδέ γ᾽ ἀρχῆς οὕνεχ᾽, ἣν ἐµοὶ πόλις 
δωρητόν, οὐκ αἰτητόν, εἰσεχείρισεν, 
ταύτης Κρέων ὁ πιστός, οὑξ ἀρχῆς φίλος,  
λάθρᾳ µ᾽ ὑπελθὼν ἐκβαλεῖν ἱµείρεται 
ὑφεὶς µάγον τοιόνδε µηχανορράφον, 
δόλιον ἀγύρτην, ὅστις ἐν τοῖς κέρδεσιν 
µόνον δέδορκε, τὴν τέχνην δ᾽ ἔφυ τυφλός.  
 
“Wealth and kingship and skill surpassing skill in the much-admired life, how great is the 
envy stored up in you, if on account of this rule, which the city entrusted to me—offered, 
not asked for—trusty Creon, a friend from the beginning, desires to expel me by 
undermining me secretly [and] suborning such a crafty-scheming impostor, a deceitful 
beggar, who has sight only for profits but is blind in respect to skill.”39 (380-89) 
 
In this passage, Oedipus fully embraces his role as an innocent victim. He clearly believes that it 
is the king’s position that turns a well-liked man into a much-envied (and conspired against) man, 
rather than anything the king himself does or does not do. He emphasizes this rule (τῆσδέ γ᾽ 
ἀρχῆς οὕνεχ᾽, 383) as the reason Creon has now (allegedly) turned against him, and makes it a 
point to mention that he himself did not seek out such a position, but that it was freely given to 
                                                
38 In Sophocles’ Ajax, Ajax and Teucer both refer to the awarding of arms to Odysseus as dishonest or somehow 
fraudulent (445-49, 1135). In the Odyssey, Odysseus names Zeus’ hatred of the Greeks as the ultimate cause of 
Ajax’s destruction (11.558-60). 
39 In tragedy, turannos at times means simply “king” (Parker 1998, 58). Accordingly, I believe that turannis ought to 
be translated here as something other than “tyranny,” given that these are Oedipus’ own words and he would not 
intentionally cast aspersions on his rule by implying that there was anything illegitimate or authoritarian about it. 
Sophocles’ fifth-century audience, however, was aware of the potentially pejorative connotation of turannis, and the 
lines following its appearance, with their mention of phthonos, seem to blur the lines between kingship and tyranny, 
even if Oedipus himself does not realize it.  
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him. Moreover, the definite article in τῷ πολυζήλῳ βίῳ (381) indicates that Oedipus is not 
referring to life in general, but to the specific life of a king.40 In Oedipus’ view, it is a king’s 
inevitable burden to endure such envy and its unfortunate effects. 
In his description of the king’s predicament, Oedipus also draws a clear association 
between phthonos and zêlos: zêlos may at times suggest a milder, more benign emotion than 
phthonos, but his point here is that where there is zêlos (or, more specifically, something that is 
poluzêlos), phthonos is likely to follow, since the two are not easily disentangled. Interestingly, 
while Oedipus surely means to invoke the passive meaning of poluzêlos—namely that he is the 
recipient of zêlos—the adjective may also be capable of conveying an active meaning. 
Bacchylides applies the term to Proetus, a mythical king who ruled over Argos, until his twin 
brother, Acrisius, defeated and exiled him (11.63). Eventually they split the kingdom, but they 
were notorious for their long-standing quarrel, which was said to have begun in the womb 
(Apollod. Bibl. 2.2.1-2). Thus it is ambiguous (and likely deliberately so) whether Bacchylides’ 
use of poluzêlos is active or passive. Given that it is here that Oedipus shows the first overt signs 
of jealousy regarding the maintenance of his position, keen observers may wonder whether both 
active and passive meanings are applicable.41 Oedipus both incurs envy and feels a great deal of 
jealousy, although he himself is only aware of and intends to draw attention to the former.42 Thus 
his words may reveal more about the king’s experience than he himself realizes. 
 By the mid-fifth century, the idea that power attracts envy had become so deeply 
entrenched in popular thinking that it began to manifest itself in a new way: it was no longer 
                                                
40 Dawe (2006), 108. Phthonos and zêlos (and related forms) do not appear frequently in Sophocles’ plays, so this 
instance of both in close proximity is striking. Given that they appear in neighboring lines and without any 
additional elaboration, it seems that they are more or less synonymous here; zêlos is not necessarily less potent than 
phthonos in this case.  
41 This ambiguity remains in the translation of certain commentators. For example, Rusten suggests rendering it as 
“in the competitive life” (1991, 23). 
42 For the main distinction between envy and jealousy, see p. 23. In short, envy has to do with something one does 
not currently have, while jealousy has to do with something one does currently have and is afraid of losing to a rival. 
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simply a warning to rulers about the dangers they faced, but for those in power, it also functioned 
as a source of comfort and/or as a strategy for preserving their reputation. By reducing the 
motivations of someone of lower standing to mere envy, a person of higher standing can both 
avoid having to reflect on his or her own behavior and deflect scrutiny onto the other person.43 In 
this way, labeling others as envious can be considered a political tactic that works to the 
advantage of the “haves” and to the disadvantage of the “have-nots.”44 Oedipus does not seem to 
be employing this strategy consciously, but nevertheless it offers him an explanation of Teiresias 
and Creon’s behavior and so too a convenient way of insulating himself from the painful truth of 
Teiresias’ words, namely that he killed his father.  
We can observe a similar phenomenon in Thucydides’ depiction of the Athenians’ 
behavior leading up to and during the Peloponnesian War. Thucydides presents several speeches 
that liken the Athenian empire to a tyranny, although this comparison was likely already in use 
before he wrote his history. While delivering a speech at Sparta and urging their allies to action, 
the Corinthians portray Athens’ hegemony as a tyranny. They exhort, δοκοῖµεν ἂν…τῶν 
πατέρων χείρους φαίνεσθαι, οἳ τὴν Ἑλλάδα ἠλευθέρωσαν, ἡµεῖς δὲ οὐδ᾽ ἡµῖν αὐτοῖς βεβαιοῦµεν 
αὐτό, τύραννον δὲ ἐῶµεν ἐγκαθεστάναι πόλιν, τοὺς δ᾽ ἐν µιᾷ µονάρχους ἀξιοῦµεν καταλύειν 
(“We would seem…to appear inferior to our fathers, who gave Greece freedom, while we do not 
even secure it for ourselves, but allow a tyrant city to be established, although we deem it fitting 
to overthrow the monarchs in individual cities,” 1.122.3).45 Pericles similarly represents 
Athenian power as a tyranny, but uses it as a warning in his attempt to steel the Athenians’ 
                                                
43 Cairns (2003), 237. 
44 Ibid. 
45 The fact that the Corinthians do not feel the need to elaborate upon this likening of Athens to a tyrant city suggests 
that the comparison was already in circulation and Thucydides’ audience had likely heard it before. The similarly 
abbreviated manner in which it appears subsequently in Thucydides’ history lends further support to this inference 
(Tuplin 1985, 353). 
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resolve in the face of adverse conditions. He cautions, ὡς τυραννίδα γὰρ ἤδη ἔχετε αὐτήν, ἣν 
λαβεῖν µὲν ἄδικον δοκεῖ εἶναι, ἀφεῖναι δὲ ἐπικίνδυνον (“For what you have presently is like a 
tyranny, which seems unjust to take hold of, but dangerous to release,” 2.63.2). Cleon also uses 
the word turannis in his speech to persuade the Athenians to stick to the original plan of killing 
the men of Mytilene and enslaving the women and children, but he does not say the Athenian 
empire is like a tyranny; he says it is one.46 He believes the Athenians have been lulled into a 
false sense of security, and so he chastises them, οὐ σκοποῦντες ὅτι τυραννίδα ἔχετε τὴν ἀρχὴν 
καὶ πρὸς ἐπιβουλεύοντας αὐτοὺς καὶ ἄκοντας ἀρχοµένους (“[You make decisions] without 
considering that your rule is a tyranny and that those you rule are themselves plotting against you 
and unwilling,” 3.37.2).  
Cognizant of the fact that their empire could be construed as a tyranny, the Athenians (as 
represented by Thucydides) appear to have relied on the idea that holding a tyranny and 
incurring envy go hand in hand to help them contextualize the hostility they received from 
abroad. In the debate at Sparta before the declaration of war, the Athenians defend themselves, 
and in doing so, they assume a connection between envy and tyranny that is similar to the view 
Oedipus expresses in the Oedipus Tyrannus. The Athenians argue, Ἆρ᾽ ἄξιοί ἐσµεν, ὦ 
Λακεδαιµόνιοι, καὶ προθυµίας ἕνεκα τῆς τότε καὶ γνώµης ξυνέσεως ἀρχῆς γε ἧς ἔχοµεν τοῖς 
Ἕλλησι µὴ οὕτως ἄγαν ἐπιφθόνως διακεῖσθαι; (“Are we not worthy, Spartans, on account of our 
willingness at that time and our intelligence of judgment, of being spared such a high degree of 
envy from the Greeks, at least on account of the rule we have?” 1.75.1). They feel that they 
earned their empire and therefore do not deserve envy, but in making such a declaration, they 
implicitly acknowledge that they have in fact incurred extreme envy from other Greek cities (or 
                                                
46 Hornblower (1991), 337. 
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at least, it is their perception that the hostility directed toward them is rooted in envy).47 Pericles 
also makes a point about the inevitable connection between envy and power when attempting to 
improve the Athenians’ morale, stating that those who rule must necessarily contend with a 
certain amount of envy and hatred (2.64.4-5). This is indeed a compelling argument and a 
potential source of reassurance for those in power. Attributing one’s unpopularity to the envy of 
others shifts the blame onto those others: since envy is not considered a virtuous emotion, 
labeling others as envious releases the recipient of envy from culpability. In Oedipus’ case, 
however, this justification for Teiresias’ damning disclosure (and for Creon’s actions) is entirely 
inaccurate. Thus Oedipus is misguided in his application of the commonplace that power attracts 
envy, an error in judgment that furthers the perception of him as a tyrant.48  
 Shortly after Oedipus makes known his suspicions about Teiresias and Creon in the 
Oedipus Tyrannus, Creon appears, intent on clearing his name. He argues that it is in fact better 
not to be king: 
σκέψαι δὲ τοῦτο πρῶτον, εἴ τιν’ ἂν δοκεῖς 
ἄρχειν ἑλέσθαι ξὺν φόβοισι µᾶλλον ἢ 
ἄτρεστον εὕδοντ’, εἰ τά γ’ αὔθ’ ἕξει κράτη. 
ἐγὼ µὲν οὖν οὔτ’ αὐτὸς ἱµείρων ἔφυν 
τύραννος εἶναι µᾶλλον ἢ τύραννα δρᾶν, 
οὔτ’ ἄλλος ὅστις σωφρονεῖν ἐπίσταται. 
νῦν µὲν γὰρ ἐκ σοῦ πάντ’ ἄνευ φόβου φέρω, 
εἰ δ’ αὐτὸς ἦρχον, πολλὰ κἂν ἄκων ἔδρων. 
πῶς δῆτ’ ἐµοὶ τυραννὶς ἡδίων ἔχειν 
ἀρχῆς ἀλύπου καὶ δυναστείας ἔφυ;  
 
“Consider this first, whether you think anyone would choose to rule amidst fears rather 
than sleeping fearlessly, if he will have the same powers. Certainly I myself was not born 
desiring to be king, nor anyone else who knows good sense, but rather, [I desire] to do 
                                                
47 Plato also represents the envy of the other Greeks as a precipitating factor for the Peloponnesian War (Men. 242a). 
See p. 157-58 for a more detailed discussion of this passage.  
48 Goldhill (2003), 168. Oedipus’ claim that envy motivates Creon’s actions at least seems to be a genuine mistake 
on his part. When Clytemnestra indicates in a prayer that Electra has a tendency to spread empty rumors about her 
out of phthonos (Soph. El. 637-42), it is unclear whether she truly believes this or whether she says this with the 
intention of discrediting Electra and thereby exculpating herself. 
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what a king does. For as things are now, on account of you, I enjoy all the advantages—
and without fear—but if I myself ruled, I would have to do many things against my will. 
How then is kingship sweeter for me to have than painless rule and lordship?” (584-93) 
 
Implicit in Creon’s argument is the recognition that many men covet a king’s position, but he 
strives to distance himself from such men. Through his use of αὐτὸς (587) and ὅστις σωφρονεῖν 
ἐπίσταται (589), Creon emphasizes that while the natural or uncritical view of kingship is that it 
is desirable, he and those who have good sense know better. This reiterates the belief that 
envious men are lacking in moral fortitude, making it all the more important for Creon to dispel 
the suspicion that he is conspiring against Oedipus out of envy. Creon reasons that he already 
enjoys certain privileges by virtue of his association with Oedipus, but by not being king himself, 
he avoids the concomitant envy that is presumably the source of the fears that plague kings. 
 A similar line of reasoning about the ways in which a king’s position is burdensome 
appears in several of Euripides’ plays: the Hippolytus, Phoenician Women, and Ion. In the 
Hippolytus, produced roughly around the same time as the Oedipus Tyrannus, Theseus does not 
explicitly accuse Hippolytus of desiring his throne, but Hippolytus nonetheless defends himself 
preemptively against such a charge. He explains: 
πότερα τὸ τῆσδε σῶµ᾽ ἐκαλλιστεύετο 
πασῶν γυναικῶν; ἢ σὸν οἰκήσειν δόµον 
ἔγκληρον εὐνὴν προσλαβὼν ἐπήλπισα; 
µάταιος ἆρ’ ἦν, οὐδαµοῦ µὲν οὖν φρενῶν. 
ἀλλ’ ὡς τυραννεῖν ἡδὺ τοῖσι σώφροσιν; 
†ἥκιστά γ᾽, εἰ µὴ† τὰς φρένας διέφθορεν 
θνητῶν ὅσοισιν ἁνδάνει µοναρχία. 
ἐγὼ δ’ ἀγῶνας µὲν κρατεῖν Ἑλληνικοὺς 
πρῶτος θέλοιµ’ ἄν, ἐν πόλει δὲ δεύτερος 
σὺν τοῖς ἀρίστοις εὐτυχεῖν ἀεὶ φίλοις· 
πράσσειν τε γὰρ πάρεστι, κίνδυνός τ’ ἀπὼν 
κρείσσω δίδωσι τῆς τυραννίδος χάριν. 
 
“Was the body of this woman the most beautiful of all women? Or did I hope to govern 
your household by taking hold of your wealthy marriage bed? Then I [would be] rash, 
with no wits at all. But [is it the case] that to be king is sweet in the view of those with 
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good sense? Not at all, unless kingship has corrupted the minds of those men to whom it 
is pleasing. I may wish to prevail as first in the Hellenic games, but in the city, [I wish] to 
live prosperously as second, always with the best men [as] my friends. For it is possible 
to act, and danger being absent grants a greater pleasure than kingship.” (1009-20) 
 
Like Creon, Hippolytus prefers the privileges afforded to him in an unofficial capacity: by being 
second (i.e. the son of the king), he can live well without having to worry about being usurped or 
otherwise targeted by those who might envy him. Moreover, both men use words with the stem 
sôphro- to put themselves into a category of higher understanding and sophistication than men 
who succumb to envy. Hippolytus goes a step further than Creon, however, by describing 
kingship itself as a corrupting force: certain men may be predisposed to finding kingship 
appealing (ὅσοισιν ἁνδάνει, 1015), but kingship itself (µοναρχία, 1015) is the subject of the 
active verb διέφθορεν (1014).  
 In Euripides’ Phoenician Women, Jocasta cautions her son Eteocles against the things she 
imagines he considers advantageous about being in power. The scenario presents notable 
differences from those discussed above. Jocasta is not trying to prove that she herself does not 
want power, but rather she aims to persuade her son to let go of his obsession with holding a 
tyranny. Moreover, she is in a uniquely qualified position to dispense such advice, having lived 
as queen for many years and having seen firsthand all the troubles that plague the royal 
household. This lends an increased credibility to her argument against the desirability of rule, 
although in content it is similar to what we have seen above. She warns: 
τί τὴν τυραννίδ’, ἀδικίαν εὐδαίµονα, 
τιµᾷς ὑπέρφευ καὶ µέγ’ ἥγησαι τόδε; 
περιβλέπεσθαι τίµιον; κενὸν µὲν οὖν. 
ἢ πολλὰ µοχθεῖν πόλλ’ ἔχων ἐν δώµασι 
βούλῃ; τί δ’ ἔστι τὸ πλέον; ὄνοµ’ ἔχει µόνον· 
ἐπεὶ τά γ’ ἀρκοῦνθ’ ἱκανὰ τοῖς γε σώφροσιν. 
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“Why do you excessively value tyranny, a prosperous injustice, and consider it great?49 Is 
being admired valuable? On the contrary, it is useless. Or are you willing to endure many 
hardships for the sake of having many things in your house? What is the advantage? 
[Tyranny] offers a name alone, for what is sufficient is satisfactory, at least for those of 
good sense.” (549-54) 
 
While Jocasta describes admiration as being empty (rather than as potentially dangerous), she 
acknowledges that wealth brings trouble along with pleasure, presumably on account of the envy 
it stands to attract. In her full speech, she mentions phthonos only once (545), when she argues 
that men who value equality (isotês, 536) as opposed to ambition (philotimia, 532) do not 
succumb to envy, a statement that reiterates the connection between envy and reputation.50 
Nevertheless, envy remains a prominent topic throughout her speech, and we can see this in the 
appearance of associated terms. Her use of περιβλέπεσθαι (551), which appears only here in 
Euripides’ works, recalls the chorus’ use of ζήλῳ…ἐπέβλεπεν at the end of Sophocles’ Oedipus 
Tyrannus (1526, to be discussed below), and the appearance of two timê words in consecutive 
lines (τιµᾷς, 550; τίµιον, 551) reinforces the idea that she believes her son is acting out of envy, 
fueled by concern for his personal honor. Like Creon and Hippolytus, Jocasta indicates that 
prudent men (τοῖς…σώφροσιν, 554) know better than to strive for tyranny, thus issuing a subtle 
criticism of Eteocles as lacking good sense. She then turns to Polyneices and reproaches him for 
endangering Thebes. Ultimately, Jocasta fails to dissuade either son from his chosen course of 
action—they hardly even acknowledge her before resuming their quarrel—which serves as a 
sobering reminder that while some, such as Jocasta, recognize that a ruler’s life is not enviable, 
some persist in believing otherwise.  
                                                
49 Jocasta likely intends for turannis to mean “tyranny” rather than “kingship,” given the larger context of her speech 
as well as the appositive ἀδικίαν εὐδαίµονα, which combines two antithetical ideas: the idea that tyranny is desirable 
on account of the associated wealth and the idea that tyranny is ultimately unjust (Mastronarde 1994, 308). In 
Eteocles’ case, tyranny is doubly unjust. It is unjust in the way that any tyranny is unjust, but also on account of the 
fact that he has broken the agreement with his brother and driven him into exile. 
50 For the association between timê and the emotions of envy and jealousy in epic, see p. 46ff. 
  91 
In Euripides’ Ion, Ion explains to Xuthus why he does not wish to go with him to live in 
Athens, where Xuthus and Creusa are members of the royal house. His reasoning is similar to 
that of Creon, Hippolytus, and Jocasta: he views kings as fearful and surrounded by worthless 
friends, and he does not desire any part of such a life (621-32).51 Ion shapes his argument in 
terms of personal preference with first-person statements (ἂν θέλοιµι, 626; οὐ φιλῶ, 630), and 
generally refrains from passing absolute judgment on positions of power. Moreover, he does not 
attempt to depict himself as having superior insight or good sense for resisting the allure of 
kingship. This is perhaps in part because Ion, unlike Creon and Hippolytus, has no anxiety about 
being suspected of feeling envy—he does not pose any threat to Xuthus and Xuthus does not 
view him as a rival—but more significantly, Ion does eventually go to Athens and become king, 
thus providing the connection that later enables the Athenians to establish their Ionian empire.52 
If Euripides had had Ion declare himself too wise to want to be king, it could have potentially 
created an uncomfortable dissonance for the Athenian audience, who knew perfectly well what 
Ion’s future held in store.53 Nevertheless, all of these examples simultaneously acknowledge the 
prevalence of and work to challenge the idea that the position of a sole ruler is innately enviable. 
The fact that these counterarguments come from a diverse range of character perspectives—
young, old, male, female, citizen, foreigner—as well as from different authors demonstrates that 
this line of thinking was gaining in prominence and was not merely an outlier opinion in the fifth 
century. 
                                                
51 Ion thus rejects even the association with those in power, unlike Creon and Hippolytus, who are content to reap 
the benefits of such a connection. 
52 Wohl (2015), 22.  
53 Alternatively, if Ion were to make such a statement, it could function as a sign that he would be a sage and self-
aware king. Regardless, its absence makes matters simpler. 
  92 
 The topic of envy reappears at the end of the Oedipus Tyrannus, at which point the 
chorus issues a reminder that anyone can experience a reversal of fortune before reaching the end 
of life. The Theban elders caution: 
 ὦ πάτρας Θήβης ἔνοικοι, λεύσσετ᾽, Οἰδίπους ὅδε, 
ὃς τὰ κλείν᾽ αἰνίγµατ᾽ ᾔδει καὶ κράτιστος ἦν ἀνήρ, 
οὗ τίς οὐ ζήλῳ πολιτῶν ταῖς τύχαις ἐπέβλεπεν, 
εἰς ὅσον κλύδωνα δεινῆς συµφορᾶς ἐλήλυθεν. 
ὥστε θνητὸν ὄντ᾽ ἐκείνην τὴν τελευταίαν ἔδει 
ἡµέραν ἐπισκοποῦντα µηδέν᾽ ὀλβίζειν, πρὶν ἂν 
τέρµα τοῦ βίου περάσῃ µηδὲν ἀλγεινὸν παθών.54  
 
“Inhabitants of ancestral Thebes, behold this man Oedipus, who knew the renowned 
riddle and was a most powerful man. Who of the citizens did not eye his fortunes with 
envy? [See] into what a great flood of terrible misfortune he has come. Therefore, count 
no one who is mortal and waiting to see his final day as happy until he passes through the 
end of life having suffered nothing grievous.” (1524-30) 
 
The chorus’ message is clear: it is premature to judge whether an individual’s life is happy or not 
before it comes to an end. There is, however, another implicit lesson, namely that there is little 
(if any) point in dwelling on the pain of envy, given that we cannot know whether the person 
toward whom envy is directed is truly worthy of such envy until his or her life has reached its 
conclusion. According to the chorus, virtually every citizen envied Oedipus (although there is no 
suggestion that we should take this as a vindication of Oedipus’ earlier distrust of Creon). Here, 
the focus is on the ultimate pointlessness of envy more so than on its potential nefariousness, and 
accordingly, the term used is zêlos (1526): in this instance, it seems to denote a milder form of 
phthonos, more akin to covetous envy than begrudging envy.55 As the epitome of the “haves,” 
                                                
54 Dawe has argued that these lines are an interpolation, pointing to similar passages in Euripides (cf. Andr. 100-2; 
Phoen. 1687-89, 1758-63) (2006, 202). Other scholars disagree and the debate continues. See Sommerstein (2011); 
Kovacs (2014). Whether the lines are authentically Sophoclean has little bearing on the present study: regardless of 
the origins of these particular lines, the idea presented in them (i.e. that you cannot judge a man as happy until he 
comes to the end of his life) is a conventional one. For example, it is discussed at length in Herodotus’ narrative 
about the meeting between Croesus and Solon (1.32; see p. 140-41). 
55 For the distinction between covetous and begrudging envy, see p. 24; Sanders (2014), 38-39. Stanford’s 
observation that zêlos sometimes represents a milder form of phthonos (1983, 44) is valid here. Elsewhere (e.g. OT 
380-89; see p. 84), the two are not so different. 
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sole rulers are especially liable to incurring envy, but they also have the highest position from 
which to fall.56 By highlighting the change in Oedipus’ affairs, the chorus indirectly corroborates 
Creon’s earlier argument against the enviable nature of a king’s position: although the chorus 
and Creon have very different messages, they arrive to a similar conclusion, namely that feeling 
envy toward a ruler is not worthwhile.  
 Sophocles includes a comparable message in a scene near the end of the Antigone. A 
messenger arrives to tell of Haemon’s death, an event that subsequently prompts Eurydice’s 
suicide. He announces: 
οὐκ ἔσθ᾽ ὁποῖον στάντ᾽ ἂν ἀνθρώπου βίον 
οὔτ᾽ αἰνέσαιµ᾽ ἂν οὔτε µεµψαίµην ποτέ. 
τύχη γὰρ ὀρθοῖ καὶ τύχη καταρρέπει 
τὸν εὐτυχοῦντα τόν τε δυστυχοῦντ᾽ ἀεί· 
καὶ µάντις οὐδεὶς τῶν καθεστώτων βροτοῖς. 
Κρέων γὰρ ἦν ζηλωτός, ὡς ἐµοί, ποτέ, 
σώσας µὲν ἐχθρῶν τήνδε Καδµείαν χθόνα, 
λαβών τε χώρας παντελῆ µοναρχίαν 
ηὔθυνε, θάλλων εὐγενεῖ τέκνων σπορᾷ· 
καὶ νῦν ἀφεῖται πάντα. 
 
“There is no life of men of such a sort that I would ever praise or blame it as it stands. For 
fortune straightens and fortune makes fall the lucky and the unlucky constantly. And 
there is no prophet of established things for mortals. For Creon was once enviable, at 
least in my view, having saved this Cadmeian land from enemies, and after receiving 
total sovereignty of the region, he guided it straight, while flourishing with the noble 
sowing of children: and now all is lost.” (1156-65) 
 
Like in the passage from the Oedipus Tyrannus (quoted above), the term used here to denote 
envy is a form of zêlos (ζηλωτός, 1161). This is fitting, given that once again, the point being 
made is one about the precariousness of the good fortune that invites envy (and thus the 
pointlessness of envy), rather than about the potential danger or malignancy of such feelings. 
Nevertheless, these two passages once again demonstrate how common it was (or was believed 
                                                
56 Aeschylus’ Seven Against Thebes presents a similar message (i.e. that even the most successful are subject to 
reversals of fortune) and cites Oedipus as a prime example (772-84). 
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to be) for people to envy their rulers, even if this envy was ultimately a waste of emotional 
energy. In reality, all is not yet lost: Creon will fall even further when he learns of the death of 
his wife, which will reinforce the messenger’s point that fortune is constantly changing.  
In contrast to many of the previous cases, which involve arguments or statements about 
why people do not or should not envy rulers, the Oedipus at Colonus offers a concrete example 
of the disastrous effects that can ensue when people do envy rulers and their power. Creon 
assumed control of Thebes after Oedipus’ fall from grace, but eventually Oedipus’ sons, Eteocles 
and Polyneices, grew envious of Creon’s position, which in turn led to conflict between brothers. 
Ismene, their sister, describes how they were once satisfied with Creon occupying the throne: 
πρὶν µὲν γὰρ αὐτοῖς ἤρεσεν Κρέοντί τε / θρόνους ἐᾶσθαι, 367-68), but later had a change of 
heart: νῦν δ’ ἐκ θεῶν του κἀξ ἀλειτηροῦ φρενὸς / εἰσῆλθε τοῖν τρισαθλίοιν ἔρις κακή, / ἀρχῆς 
λαβέσθαι καὶ κράτους τυραννικοῦ (“But now, from one of the gods and a sinning mind, wicked 
strife entered into them, triply wretched, to seize command and kingly power,” 371-73). 
Although envy is not explicitly named as a driving force of the brothers’ actions, the scenario 
included the prerequisite conditions: Eteocles and Polyneices did not have control over Thebes, 
Creon did have control over Thebes, and the brothers felt that this was wrong. Moreover, Ismene 
attributes their deeds to “wicked strife” (ἔρις κακή, 372), and as we have seen in the previous 
chapter, where there is eris, there is often envy as well.57  
 When Polyneices makes his appearance, his telling of the events that transpired indicates 
that his idea of proper governance is more akin to a tyranny than to a benevolent kingship. He 
describes how he felt entitled to occupy the throne himself, but Eteocles took it upon himself to 
                                                
57 See p. 40-41, 48-49. As a point of comparison, in Euripides’ Phoenician Women, after Creon has already been 
removed from power, Jocasta mentions phthonos as she tries to dissuade Eteocles from obsessing over power. While 
we cannot expect absolute continuity among playwrights’ works or even among a single playwright’s works, this at 
the very least indicates that it would not be far-fetched to regard Eteocles (and so too Polyneices) as acting out of 
phthonos.  
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banish him in what Polyneices considers an unceremonious and illegitimate manner: οὔτε 
νικήσας λόγῳ / οὔτ’ εἰς ἔλεγχον χειρὸς οὐδ’ ἔργου µολών, / πόλιν δὲ πείσας (“neither by 
prevailing [against me] in an argument of words nor by entering into a test of act or deed, but by 
persuading the city,” 1296-98). His disdain for Eteocles’ power of persuasion would not have 
endeared him to a democratic audience, and it reveals an authoritarian disposition.58 Moreover, 
Polyneices clearly prioritizes his own reputation over all else, including the well-being of his 
native city.59 His speech is relatively devoid of explicit verbal markers such as timê, kleos, or 
kudos, but he uses terms that emphasize the moral outrage he feels, which in turn reveals an 
elevated concern for honor.60 For example, he describes Eteocles as a turannos (1338) who 
laughs at both Oedipus and Polyneices (κοινῇ καθ’ ἡµῶν ἐγγελῶν, 1339). When Antigone tries 
to dissuade him from marching against Thebes, asking what he hopes to gain by destroying it, he 
responds simply, αἰσχρὸν τὸ φεύγειν, καὶ τὸ πρεσβεύοντ᾽ ἐµὲ / οὕτω γελᾶσθαι τοῦ κασιγνήτου 
πάρα (“It is shameful to be in exile and to be derided in this way by my brother, since I am the 
elder,” 1422-23). This may indeed be shameful, but the fact that Polyneices is willing to risk his 
own life, his comrades’ lives, and the destruction of his ancestral Thebes all for the sake of 
personal honor speaks volumes. He has determined that sole rule is the definitive measure of his 
honor, and this obsession suggests that he is being consumed by a particularly corrosive envy. 
He has heard the prophecy regarding his and Eteocles’ mutual deaths, but he would rather die 
                                                
58 Blundell (1989), 244-45. Blundell notes that Sophocles does not depict Eteocles as blameless, but he is less 
objectionable in the eyes of an Athenian audience in this particular regard. 
59 For Aristotle, the distinction between a king and a tyrant hinges upon the question of whose interest is at the 
forefront of the ruler’s mind (Pol. 1279a33-b7). According to this logic, Polyneices is surely a would-be tyrant, 
rather than a would-be king. 
60 Polyneices uses the verb atimân when he entreats Antigone to provide him with a proper burial so that he might 
not be dishonored (1409), but the request itself is not an unusual one. 
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and take his brother with him than live to see his continued rule.61 Thus Polyneices exhibits a 
combination of covetous and begrudging envy, but the latter seems to be the stronger of the two: 
his ultimate goal is to deprive Eteocles of the throne, regardless of what that means for his own 
attainment of the throne or even for his life. 
 We have now seen examples that illustrate the commonplace that sole rulership attracts 
the envy of others, arguments that challenge the desirability of such a position, and statements 
about the pointlessness and/or dangers of feeling envy toward rulers. But armed with the 
knowledge that power typically attracts envy, what is a sole ruler to do? The prospect of 
constituents’ envy is one of the primary reasons why sole rulers were believed to live in fear, and 
unfortunately for them, mere awareness of it does not necessarily equip them to manage or 
circumvent it. The alacrity with which Oedipus assumes an envious Creon is conspiring against 
him demonstrates this fear in action, and indeed, his paranoia renders him incapable of 
evaluating the facts in a sensible manner. Aeschylus’ Agamemnon offers another depiction of a 
monarch who is wary of provoking envy, at least initially, but who ultimately fails to navigate 
the situation wisely. When Agamemnon arrives home from Troy, Clytemnestra urges him to 
dismount from his chariot onto strewn tapestries, but he objects: 
µηδ᾽ εἵµασι στρώσασ᾽ ἐπίφθονον πόρον 
τίθει· θεούς τοι τοῖσδε τιµαλφεῖν χρεών, 
ἐν ποικίλοις δὲ θνητὸν ὄντα κάλλεσιν 
βαίνειν ἐµοὶ µὲν οὐδαµῶς ἄνευ φόβου. 
 
“Do not make my path liable to envy by spreading it with garments. We must worship the 
gods with these, but for one who is mortal to walk on beautiful works of tapestry is in no 
way without fear in my view.” (921-24) 
 
                                                
61 One could argue that as a son of Oedipus, Polyneices is more aware than most of the futility of trying to avoid a 
prophecy’s fulfillment and so he is just resigned to his fate. His straightforward and unwavering resolve, however, 
suggests that he not only accepts the idea of mutual death but even welcomes it as a matter of moral necessity.  
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Agamemnon thus demonstrates awareness that he risks the phthonos of the gods if he does as 
Clytemnestra suggests. Several lines later, he raises the censure of men as another concern, 
pointing out, φήµη γε µέντοι δηµόθρους µέγα σθένει (“The voice of the people, however, has 
great strength,” 938).62 Clytemnestra works to allay his various fears in different ways, 
ultimately countering, ὁ δ᾽ ἀφθόνητός γ᾽οὐκ ἐπίζηλος πέλει (“The unenvied man is not 
admirable,” 939), and this argument wins him over. The idea that envy is a marker of success is 
one that appears elsewhere as well, but there are several notable caveats about its use here.63 First, 
the fact that it is Clytemnestra who says this—a woman who duplicitously pretends to ward off 
envy (φθόνος δ᾽ ἀπέστω, “But let envy be absent,” 904) while in reality hoping to stir up envy 
toward her husband in an attempt to further assassinate his character—is a solid indication (to the 
audience, if not to Agamemnon) that we should not blindly accept such logic in every case. 
Moreover, Clytemnestra’s words seem to draw a distinction between phthonos and zêlos: a man 
who does not provoke envy in the bad sense (phthonos) is not worthy of envy in the good sense 
(zêlos).64 The context of this situation, however, suggests that she is taking advantage of the 
conceptual fluidity and deliberately blurring the line between the two: phthonos is bad, but zêlos 
is not always good.65 Even if we accept her statement as valid—that the unenvied man is truly 
not admirable—this does not actually prove that it is appropriate to act deliberately so as to incite 
envy.66 If Agamemnon were a humbler, more sensible man, we might expect him to realize this, 
especially since this argument does nothing to dispel his earlier objection regarding the phthonos 
                                                
62 Denniston and Page (1957), 148.  
63 Cf. Hes. Op. 312-13: εἰ δέ κεν ἐργάζῃ, τάχα σε ζηλώσει ἀεργὸς / πλουτεῦντα· πλούτῳ δ᾽ ἀρετὴ καὶ κῦδος ὀπηδεῖ 
(If you work, soon the idle man will envy you as you become wealthy: excellence and renown go along with 
wealth); Pind. Pyth. 1.85-86: ἀλλ᾽ ὅµως, κρέσσων γὰρ οἰκτιρµοῦ φθόνος, / µὴ παρίει καλά (But nevertheless, do not 
give up on noble deeds, for envy is better than pity).  
64 Stanford (1983), 142. 
65 Clytemnestra’s assertion suggests that phthonos is either a precursor or concomitant of zêlos. For the idea that 
zêlos gives way to phthonos, see OT 380-89 (p. 84); Pl. Menex. 242a (p. 157 note 7). 
66 Goldhill (1986), 12. 
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of the gods. Clytemnestra only addresses this point cursorily, with a bizarre counterfactual 
hypothetical about whether he would tread on the tapestries if he had made a vow to the gods.67 
At any rate, neither divine nor mortal envy from walking on the tapestries can be 
considered the immediate cause of Agamemnon’s death, but nevertheless this exchange 
characterizes him as vain and reckless, since the most plausible reason for why he yields so 
suddenly is that he himself secretly wants to walk on the tapestries and be welcomed home with 
such pomp.68 Thus we can see what happens when a ruler throws caution to the winds and gives 
in to his desires. If Agamemnon had heeded his initial misgivings about incurring the envy of 
gods and men, he would not have acquiesced to Clytemnestra’s instructions, which do result in 
his death. Assessing and managing the envy of others is a difficult matter for kings: in Oedipus’ 
case, his hyperawareness leads to misguided accusations, but in Agamemnon’s case, his 
dismissal of initial concerns leads to a fatal mistake.  
For those who experience envy toward rulers, the most neutral outcome in tragedy is 
sheer pointlessness, as passages near the end of the Oedipus Tyrannus and Antigone reveal, but 
nowhere is it seen to play a positive role. Eteocles and Polyneices constitute an extreme example 
of the negative effects that can come from feeling envy. Incited by envy of Creon’s position, they 
have taken power from him, but the allure of sole rule is too great and they are unable to share 
with one another; thus envy takes hold again and eventually leads to double fratricide, along with 
the destruction of several armies. Given that envy can have such devastating consequences, not 
only do kings want to avoid being its object, but conversely, people want to avoid being 
suspected of acting out of envy. We have seen this with Creon in the Oedipus Tyrannus and with 
                                                
67 Raeburn and Thomas (2011), 166-67. 
68 Denniston and Page (1957), 151-52. Goldhill has argued that it is not so much Agamemnon’s weakness as 
Clytemnestra’s argumentation that determines how the scene plays out (1986, 13). Clytemnestra is a skilled 
rhetorician, to be sure, but her logic is not without flaws, and thus Agamemnon must still bear much of the 
responsibility. 
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Hippolytus, and Teucer in the Ajax offers an additional example. After Ajax’s suicide, Teucer 
bemoans his own fate, anxious about what his irascible father, Telamon, will say when he returns 
without Ajax, the preferred son. Among other accusations that Teucer anticipates, he imagines 
that his father will assume that he in some way allowed or even engineered Ajax’s demise 
because he envied Ajax’s power at home (τὸν δειλίᾳ προδόντα καὶ κακνδρίᾳ / σέ, φίλτατ᾽ Αἴας, 
ἢ δόλοισιν, ὡς τὰ σὰ / κράτη θανόντος καὶ δόµους νέµοιµι σούς, “the one who betrayed you out 
of cowardice and unmanliness, most beloved Ajax, or with tricks, in order that with you dead, I 
might enjoy your rule and house,” 1014-16). Teucer predicts that Telamon will banish him from 
Salamis. Although banishment pales in comparison to the punishment with which Oedipus 
threatens Creon, namely death (OT 622-24), it is still no trivial matter. With penalties like these, 
we can easily see why people are keen to avoid being suspected of feeling envy, especially 
toward powerful individuals. 
 
5. Power engenders jealousy in rulers 
 
Occupying a position of power increases the likelihood of attracting the envy of others, 
but it simultaneously increases the likelihood of experiencing jealousy when one senses that his 
position is in jeopardy. In contrast to envy, which we see in both the actions and speeches of 
various characters in Sophocles’ tragedies, jealousy appears solely in rulers’ actions; there are no 
discussions or statements about their jealous tendencies.69   
In the Oedipus Tyrannus, Oedipus accuses Creon of conspiring against him out of envy, 
but Oedipus’ own jealousy is responsible for making him suspect this in the first place. Oedipus 
                                                
69 Power dynamics offer a partial explanation for this difference. Envy and jealousy were both regarded as 
unflattering emotions; thus it is one thing to accuse those not in power of acting out of envy and in doing so 
characterize them in a negative way, but quite another to accuse those in power of acting out of jealousy and in 
doing so characterize them in a negative way. This cannot, however, account for the lack of discussion of rulers’ 
jealous tendencies when the rulers themselves are not present.  
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begins to have doubts about Creon during his encounter with Teiresias, but even before then, he 
displays a hint of generalized insecurity about his position: ὅστις γὰρ ἦν ἐκεῖνον ὁ κτανὼν τάχ᾽ 
ἂν / κἄµ᾽ ἂν τοιαύτῃ χειρὶ τιµωρεῖν θέλοι. / κείνῳ προσαρκῶν οὖν ἐµαυτὸν ὠφελῶ (“For 
whoever was the killer of [Laius] could perhaps wish to take revenge on me also with such a 
hand. Therefore by helping him, I benefit myself,” 139-41). At this point, Oedipus’ apprehension 
seems fairly reasonable (albeit ironic, since the audience already knows that Laius’ killer wishes 
Oedipus no harm whatsoever), but once he can envision a specific person (Creon) as a potential 
threat, his concern rapidly devolves into a jealous need to protect his rule, even if that means 
turning on his close associates.70 After coming to the quick conclusion that Teiresias has named 
Oedipus as Laius’ killer only because Creon has paid him to do so, Oedipus neither allows Creon 
to speak nor questions him at all before accusing him of plotting murder and theft (532-42). 
Creon immediately asks Oedipus to let him respond to the accusations, appealing to his sense of 
reason and his intelligence, but Oedipus has already made up his mind. His certainty that Creon 
is a threat to his rule and his refusal to consider other possibilities suggest that jealousy over his 
position as king and the concomitant need to protect it have clouded his judgment. This 
jealousy—and the corresponding belief that Creon is acting out of envy—is crucial to the 
continued escalation of the play. If Oedipus simply accepted Teiresias’ declaration that he killed 
his father as true, he would then be forced to make good on his word and remove himself from 
the city. It is unclear whether he would make the further discovery about having married his 
mother, and the plot would be truncated and oddly straightforward. Thus Oedipus’ jealousy is 
                                                
70 Tyrants are often depicted as being suspicious of and mistreating their philoi. Seaford identifies distrust of philoi 
as one of three main characteristics of tyrants, with impiety and greed as the other two (2003, 96-99). He names 
Clytemnestra and Aegisthus in Aeschylus’ Agamemnon, Zeus in Aeschylus’ Prometheus Bound, and Creon in 
Sophocles’ Antigone as examples of tyrant figures who display strained relationships with philoi in tragedy (99-101, 
104-5). For additional examples, as well as a more comprehensive list of tyrannical characteristics and associations, 
see Lanza (1977), 233-36.   
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not only a way of portraying him as a flawed character but it is also a necessary device of plot 
advancement. 
In the Antigone, Creon also exhibits a possessiveness regarding his rule that points to 
jealousy. Whereas for Oedipus, Creon constitutes the perceived threat to his power, for Creon, it 
is the people that he views as a potential rival. When Creon rejects Haemon’s advice on the basis 
of his youthful age, the two argue about how much consideration Creon ought to give to the 
counsel of others. Creon asks, ἄλλῳ γὰρ ἢ ᾽µοὶ χρή µε τῆσδ᾽ ἄρχειν χθονός; (“Must I rule this 
land in accordance with a person other than myself?” 736). Haemon responds, πόλις γὰρ οὐκ 
ἔσθ᾽ ἥτις ἀνδρός ἐσθ᾽ ἑνός (“A city that belongs to one man is not a [true] city,” 737), to which 
Creon retorts, οὐ τοῦ κρατοῦντος ἡ πόλις νοµίζεται; (“Is the city not considered [to belong to] 
the ruler?” 738). By maintaining that the city belongs to him and to him alone, Creon reveals 
both his jealous side and his tyrannical nature.71 If he were not so concerned with protecting his 
reputation and his position, he would be less likely to view the city and his constituents’ opinions 
as a threat. 
Sophocles’ audience has already seen evidence of Creon’s tyrannical leanings by the time 
the exchange between father and son takes place. In his opening speech, Creon addresses the 
chorus of Theban elders: 
ὅτ᾽ οὖν ἐκεῖνοι πρὸς διπλῆς µοίρας µίαν 
καθ᾽ ἡµέραν ὤλοντο παίσαντές τε καὶ 
πληγέντες αὐτόχειρι σὺν µιάσµατι, 
ἐγὼ κράτη δὴ πάντα καὶ θρόνους ἔχω 
γένους κατ᾽ ἀγχιστεῖα τῶν ὀλωλότων. 
 
“Since [Eteocles and Polyneices] perished from a double fate on one day, having struck 
and having been struck with the stain of their own hand, I hold all the power and the 
throne in accordance with the closeness of family of those who have perished.” (170-74) 
 
                                                
71 Fletcher (2010), 173. 
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While these lines serve to inform Sophocles’ audience of the backstory, they also reveal Creon’s 
preoccupation with establishing his legitimacy. Moreover, his use of kratê panta (273) hints at 
the authoritarianism that will emerge over the course of the play. In this opening speech (162-
210), Creon repeatedly draws attention to himself and his views. Words such as egô and emos 
appear nine times, and often in emphatic positions, such as the egô at the beginning of line 173, 
which is also the first word of a main clause that has been delayed by three lines.72 Creon claims 
to put the state’s interest ahead of his own (184-90), but the prevalence of self-centered language 
in this opening speech raises questions about this avowed allegiance. 
 Indeed, when Creon addresses Haemon for the first time, it becomes clear that Creon 
views Antigone’s transgression as a personal affront.73 He announces, ψευδῆ γ’ ἐµαυτὸν οὐ 
καταστήσω πόλει, / ἀλλὰ κτενῶ (“I will not make myself a liar before the city, but I will kill her,” 
657-58). At this point, he cares more about vengeance than mere punishment, and he has lost 
sight of doing what is best for the city because he is too preoccupied with upholding his own 
dignity.74 This sort of egocentric behavior is stereotypically tyrannical, but it also suggests 
underlying jealousy; as we have seen, personal honor is often (perceived to be) at stake when 
feelings of envy or jealousy arise.75 Whereas Oedipus was concerned that Creon wanted to take 
over his actual rule, Creon is concerned that Antigone’s action will diminish his honor by 
tarnishing the image of his rule as a strong and capable one. Both men take steps to neutralize the 
threats and protect themselves, but the fact that they go too far in their attempts and ignore the 
(sound) advice of those around them speaks to their jealous natures.76 
                                                
72 Griffith (1999), 156. 
73 Idem, 236. 
74 Trousson (1964), 25.  
75 See the discussion of Polyneices above (p. 95-96). For the relationship between these emotions and honor in epic, 
see p. 46ff. 
76 The topic of this study necessitates an emphasis on Creon’s (and Oedipus’) negative qualities as they relate to 
envy and jealousy, but I would be remiss if I did not acknowledge that the Antigone has no simple protagonist or 
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Euripides’ Ion presents an additional example of royalty acting out of jealousy when a 
potential rival enters into the equation. After the oracle at Delphi tells Xuthus that Ion is his son 
and he succeeds in convincing him to come to Athens, Creusa learns of her husband’s newfound 
son from her attendants. The aged tutor who accompanies Creusa quickly jumps to the 
conclusion that Xuthus has been dishonest with her. He informs her, δέσποινα, προδεδόµεσθα 
(σὺν γὰρ σοὶ νοσῶ) / τοῦ σοῦ πρὸς ἀνδρός καὶ µεµηχανηµένως / ὑβριζόµεσθα δωµάτων τ’ 
Ἐρεχθέως / ἐκβαλλόµεσθα (“Mistress, we have been betrayed—for I suffer along with you—by 
your husband and by stratagem we are outraged and cast out from the house of Erechtheus, 808-
11). He explains how Xuthus must have sired a child with another woman after entering into 
Creusa’s house and inheritance, with the intention of later introducing him as an heir, and he 
urges Creusa to prevent this from happening by killing both Xuthus and Ion (812-31, 836-56). 
This explanation of events is somewhat strange and far-fetched, and if Creusa were thinking 
more rationally, she might realize this, especially given that the timeline does not match up. She 
has already noted that Ion seems to be the same age as her own son would be (354), to whom she 
gave birth before marrying Xuthus, so a child born of Xuthus and another woman after their 
marriage would need to be younger.77 Moreover, Xuthus has given Creusa no reason to suspect 
him of being so deceptive and cunning. To her credit, she objects to the prospect of killing her 
husband (977), although she agrees to poison Ion. This demonstrates the corrosive power of 
jealousy: Creusa is so keen on preventing an interloper from entering her household and 
ascending the Athenian throne that she is willing to commit murder, despite a lack of concrete 
evidence to support the tutor’s version of events. She even goes so far as to acknowledge the 
stereotype that stepmothers feel phthonos toward their stepchildren (φθονεῖν γάρ φασι µητρυιὰς 
                                                                                                                                                       
antagonist. For a more detailed treatment of the degree to which Antigone (as well as Creon) can be considered at 
fault, see Griffith (1999), 28-34; Sourvinou-Inwood (1990). 
77 Lee (1997), 252. 
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τέκνοις, 1025), yet Creusa’s jealousy is no ordinary case. The typical phthonos that a stepmother 
may feel is exaggerated on account of Creusa’s position: if Ion’s presence means that she will be 
ousted from the royal household, as the tutor suggests, she has much more to lose than the 
average stepmother.78  
This scenario in the Ion offers an interesting comparison for the examples of jealousy 
from the Oedipus Tyrannus and Antigone: unlike Creusa, Oedipus and Creon need no prompting 
from an allied source to fuel their jealousy and suspicion, and, unlike Creusa, Oedipus and Creon 
themselves occupy the royal seat, whereas Creusa is a princess of the royal family. In all three 
cases, however, death is the proposed solution: Oedipus initially wants to put Creon to death so 
as to protect his rule, Creon wants to make good on his declaration to kill Antigone so as to 
protect his reputation, and Creusa wants to kill Ion so as to prevent him from becoming an heir to 
the Athenian throne. And in all three cases, these feelings of jealousy fail to be productive, but 
rather they cause the individuals experiencing them to act in ways that turn out to be detrimental 
to their interests in the short and/or long term. Oedipus’ downfall is predestined, regardless of his 
actions, but in the short term, his jealousy negatively affects his relationships with Teiresias and 
Creon, two trusted associates. Creon’s jealousy causes him to prioritize his reputation over all 
else and to insist upon Antigone’s death; he does not see the error of his ways until it is too late, 
and thus he loses his son and his wife (in addition to his niece). Creusa’s jealousy, stirred up by 
the tutor, makes her try to murder Ion, which nearly results in her own death when the deed is 
discovered.  
As we have seen above, individuals in positions of power are especially susceptible to 
attracting the envy of others, and this makes sense, because they have more to be envious of—
                                                
78 Creusa likely feels a certain amount of envy as well. She has longed for a child and while Xuthus now finds that 
he has one, she still does not (Sanders 2014, 128-29). 
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material resources, license to act as they please, honor, etc. Conversely, individuals in positions 
of power are especially susceptible to experiencing jealousy, and this too makes sense, because 
they have more to lose. Furthermore, just as envy can be dangerous and is often pointless, so too 
jealousy can be dangerous and is often pointless. The only suggestions we have seen that envy 
and jealousy can bring about positive effects are ones from Aeschylus and Euripides, but even 
these are highly debatable. Clytemnestra argues that envy serves as a marker of success, but her 
ulterior motives cast doubt upon her logic; at best, this means that envy at times has a positive 
aspect, but it is never without the negative aspect. One could argue that when Creusa tries to 
poison Ion out of jealousy, she initiates a series of events that leads to her discovery that he is her 
son. On the other hand, her actions very nearly end in her being flung from a cliff or stoned to 
death, and this course of action is only one of many possible ways the discovery could have been 
made. Thus jealousy is only very indirectly responsible for Creusa and Ion’s happy reunion, and 
this outcome is far more happenstance than it is necessary or natural. Based on these examples, it 
seems likely that Aeschylus and Euripides considered envy and jealousy to be largely—if not 
entirely—negative emotions, but it is impossible to say for certain without doing a more 
comprehensive survey of their works. In Sophocles’ plays, however, these emotions are 
unequivocally negative, and the frequency with which they occur or are suspected of occurring 
in relation to ruling figures constitutes a cautionary message about the instability and volatility of 
one-man rule. 
 
6. Conclusions and implications 
 
 In this study of political envy and jealousy in the plays of Sophocles, we have seen 
enough to revisit and revise the earlier claims made by Stanford, Goldhill, and Sanders. Stanford 
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asserts that characters do not exhibit strong phthonos in tragedy, since it would brand them in a 
villainous way, but that sexual jealousy does have a more pronounced role. Envy and jealousy do 
appear, and when they do, they contribute to a negative characterization (to be discussed in 
summary below), but they do not so intensely vilify the figures under their influence that they 
become irredeemable antagonists for whom we feel no sympathy. Oedipus devotes himself to 
solving the problems that beset Thebes, despite forewarnings of unsettling discoveries, and he 
demonstrates willingness throughout to adhere to the expectations he sets for others. Creon, 
while highly unlikeable for most of the play until he changes his mind, nevertheless garners our 
sympathy in the end as he suffers loss upon loss, painfully aware of his own culpability in 
bringing about such devastation.79 Even Polyneices admits how he has wronged Oedipus in the 
past and does not try to disguise his motives for coming to him now.80 
 Goldhill claims that envy and jealousy enter into characters’ understandings of others’ 
behavior, but that they are “brief tokens in rhetorical battles” that do not drive the overall plot or 
permeate the action.81 Similarly, Sanders argues that phthonos, with the exception of sexual 
jealousy, occupies a small role and tends to appear only in brief scenes.82 I do not wish to 
overstate the importance of envy and jealousy in the works of Sophocles. Indeed, there are entire 
plays in which these emotions, at least insofar as they relate to the political sphere, are either 
nonexistent or inconsequential. In the Oedipus Tyrannus and Antigone, however, these emotions 
appear both in the behavior and in the imagination of certain characters: they may not be the 
principal motivating factor of the actions that ultimately determine the outcome of the play, but 
                                                
79 Cairns (2016), 57 
80 Kelly (2009), 120. 
81 Goldhill (2003), 178. 
82 Curiously, Sanders goes on to discuss how in addition to Ajax’s shame and anger, jealousy over Achilles’ armor 
also plays a key role in fueling his desire for revenge, particularly against Odysseus, who was awarded the armor 
(2014, 122-25). Since I do not consider Ajax’s jealousy over Achilles’ armor to have a political dimension, I have 
chosen not to examine it further in this chapter. 
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they make significant contributions nevertheless. The assumption that his position attracts envy 
feeds Oedipus’ jealousy and causes him to believe that Creon is conspiring against him out of 
envy; we cannot consider envy and jealousy to bring about the play’s end result, but a 
considerable amount of time is devoted to these scenes with Oedipus, Teiresias, and Creon, in 
which these emotions play an essential role. The deaths in the Antigone seem more avoidable 
than some in other tragedies, which places the responsibility on a combination of Creon and 
Antigone’s emotions and personal traits, of which jealousy is one.83 Eteocles and Polyneices are 
depicted in the Oedipus at Colonus as having taken over Creon’s position out of envy, and 
Polyneices’ continuing envy and obsession with honor is what drives him to march against 
Thebes and attack his brother. While this attack occurs after the conclusion of the play and prior 
to the start of the Antigone (so envy cannot be considered to motivate the plot of either), it is 
clearly presented as a powerful force. In sum, envy and jealousy are not ubiquitous and cannot be 
considered principally responsible for the outcomes of Sophocles’ tragedies, but when they do 
appear, they either represent great potential for danger or indeed act as destructive forces. 
Moreover, they have a striking impact on the characterizations of various figures. 
More specifically, envy and jealousy can serve as useful tools to help characterize a ruler 
as a king or as a tyrant. It is important to note, however, that the issue of king versus tyrant is not 
so much a binary as a spectrum, and in tragedy this fluidity is perhaps in part due to the frequent 
use of turannos to mean “king.” Let us revisit the cases of Oedipus in the Oedipus Tyrannus and 
Creon in the Antigone once more in summary.  
In many ways, Oedipus does not present as a stereotypical tyrant at the start of the 
Oedipus Tyrannus. He came into power by invitation (384), seems to enjoy the respect of his 
                                                
83 Other deaths seem more inevitable. For example, Polyneices is determined to destroy Eteocles, Hippolytus stands 
no chance once Aphrodite decides to punish him, etc. 
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constituents (31-39), and there is no indication that he has ever ruled arbitrarily or considered 
himself to be above the law. This is what makes his behavior in and following his encounter with 
Teiresias so surprising. Teiresias has been a trusted adviser to Oedipus in the past, but this does 
not prevent Oedipus from accusing and threatening the old prophet, and this marks a turning 
point in the play. Paranoid about suffering ill effects on account of others’ envy, he succumbs to 
jealousy and, in an attempt to protect his position, threatens Creon with death (623). While this 
rash behavior cannot be considered responsible for the outcome of the play—indeed, Oedipus 
killed his father and married his mother years before, and however he found out, he would be 
equally horrified—it is crucial for characterizing Oedipus in a tyrannical manner, as well as for 
escalating the tension and the development of the plot.84 This is not to say that he is a tyrant, 
since there is a spectrum and he resists such a categorization in several ways, but this less-than-
admirable behavior constitutes a key part of his persona and of his culpability. According to 
Aristotle, the main character of a tragedy is not supposed to be entirely virtuous and just (Poet. 
1453a7-12), and in this way, his jealousy renders Oedipus an appropriately imperfect figure. 
Creon exhibits tyrannical traits in a variety of ways in the Antigone, some of which have 
been mentioned above, namely his insistence that the city belongs to him alone and his 
privileging of his own reputation above the interests of the state. Moreover, he exhibits a 
preoccupation with money and a pattern of troubled relationships with philoi, two behaviors 
often associated with tyrants.85 He believes that those who oppose him are doing so on account 
of bribes (293-301), and when he accuses Teiresias (and other prophets) of being greedy and 
                                                
84 The jealousy that Oedipus exhibits is not the only reason he could be considered tyrannical. He becomes 
noticeably (although understandably) more self-absorbed as the play progresses; significantly, he tends to be 
referred to as a turannos in these instances (Budelmann 2000, 218). Oedipus’ change in focus is evident in the fact 
that the word polis appears twenty-five in the first nine hundred lines of the play, but nowhere in the last six hundred 
(Burian 2009, 109).  
85 Seaford (2003), 104-6. 
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fond of money (1055), Teiresias counters that the same is true of tyrants (1056)—and here, 
Teiresias’ use of turannos seems intended to carry a pejorative connotation. As for relationships 
with philoi, he denies his nephew burial, refuses to consider the counsel of his son, and drives his 
wife to suicide, as she considers him responsible for both Haemon’s death as well as that of 
another unnamed son (1312-13).86 Lastly, Creon’s irritation at the mere suggestion of political 
dissent—a common and expected phenomenon in the society of Sophocles’ audience—and his 
expectation of submission (289-92) point to his tyrannical nature.87 All of these traits have some 
connection to envy and jealousy; even if the relationship is not clear or explicit in Creon’s case, 
it exists in the abstract. Greed and jealousy both suggest a heightened awareness of what one has, 
especially relative to what others have. Jealousy has detrimental effects on one’s ability to trust 
and have good relationships with close friends and family, particularly if it causes that person to 
believe that others are envious and thus do not have his or her own interests at heart. And 
political dissent can easily be perceived as a threat to one’s own position or status, which threat 
is an integral part of jealousy.  
Not everyone who exhibits envious or jealous behavior in tragedy can be considered 
tyrannical, but the characters in Sophocles’ plays who show signs of being influenced by 
political envy or jealousy tend to be rulers (or their close associates) and these emotions 
constitute an essential part of their characterization.88 Being in a position of power increases the 
likelihood of incurring the envy of others and of experiencing jealousy oneself, and how a ruler 
handles these emotions is an important indication of where he falls on the spectrum of benign 
king to oppressive tyrant. Moreover, the pattern of rulers appearing in conjunction with these 
                                                
86 Athenian law forbade burial of traitors within Attica, but it did not outlaw burial elsewhere, as Creon does (Scodel 
2010, 108).  
87 Funke (1966), 35.  
88 It would be difficult to argue, for example, that Deianeira plays a tyrannical role.  
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negative emotions corroborates the idea that one-man rule persisted as a relevant topic of 
discussion in political discourse and as a source of anxiety in Athens well into the fifth century, 
decades after the introduction of democracy. Sophocles staged political envy and jealousy in 
such a way as to highlight their potential danger and/or pointlessness; perhaps the discerning 
audience member recognized the applicability of his warnings not just for the purposes of 
political life at home in Athens but also for Athenian imperialism at large.  
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CHAPTER 4: HERODOTUS 
 
 
As the only work of historiography included in the present study, Herodotus’ Histories is 
bound to offer a perspective on envy and jealousy and on their role in Greek society that differs 
somewhat from what we find in poetry. With history as his subject, Herodotus had less creative 
liberty to mold characters and series of events to suit his purposes than authors of poetry, 
although there was certainly still room for his opinions and interpretations; no recording of 
history can be truly objective, especially given that decisions must be made about what to 
highlight and what to omit. The aim of the Histories, as Herodotus sets out in the proem, is to 
record great and wondrous deeds, of Greeks and barbarians alike, and in doing so, to examine the 
origins of the conflict between these two civilizations. There is no suggestion that Herodotus 
intends to take sides, and indeed, he does not systematically demonize the Persians or other 
eastern peoples. Moreover, since Athens was neither Herodotus’ birthplace nor permanent 
residence, we cannot assume that his work propagates an exclusively Athenian perspective.1 
Even so, however, the Histories reveals serious misgivings about tyranny, which the Athenians 
in Herodotus’ day vehemently opposed and which had come to be associated with the east, 
despite the Greeks’ own history with tyrants. While Herodotus largely refrains from issuing 
programmatic or moralizing statements in his own voice, his work nevertheless contains 
messages about the dangers of tyranny, and phthonos figures prominently in these.  
 
                                                
1 Herodotus did spend time in Athens (as well as in Thurii, a colony sponsored by Athens), during which he gave 
public readings of his work (Asheri, Lloyd, and Corcella 2007, 3; Munson 2013a, 13). 
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1. Existing scholarship 
 
In his contribution to Konstan and Rutter’s Envy, Spite and Jealousy (2003), which is the 
most recent study on envy in Herodotus’ work, Harrison focuses largely on the emotion among 
mortals. He asserts, “Envy—interpreted broadly to include the pre-emptive envy of tyrants, the 
desire for tyranny and for imperial expansion, as well as the seemingly more benign rivalry of 
the Athenians—is arguably for Herodotus the primary motor of historical action.”2 This falls on 
the opposite side of the spectrum as Mabel Lang’s stance in Herodotean Narrative and 
Discourse (1984). Lang hones in on divine rather than human phthonos, but only to conclude 
that while it “has very definite rhetorical value,” it has “no merit for Herodotus as an expression 
of historical causation” and that Herodotus gives no indication that he personally believes in the 
phenomenon.3 In this chapter, I hope to demonstrate that both of these views are too extreme. 
While I concede that Harrison’s is an attractive theory, in reality, it is problematic. 
Harrison does not define or set out requisite conditions for envy, but merely groups certain things, 
like the desire for tyranny and for imperial expansion, under the heading of envy. Moreover, he 
does not provide sufficient evidence that phthonos has scripts that cover these concepts in the 
ancient Greek understanding. As stated in the introduction, envy is rooted in social comparison 
and can be differentiated from greed in this way.4 There is no clear indication that a ruler who 
wants to expand his boundaries necessarily has any designs on depriving a specific person of that 
land. He may even have his sights set on a particular territory (for its resources, its proximity to 
his own, etc.), but that does not automatically mean that he wishes ill on the ruler currently in 
possession of it—the latter’s potential loss is incidental. While a ruler’s desire for expansion can 
                                                
2 Harrison (2003), 157. 
3 Lang (1984), 61-62. Gould agrees with the assessment that divine phthonos cannot serve an explanation of 
causation (1989, 80). 
4 See p. 23-24. 
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be related to envy, we cannot automatically consider them one and the same, as Harrison does. 
On the other hand, Lang is perhaps too eager to discount the effects of divine phthonos. It is true 
that divine phthonos appears predominantly in abstract discussions or warnings, but there are 
also several scenarios in which it can be considered the driving force behind the outcome. 
Moreover, Herodotus makes extensive use of narrative patterning to convey messages and 
morals, so we should not necessarily read too much into the fact that he rarely calls explicit 
attention to instances of divine phthonos in action.  
The aim of the present chapter is to show that Herodotus represents human phthonos as 
an influential and largely negative emotion that often appears in conjunction with kings and 
tyrants, thus characterizing them in an unflattering and transgressive light, and that he uses 
divine phthonos to shed light on the fragility of the human condition as well as on the dangers of 
amassing too much power. While phthonos (either human or divine) alone cannot account for the 
majority of events detailed in the Histories, it is shown to be responsible for a considerable 
number of actions and its presence often serves as a warning about the drawbacks of sole 
rulership. The final section will examine whether Herodotus represents phthonos as 
unequivocally and universally harmful. While phthonos is never beneficial for those toward 
whom it is directed, Herodotus allows for—but does not emphasize—the possibility that it can in 
some circumstances have a positive effect on others or on society as a whole.5 
 
  
                                                
5 Even when Periander tells his son that it is better to be envied than pitied (φθονέεσθαι κρέσσον ἐστὶ ἢ οἰκτειρεσθαι, 
3.52.5), his point is about relativity rather than about any standalone merits of being the object of envy. Periander 
has resources worth envying, but such envy is only incidental. It does not increase his standing or the value of his 
resources and there is no indication that Periander goes out of his way to increase the amount of envy directed 
toward him. 
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2. Depiction of tyrants 
 
Some scholars hold the opinion that Herodotus did not intend to create a stereotype of 
tyranny and that none exists in his work. Vivienne Gray is a proponent of this view, arguing that 
while there are similarities among the characteristics that despots exhibit, it is the context of the 
episodes in which the tyrants appear that is ultimately responsible for any such patterns.6 Few 
would dispute Gray’s stance that context plays a key role in shaping narratives. Indeed, one of 
the reasons for the overall complexity of Herodotus’ depiction of tyranny is that the episodes in 
which tyrants appear are crafted to demonstrate various ethical and philosophical lessons, rather 
than merely political ones.7 Gray has perhaps been too rigid, however, in her expectation of a 
clearly defined template for tyrants, from which Herodotus never deviates. Moreover, Gray’s 
arguments in favor of the influence of context do not sufficiently negate or disprove the 
possibility that, by virtue of possessing similar positions of absolute power, tyrants did in fact 
tend to develop certain parallel characteristics. Pelling’s view is more moderate. He uses the 
example of Darius to illustrate that not all rulers fit the mold set forth in the constitutional debate 
by Otanes, who argues in favor of rule by the people.8 Pelling insists that if there is a pattern of 
tyrannical characteristics and how tyrants behave, its function is “to guide the questions that the 
reader puts to the complicated stories which follow: it is not to guide the answers.”9 
On the other side of the debate, John Gammie finds examples throughout the Histories of 
rulers who embody the flaws or inappropriate behaviors that Otanes lists, although he 
acknowledges that this pattern is less pronounced among Greek tyrants than eastern ones and that 
                                                
6 Gray (1996), 364. 
7 Forsdyke (2006), 236. 
8 For example, Darius does not exhibit violence toward women, commit outrage, or act out of jealousy (Pelling 2002, 
154). 
9 Ibid. 
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Herodotus occasionally mentions positive attributes or actions as well.10 Likewise, Carolyn 
Dewald argues in favor of the existence of what she terms “the despotic template,” to which 
eastern despots generally adhere, while Herodotus’ treatment of Greek tyrants is more 
idiosyncratic: their stories and their challenges vary more widely than those of their eastern 
counterparts.11 The fact that exceptions and qualifications exist does not detract from the 
significance of this template—indeed, it would be to the detriment of Herodotus’ reputation as a 
historian if he presented such one-dimensional monarchs that they could all be reduced to the 
same exact set of characteristics. Regardless of exceptions and qualifications, enough similarities 
emerge among the descriptions of tyrants to suggest that a template does exist, and as we will see 
below, phthonos is a distinctive feature of it. 
The Histories contains three extended narratives about the drawbacks of autocratic rule: 
the description of Deioces’ rule over the Medes in Book 1, the constitutional debate of the 
Persians in Book 3, and the speech of Socles of Corinth to the Spartans in Book 5.12 All three of 
these involve envy and/or jealousy, whether named explicitly or not, but let us begin with the 
constitutional debate, since this is the most generalized, theoretical discussion of various types of 
rule, as well as the one in which phthonos is treated most directly.  
Otanes speaks first in the debate. His argument against one-man rule contains four 
instances of phthonos (and cognates), whose repetition emphasizes the close association he sees 
between the two. After protesting that monarchy is a fundamentally flawed institution on the 
grounds that a monarch is not held accountable to anyone, Otanes identifies hubris and phthonos 
as the root of every evil, arguing that these two traits inevitably corrupt even the best of men 
                                                
10 Gammie (1986), 195. 
11 Dewald (2003), 44, 47. 
12 Idem, 27. Dewald also notes that these passages have been placed deliberately in order to emphasize the tendency 
of sole rulership to grow more controlling and perverse as time progresses (32). 
  116 
when placed in a position of sole power.13 He states, καὶ γὰρ ἂν τὸν ἄριστον ἀνδρῶν πάντων 
στάντα ἐς ταύτην τὴν ἀρχὴν ἐκτὸς τῶν ἐωθότων νοηµάτων στήσειε. ἐγγίνεται µὲν γάρ οἱ ὕβρις 
ὑπὸ τῶν παρεόντων ἀγαθῶν, φθόνος δὲ ἀρχῆθεν ἐµφύεται ἀνθρώπῳ. δύο δ᾽ ἔχων ταῦτα ἔχει 
πᾶσαν κακότητα (“Putting even the best of all men into this rule would push him beyond his 
accustomed thoughts. For hubris is bred in him from the good things at hand, while phthonos 
grows in man from the start. Having these two [traits], he has every evil,” 3.80.3-4). Given that 
phthonos can refer to both envy and jealousy and that both are applicable in this case, I have 
chosen not to translate it in this passage, in order to avoid giving precedence to one term over the 
other. A tyrant can just as easily envy others for possessions or qualities they have as he can feel 
jealousy over protecting what he believes is his. According to Otanes, power has the ability and 
tendency to corrupt, and phthonos, a basic and natural phenomenon, is one of the forces that 
bring about this corruption. His use of the verb emphuein with phthonos as its subject suggests 
that this is not something we as humans need to learn or acquire: it is a matter of nature rather 
than nurture. Herodotus could have had Otanes say that men experience phthonos or are 
phthoneros from the start, but by using the noun form in the nominative case, Otanes depicts 
phthonos as a force to be reckoned with, as something that has agency of its own. It is not 
surprising, then, that such a force grows stronger and more pronounced when one enters into a 
position of sole power, which creates ample space for flaws and vices to run rampant.  
After asserting that many types of misconduct exhibited by tyrants have their origins in 
the aforementioned hubris and phthonos (τὰ µὲν γὰρ ὕβρι κεκορηµένος ἔρδει πολλὰ καὶ 
ἀτάσθαλα, τὰ δὲ φθόνῳ, 3.80.4), Otanes enumerates various examples. Tyrants are inconsistent 
in their behavior and treatment of others because they demand more than just moderate 
                                                
13 In the beginning of his speech, Otanes refers to the sole ruler as a monarchos, but later switches to calling him a 
turannos. 
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admiration, but while rejecting false flattery; still worse, they disregard customs, commit 
violence against women, and are prone to indiscriminate killing without trial (3.80.5). Moreover, 
Otanes acknowledges the paradoxical nature of a tyrant’s phthonos: καίτοι ἄνδρα γε τύραννον 
ἄφθονον ἔδει εἶναι, ἔχοντά γε πάντα τὰ ἀγαθά· τὸ δὲ ὑπεναντίον τούτου ἐς τοὺς πολιήτας 
πέφυκε. φθονέει γὰρ τοῖσι ἀρίστοισι περιεοῦσί τε καὶ ζώουσι, χαίρει δὲ τοῖσι κακίστοισι τῶν 
ἀστῶν, διαβολὰς δὲ ἄριστος ἐνδέκεσθαι (“And yet a tyrant ought to be a man free from 
phthonos, since he has all good things, but he becomes by nature the opposite of this against the 
citizens. For he feels phthonos toward the best men because they excel and [even] exist, and he 
delights in the worst of the citizens, and is the best at giving ear to slander,” 3.80.4).  Phthonos 
can refer to both envy and jealousy in this context as well. It is ambiguous (and perhaps 
deliberately so) whether Otanes’ stereotypical tyrant feels envy toward the best men (because 
they happen to have some particular quality, ability, or type of wealth that he does not) or 
jealousy (because he views them as rivals and is concerned to protect his own position and 
holdings), or perhaps some combination of the two (e.g. because they have something that he too 
possesses but he wants to possess it in greater quantity than anyone else or even exclusively).14 
Phthonos plays a crucial role in Otanes’ criticism of one-man rule. Nowhere else in the Histories 
does such a dense clustering of phthonos terms occur, and this repetition—especially given its 
placement in the most prominent and theoretical discussion about the nature of monarchy—
highlights the intensity and inevitabiliy of the connection between phthonos and sole rulership.  
The constitutional debate is imbalanced in several ways, but this does not detract from 
the idea that hubris and phthonos can incite rulers to multiple types of wrongdoing. Not only are 
the speeches mismatched in terms of length, with Megabyzus’ argument in favor of oligarchy 
                                                
14 For the idea that Cypselus and Periander kill many leading citizens out of a jealous desire to protect their regime, 
see Hdt. 5.92.ε2, 5.92.η1 (discussed below, p. 122-23). 
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receiving by far the least attention, but the characters compare the best scenarios of their 
preferred governments with the most flawed scenarios of those they oppose. A more productive 
debate would compare the best versions of each type with one another and the worst versions 
with one another.15 But as the debate stands, the lack of response to the critiques raised suggests 
that they are indeed valid concerns, and in the case of absolute rule and its susceptibility to 
phthonos, we can see this in action throughout the Histories. Of course, not every king or tyrant 
exhibits the kind of behavior that Otanes describes as originating from phthonos, but Otanes’ 
insistence on the significance of phthonos is enough to alert Herodotus’ audience to look for it 
whenever a sole ruler enters the picture. 
Croesus is easily the most prominent example in the Histories of a ruler who craves the 
admiration of others, which is one of the behaviors that Otanes attributes to hubris and phthonos. 
He claims, ἤν τε γὰρ αὐτὸν µετρίως θωµάζῃς, ἄχθεται ὅτι οὐ κάρτα θεραπεύεται (“If you marvel 
at him [only] moderately, he is vexed that he is not honored exceedingly,” 3.80.5). Expecting 
Solon to deem him the most fortunate man he has known, Croesus grows angry (σπερχθεὶς, 
1.32.1) when Solon names Tellus first and Cleobis and Biton second, thus flattering Croesus in 
no way (οὐδὲν ὑποθωπεύσας, 1.30.3). Herodotus does not explicitly label Croesus as laboring 
under the influence of either hubris or phthonos, but his need for admiration and confirmation of 
his high status and his displeasure upon failing to receive it fit Otanes’ description. Also in Book 
1, Candaules exhibits a similar need for validation, but in his case regarding his wife’s beauty 
(1.8). It is not enough for him that he himself believes his wife to be the most beautiful woman in 
the world, but he needs other people to recognize her as such, even at the risk of causing her 
potential disgrace. Considered in isolation, the behaviors of Croesus and of Candaules do not 
seem terribly dangerous (although Candaules’ action is certainly perverse, as the reactions of 
                                                
15 Raaflaub (1989), 44. 
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both Gyges and Candaules’ wife indicate). In context, however, both of these incidents form part 
of a greater narrative that details the downfall of each man, and thus they point to the dangers 
that a ruler’s phthonos poses to the ruler himself. Curiously, it seems that this particular type of 
phthonos, which drives the ruler’s need for admiration, can in turn be satisfied by the envy of 
others. Indeed, admiration and envy are nearly inseparable, for what inspires admiration in one 
man inspires envy in another, and both serve as validation that one has something worth 
having.16 We have seen in the previous chapter what happens when Oedipus becomes paranoid 
about incurring the envy of others, but here, Croesus and Cambyses have the opposite problem: 
insufficiently wary of the consequences of incurring envy, they are willing to risk it and perhaps 
even want it, and this mentality either drives them to or itself constitutes inappropriate and even 
reckless behavior.17 The stories of Croesus and Candaules appear before Otanes’ criticisms of 
monarchy in the constitutional debate, but it is plausible that Herodotus’ audience would have 
had these men in mind when encountering the description of the typical behaviors spurred on by 
hubris and phthonos.18 
The two other extended narratives about the drawbacks of autocratic rule focus on 
individual rulers. As discussed above, we should not expect individual rulers to confirm 
                                                
16 Thucydides has Pericles express the belief that the same thing induces different reactions in different people, 
depending on the temperament and/or past experience of the subject: καίτοι ταῦτα ὁ µὲν ἀπράγµων µέµψαιτ᾽ ἄν, ὁ 
δὲ δρᾶν τι καὶ αὐτὸς βουλόµενος ζηλώσει· εἰ δὲ τις µὴ κέκτηται, φθονήσει (“The unambitious man may censure 
these things [i.e. our success], but he who himself is also eager to act will feel emulation, and if someone has not 
attained [such success], he will be envious,” 2.64.4). For the idea that the envy or admiration of others serves as an 
indication of value, see Hom. Hymn Dem. 167-68, 222-23; Hes. Op. 312-13; Aesch. Ag. 939 (discussed on p. 57, 68, 
and 97-98, respectively). 
17 Herodotus notes that after Solon’s departure, Croesus suffers great divine anger (ἐκ θεοῦ νέµεσις µεγάλη, 1.34.1); 
see p. 140-41 for a more in-depth discussion of this passage. There are other examples in Herodotus’ work of rulers 
who seek admiration without consequences, but these are typically only mentioned in passing. For example, the 
Scythian king Ariantas conducts a census by asking that each Scythian present him with a bronze arrowhead. Rather 
than merely counting them for informative purposes, he has the arrowheads melted down and turned into a massive 
monumental bowl (4.81.6). His decision to create a tangible symbol of the extent of his power for others to see 
reveals his desire for admiration (Christ 2013, 218-19).  
18 Many Greeks experienced Herodotus’ work via oral performances. Some may have heard the speeches of the 
constitutional debate before hearing about Croesus and Candaules. The point here is merely that the order in which 
they read or heard these particular episodes does not necessarily matter and that a connection can be made regardless. 
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precisely to every part of Otanes’ description, and indeed they do not, but they do echo certain 
parts of it. After successfully revolting from Assyrian rule, the Medes find themselves plagued 
by robberies and lawlessness (ἁρπαγῆς καὶ ἀνοµίης, 1.97.2), so they decide to appoint Deioces as 
king, having recognized that he is a fair and just judge (ἰθύς τε καὶ δίκαιος, 1.96.2).19 Herodotus’ 
account gives no indication that Deioces wavers in his duties of dispensing justice, but 
nevertheless the relationship between Deioces and his subjects undergoes a drastic change upon 
his assumption of power. He demands a palace worthy of a king and a band of bodyguards, 
surrounds his palace with multiple walls (while leaving the people to live outside), and forbids 
anyone except messengers from entering into his presence (1.98-99). Herodotus explains, ταῦτα 
δὲ περὶ ἑωυτὸν ἐσέµνυνε τῶνδε εἵνεκεν, ὅκως ἂν µὴ ὁρῶντες οἱ ὁµήλικες, ἐόντες σὐντροφοί τε 
ἐκείνῳ καὶ οἰκίης οὐ φλαυροτέρης οὐδὲ ἐς ἀνδραγαθίην λειπόµενοι, λυπεοίατο καὶ 
ἐπιβουλεύοειν, ἀλλ᾽ ἑτεροῖός σφι δοκέοι εἶναι µὴ ὁρῶσι (He affected such a solemn air about 
himself for the following reasons, namely in order that the men of his same age, who had grown 
up with him and were neither of trivial lineage nor were they inferior in bravery, may not look 
upon [him] and then be vexed or contrive [against him], but rather in order that he might seem 
different to them if they should not look upon him, 1.99.2).  
Deioces is clearly nervous about his personal safety and the security of his rule. 
Herodotus’ explanation of his actions strongly suggests that this concern originates from his 
awareness of the danger and likelihood of incurring envy, particularly in light of the fact that he 
is not reported to have committed any atrocities for which he might potentially anticipate 
                                                
19 Herodotus more commonly refers to Deioces with the term basileus, but in introducing the episode, he remarks 
that while those on the mainland were living under their own laws, the Medes came back around to tyranny (ἐόντων 
δὲ αὐτονόµων πάντων ἀνὰ τὴν ἤπειρον ὧδε αὖτις ἐς τυραννίδα περιῆλθον, 1.96.1). He also comments that Deioces 
acted as he did because he longed to hold a tyranny (ἐρασθεὶς τυραννίδος, 1.96.2). Despite the presence of the term 
basileus, by using turannis twice in close succession in setting the stage for the episode, Herodotus indicates that 
contemporary Greeks likely would have considered this regime a tyranny. 
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retribution. As we have seen in previous chapters, there are two common beliefs regarding the 
targets of envy and these appear in Herodotus’ work as well: one is that people who are powerful 
or wealthy are wont to incur envy, and the other is that people tend to feel envy toward those 
who are their equal in some way.20 Obviously, Deioces cannot entirely avoid envy that arose on 
account of his position. Indeed, Periander has so internalized the inevitability of a ruler being the 
object of envy that he simplifies the difference between a ruler’s lot and that of a commoner 
without house or home (i.e. his son’s current predicament) to a matter of envy versus pity 
(3.52.5).21 Deioces can, however, and does attempt to minimize envy felt by those who (used to) 
have something in common with him, and he does so by creating distance and isolating himself, 
thus reducing the temptation for social comparison and disrupting the potential for envious 
feelings among his former peers. Deioces understands that the security of his regime as a king 
depends on his ability to construct a sense of inequality where previously there was equality.22 
What Deioces’ example and Otanes’ argument have in common is that phthonos plays a 
significant role in the transformation that takes place when one enters into a position of sole 
power. But whereas Otanes cautions that the hubris and phthonos that come along with being a 
tyrant cannot help but change even the best of men (3.80.3), we see something different in 
Deioces’ case: it is his anticipation of the phthonos of others, rather than his own phthonos, that 
causes him to change his ways. Even so, however, it is not difficult to read in his story a warning 
about the potential dangers of entrusting the state to a single man. Deioces does not fit Otanes’ 
description of the stereotypical tyrant regarding phthonos, but by sequestering himself away 
                                                
20 For the first belief, see Soph. Aj. 157 (p. 81-82). For the second, see Hes. Op. 25-26 (p. 63-66); Hdt. 7.237.2-3 (p. 
134-35). 
21 Periander does not view envy as something to fear, but rather as a byproduct of his position that simultaneously 
serves as an indicator of something worth having. Accordingly, he attempts to convince his son to come home by 
telling him that it is far better to be envied than pitied (φθονέεσθαι κρέσσον ἐστὶ ἢ οἰκτίρεσθαι, 3.52.5). 
22 Saxonhouse (1996), 46. 
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from the eyes of others, he embodies the lack of accountability with which Otanes begins his 
critique of monarchy. Moreover, if even he, perhaps the most perfect tyrant a man can be, 
experiences an increasing preoccupation with security and has the ability to distance himself 
from and spy on his subjects, then his example serves as a harbinger of other, less benevolent 
tyrants’ descent into paranoia, narcissism, and arbitrary rule.23 
 The third extended passage concerning the negative aspects of tyrannical rule comes in 
Book 5, when Socles of Corinth speaks out in opposition to the Spartans’ desire to reinstate 
Hippias as tyrant in Athens. As is the case with the constitutional debate, the anti-tyrannical 
sentiments expressed cannot be attributed to Herodotus himself, but are understood as belonging 
to the speaking character himself. Herodotus reports that the Spartans learned that the 
Alcmeonids had bribed the oracle to urge the Spartans to drive out the Peisistratids (5.90.1). 
Moreover, after seeing how the Athenians were flourishing (5.91.1), they wanted to reestablish 
tyranny in Athens, but most of Sparta’s allies did not support such an endeavor (5.92.1). Socles 
claims that if the Spartans themselves had ever lived under a tyrant’s rule, they would not 
consider subjecting another city—even a city whose growing power was cause for concern—to 
such a rule, and to illustrate his point, he recounts the Corinthians’ experience with Cypselus and 
his son Periander. 
In Socles’ opening remarks, he states unequivocally, τοῦ οὔτε ἀδικώτερόν ἐστι οὐδὲν 
κατ᾽ ἀνθρώπους οὔτε µιαιφονώτερον (“nothing among men is more unjust or bloodthirsty than 
tyranny,” 5.92.α1). Indeed, Cypselus ordered the execution of many citizens (5.92.ε2), thus 
demonstrating this characteristic bloodthirstiness. The comparative adjective miaiphonôteros 
appears again in Socles’ description of Periander, whom he reveals was far more bloodthirsty 
                                                
23 For the idea that Deioces is as perfect as a tyrant can be, see McGlew (1993), 82. Benardete takes a different view: 
while admitting that he administers justice in a proper manner, Benardete nevertheless calls Deioces the “unjust 
source of all justice” on account of his lack of transparency (1969, 25-26). 
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than Cypselus (5.92.ζ1). When Periander sends a messenger to ask Thrasybulus of Miletus for 
advice about how to best secure his rule, Thrasybulus simply goes into a field and cuts down the 
tallest stalks of grain. The messenger returns, confused, but Periander recognizes the symbolism 
in what Thrasybulus has done and acts on this advice: Περίανδρος δὲ συνεὶς τὸ ποιηθὲν καὶ νόῳ 
σχὼν ὥς οἱ ὑπετίθετο Θρασύβουλος τοὺς ὑπερόχους τῶν ἀστῶν φονεύειν, ἐνθαῦτα δὴ πᾶσαν 
κακότητα ἐξέφαινε ἐς τοὺς πολιήτας. ὅσα γὰρ Κύψελος ἀπέλιπε κτείνων τε καὶ διώκων, 
Περίανδρός σφεα ἀπετέλεσε (“Understanding what had been done and having it in mind that 
Thrasybulus was suggesting that he kill the prominent men of the city, Periander then exhibited 
every evil to the citizens. For as much as Cypselus left unfinished in killing and exiling, 
Periander completed,” 5.92.η1). While not named explicitly, phthonos seems to have been the 
driving force for the executions ordered by both Cypselus and Periander (as well as for the 
banishments during Cypselus’ rule, 5.92.ε2), and this is precisely what Otanes argues in the 
constitutional debate. Otanes lists the tendency to kill men without trial as one of the typical 
atrocities that tyrants commit, right after stating that all evil lies in the two traits of hubris and 
phthonos; he also points out that tyrants feel phthonos toward the best citizens, even though 
tyrants ought to be aphthonos (3.80.4).24 While it is unclear in Otanes’ theoretical discussion 
whether the phthonos directed at the best citizens is envy or jealousy (or even a mixture of the 
two), Cypselus and Periander seem to have been operating more out of jealousy. They viewed 
the Corinthian elites as rivals, and in an aggressive attempt to secure their power, they decided to 
eliminate them, through either exile or death.25  
                                                
24 See p. 117. 
25 Thrasybulus’ “advice” makes clear that Periander targeted the Corinthian elites, rather than the citizenry at large, 
but for the idea that Cypselus was also primarily concerned with rival elites (particularly the Bacchiads who held 
power before he became tyrant), see Forsdyke (2005), 71-73. 
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We find numerous other examples of kings and tyrants whose concern over the security 
of their position drives them to extreme and jealous behavior. It is important to note, however, 
that concern about security does not itself necessarily constitute jealousy. Defensive actions such 
as acquiring bodyguards or building better fortifications are generally benign (and even prudent), 
but offensive actions, namely executions or attempted murder, are much more telling. For 
example, Deioces demands bodyguards, a palace, and fortification walls (1.98.2-6); his most 
actively intrusive order is that he sends spies throughout the region to report inappropriate 
behavior so that the perpetrators can be brought to justice (1.100.2). As discussed above, Deioces’ 
choices seem to be motivated in large part by his fear of incurring the envy of others, but there is 
no indication that jealousy of his own is a factor: his measures are purely defensive or 
reactionary, rather than offensive or aggressive.  
On the contrary, according to Socles’ speech, Cypselus and Periander (and possibly 
Thrasybulus as well, if he himself employs the methods he indicates to Periander) cross the line 
into acting out of jealousy by killing their rivals. Other examples include Astyages, king of 
Media, who orders his grandson, the infant Cyrus, to be killed after he has a dream portending 
his eventual replacement by the child (1.107-8); Cambyses, who sends a man to kill his brother 
Smerdis after he has a dream that Smerdis was sitting on the throne (3.30); and Darius, who kills 
one of his former co-conspirators along with his male relatives because he suspects they were 
plotting against him (3.119).26 Cambyses’ case is particularly noteworthy, since Herodotus 
explains as part of the background to the dream the fact that Cambyses already sent Smerdis 
back to Persia out of envy (τὸν ἀπέπεµψε ἐς Πέρσας φθόνῳ ἐξ Αἰγύπτου, 3.30.1). The reason for 
his envy was that Smerdis managed to string a bow from the Ethiopian king, a feat at which 
                                                
26 Jealous behavior concerning one’s rule is a common and long-standing paradigm that occurs in works as early as 
Hesiod’s Theogony, where Cronus and Zeus employ violence against their family members to secure their position 
(see p. 62-63). 
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Cambyses and the other Persians had failed (3.30.1). This glimpse into Cambyses’ state of mind 
at the time when the dream occurred helps to illustrate how envy and jealousy can easily shade 
into one another: already beset by envy at his brother’s success, the dream provokes an acute 
sense of jealousy and thus the need to protect his throne from his brother’s grasp. Cambyses’ 
phthonos first drives him to push his brother away and later, aggravated by the dream, it drives 
him to order that he be killed. This is clearly not an innocent act undertaken by a prudent-minded 
monarch, as Herodotus makes known from the outset by labeling it as a kakon: πρῶτα µὲν τῶν 
κακῶν ἐξεργάσατο τὸν ἀδελφεὸν Σµέρδιν (first among his evils he destroyed his brother 
Smerdis, 3.30.1).  
 Phthonos appears explicitly in Otanes’ speech during the constitutional debate, but as I 
hope to have shown, it also plays a role in the other two extended narratives about the drawbacks 
of autocratic rule: Deioces’ concern about the envy of others prompts him to isolate himself and 
become an inaccessible  (and thus unaccountable) ruler, and Cypselus and Periander’s jealous 
need to protect themselves urges them to murder their rivals without trial. What, then, does this 
pattern reveal: contemporary Greek attitudes, Herodotus’ own, or both? It is tempting to assume 
that Otanes is a mouthpiece for Herodotus’ opinion about types of government, and this certainly 
seems plausible, but we should be careful about the process by which we arrive to such a 
conclusion. According to the Suda, Herodotus left his native Halicarnassus because of its tyrant, 
Lygdamis, and later returned to drive him out (s.v. Ἡρόδοτος). Unfortunately, the Suda is less 
reliable than we would like, and it is possible that the story of his involvement in removing 
Lygdamis from power was created out of the anti-tyrannical statements (in the voices of various 
characters) found in the Histories.27 Helmut Apffel belives that Otanes’ speech is less likely to be 
authentic than the other speeches, arguing that pro-democratic sentiments were not yet so 
                                                
27 Munson (2013a), 9-10. 
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advanced in Persia.28 It is not, however, an established fact that such sentiments (or at least 
ambivalence about monarchy) did not exist in fifth-century Persia. Rosaria Munson urges us to 
read the fact that Herodotus twice insists upon the historicity of the debate as an indication that 
he was utilizing Persian sources, and she points out various instances elsewhere that corroborate 
this idea.29 Helmut Berve suggests that Herodotus’ defense of freedom and dislike for tyranny 
elsewhere in the work (e.g. his emphasis on the increased strength of the Athenians after the 
removal of the Peisistratids, 5.78) means that Otanes’ view is in accordance with the author’s 
own.30 This argument holds up better under scrutiny. This commentary about the change in 
Athenian morale and ability indeed appears in Herodotus’ own voice and it is his most explicit 
endorsement of the benefits of political freedom, yet significantly, this is simply an endorsement 
of political freedom, of which democracy is not the sole provider or guarantor.31 Moreover, 
Herodotus is not uncritical of democracy, and in this way his view is more nuanced than Otanes’, 
even if the two are largely in accordance.32  
Other scholars have argued that it is misguided to attempt to extract Herodotus’ political 
ideas from passages such as the constitutional debate or Socles of Corinth’s speech, given that 
they are pieces of rhetoric inserted into the mouths of other figures, rather than part of the 
narrative itself.33 While it is only prudent to remember that characters’ viewpoints are not 
necessarily the same as the author’s own, this need not mean that their speech is wholly 
unaffected by the author’s opinions; a speech can bear traces of various influences. Taking 
                                                
28 Apffel (1979), 48-58. 
29 Munson (2013c), 326-30. 
30 Berve (1967), 197. 
31 Forsdyke (2006), 233. Forsdyke argues elsewhere that Herodotus deliberately incorporates and favors democratic 
ideology (2002, 542-45). For the idea that freedom is not the exclusive prerogative of democracy, see Saxonhouse 
(1996), 38-39. 
32 After recording that Aristagoras was successful in rousing the Athenians to come to the aid of the Ionians, 
whereas he failed to persuade the Spartans, Herodotus notes that it is apparently easier to deceive thirty thousand 
men than a single man (5.97.2). 
33 Hornblower (2013), 249.  
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matters a step further, however, Kenneth Waters finds Herodotus’ work to possess a high degree 
of objectivity throughout and thus he considers it unwise to focus too much energy on trying to 
determine authorial intent.34 Waters has perhaps gone too far in trying to establish Herodotus’ 
objectivity in the first place. Relying heavily upon arguments from silence, he takes the lack of 
overt condemnation of tyranny and tyrants as a sign of impartiality.35 For example, he notes that 
Herodotus refrains from making any unflattering comments after relating that Periander killed 
his wife.36 While this could in theory support Waters’ claim about Herodotus’ objectivity, it 
seems more likely that Herodotus figured that the depraved act of killing one’s wife could speak 
for itself and needed no further elaboration to evoke the audience’s disdain.  
The fact that the debate over his political views continues to this day is a testament to 
Herodotus’ fair-mindedness as a historian, but the lack of unequivocal condemnation of tyrants 
and their behavior in Herodotus’ own voice does not necessarily mean that he was truly neutral 
and had no misgivings about tyranny. Taking a more moderate approach, David Asheri asserts 
(correctly, I believe) that Herodotus would surely choose freedom over despotism in the Greek 
cities, but that it is more difficult to assess his preference for democracy versus oligarchy.37 
While Herodotus at times mentions commendable traits and actions of individual tyrants, there is 
nothing to suggest that he sees tyranny as a viable and worthwhile option for his audience to 
consider.38 Moreover, his overall tendency to pass over or minimize tyrants’ positive 
                                                
34 Waters (1971), 41. 
35 See Gammie (1986), 189. 
36 Waters (1971), 19. 
37 Asheri, Lloyd, and Corcella (2007), 45-46. Asheri points to 5.97.2 (see p. 126 note 32) as evidence of this 
ambiguity. Saxonhouse argues that Herodotus’ regard for equality is at the core of his opposition to tyranny and of 
his admiration of the institutions of Greek cities, but that he has praise for more than just one type of regime (1996, 
43, 37). 
38 For example, Herodotus recognizes that Cambyses exempted his subjects from military service and taxes for three 
years (3.67.3) and provides details that reveal Darius’ competence and skill as an imperial administrator (3.88.3ff.). 
Deioces is perhaps the most benevolent tyrant in the Histories, but even his example hints at the troubles inherent in 
the position of a sole ruler (see p. 121-22). 
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achievements while highlighting their transgressions conveys a deliberate message to those 
discerning enough to read between the lines.39 Herodotus does not come out and say directly in 
his own voice that tyranny is dangerous and that it ought to be avoided, but rather he shows his 
readers through his careful selection of material. From the examples he provides, a despotic 
template emerges, which in large part draws upon Otanes’ list of criticisms: hubris, phthonos, 
inconsistent behavior, disregard for custom, violence toward women, and indiscriminate killing. 
This template is more or less in accordance with ideas present in the works of other fifth-century 
authors, and thus can be considered both a reflection of contemporary views and a window into 
Herodotus’ own.  
 
3. Phthonos: a cautionary tale about sole rulership 
 
 Despite the role of phthonos in characterizing various kings and tyrants and explaining 
some of their actions, and despite the fact that Herodotus’ narrative has a tendency to center on 
significant individuals and the influence they have on affairs, phthonos alone cannot account for 
the decisions that propel the main action of the Histories forward, as Harrison claims.40 While 
incidents involving phthonos generally turn out either to be of relatively limited consequence as 
far as the larger narrative is concerned or to not involve real phthonos at all, taken in aggregate, 
these examples nevertheless constitute a serious warning about this destructive emotion and the 
dangers of one-man rule. Deioces’ concern about minimizing his constituents’ grounds for 
phthonos does not seem to have caused him to become paranoid or violent, and given that he 
allegedly ruled for fifty-three years, it does not seem to have affected him or his people in an 
adverse way (1.102.1). Even so, this episode reveals how the fear of incurring envy can make 
                                                
39 Lateiner (1989), 186.  
40 Harrison (2003), 157. 
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even the most reasonable of kings suspicious and aloof, which does not bode well for less 
scrupulous or disciplined heads of state and their constituents. Cypselus and Periander also 
managed to stay in power for a relatively long time—Cypselus for thirty years (5.92.ζ1) and 
Periander until he was too old to administer affairs (3.53.1)—which serves as somewhat of an 
indicator that the Corinthians did not find their rule wholly intolerable. Nevertheless, their 
jealous need to secure their rule resulted in the extralegal murder of numerous citizens, and they 
are held up as a prime example of why tyranny is bad—so bad that it should not even be inflicted 
upon one’s enemies.41 In Cambyses’ case, it is again unclear that the phthonos that drove him to 
have his brother killed resulted in any far-reaching effects. True, Smerdis’ death made it possible 
for the Magi to assume the throne, which led to Darius’ assumption of power, but neither the 
power of the Persian Empire nor the nature of its government underwent a radical change in the 
period between Cambyses and Darius’ reigns. Even so, phthonos is clearly depicted as a 
destabilizing force: a radical change could have taken place, and the fact that it did not seems 
almost happenstance. 
 Let us consider several other examples. The kingship at Sparta gives rise to several 
incidents of phthonos. In one, King Anaxandrides fathers several boys by different mothers, and 
the second eldest, Dorieus, assumes that he will one day inherit the throne, on the grounds that 
the eldest, Cleomenes, is not of sound mind (5.39-42). The Spartans, however, adhere to their 
ancestral law in making the eldest son king, at which point Dorieus grows angry and decides to 
leave Sparta to found a colony (ὁ Δωριεὺς δεινόν τε ποιεύµενος καὶ οὐκ ἀξιῶν ὑπὸ Κλεοµένεος 
                                                
41 Alternatively, Socles’ use of an argument that associates tyranny with oppression and weakness to convince the 
Spartans not to reinstate tyranny in a state whose growth concerns them indicates that Herodotus is relying on 
Athenian sources for this episode, rather than Spartan or Corinthian sources (Forsdyke 2002, 545). 
  130 
βασιλεύεσθαι, αἰτήσας λεὼν Σπαρτιήτας ἦγε ἐς ἀποικίην, 5.42.2).42 Dorieus’ reaction to his 
brother being named king exhibits the requisite conditions for envy: his brother has the kingship, 
he himself does not, and he clearly believes this situation to be grievously unfair.43 By including 
this incident, Herodotus provides context for the fact that it is Cleomenes who is king at the time 
when Aristagoras comes to ask for help in freeing the Ionians. Moreover, Cleomenes does not 
rule for long and dies without an heir, which explains why Anaxandrides’ son Leonidas is king at 
the time of the battle of Thermopylae. The story of Doreius is thus related to the development of 
events relating to the Ionian revolt, but is not strictly necessary, as the story of the Ionian revolt 
could easily be told without it.44 Thus Doreius’ departure from Sparta, motivated by envy, does 
not hold much (if any) significance in the whole scheme of things. Nevertheless, Doreius’ envy 
does not serve him or those following him well, and it can still be considered a lesson or warning 
of sorts: after a failed attempt at establishing a colony in Libya (5.42.3), he and most of his 
company are killed in battle by the Phoenicians in Sicily (5.46.1). If he had not let his envy get 
the best of him and instead he had stayed in Sparta, he would have become king when 
Cleomenes died without an heir.45  
 Later during Cleomenes’ rule, Darius demands submission from the city-states in 
mainland Greece, and many, including Aegina, comply. The Athenians ask the Spartans for help 
in intervening, but when Cleomenes attempts to seize the guilty parties in Aegina, the Aeginetans 
                                                
42 This is an unusual situation from the start: Dorieus’ mother was Anaxandrides’ first wife, whom he refused to 
divorce when she failed to bear a son. The Spartans urged him to take a second wife, which ran contrary to Spartan 
tradition, and after the second wife gave birth to Cleomenes, the first wife subsequently bore Dorieus. Dorieus thus 
had reason to believe that he might inherit the kingship, if the law were reinterpreted to mean the eldest son of the 
first wife.   
43 Dorieus’ aggravation is likely intensified by the concurrence of his negative estimation of Cleomenes’ 
qualifications with the positive one of his own. Either one by itself could lead to the third requisite condition for 
envy (i.e. his assessment that the situation is wrong). Although he believes that he should be king, the Spartans 
evidently do not agree. As a group, they decide that Cleomenes is the rightful king, which suggests that they would 
consider Dorieus’ reaction to be more akin to envy than to indignation (see p. 24).  
44 Hornblower (2013), 148. 
45 Benardete (1969), 166-67. 
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argue that he has no authority to do so. They claim that if the Spartan government approved of 
this action, they would have sent both kings instead of just one (6.50.2). The other king, 
Demaratus, had advised them on this matter (6.50.3), and Herodotus describes that he meanwhile 
remained in Sparta, slandering Cleomenes out of envy and malice (Τότε δὲ τὸν Κλεοµένεα ἐόντα 
ἐν τῇ Αἰγίνῃ καὶ κοινὰ τῇ Ἑλλάδι ἀγαθὰ προεργαζόµενον ὁ Δηµάρητος διέβαλλε, οὐκ 
Αἰγινητέων οὕτω κηδόµενος ὡς φθόνῳ καὶ ἄγῃ χρεώµενος, 6.61.1).46 In reality, the two kings 
represented opposing sides of an ongoing debate at Sparta between those who advocated 
involvement beyond their own borders and those who favored an isolationist approach, but 
Herodotus’ assessment of Demaratus’ motives as phthonos and agê gives no indication that the 
quarrel is anything other than personal in nature.47 Demaratus’ phthonos and agê set off a series 
of events in which Cleomenes retaliates and contrives a deceitful plan to remove Demaratus from 
the kingship by casting doubt on his paternity, leading to Demaratus’ flight to Persia (6.70.2), 
where he is welcomed by Darius and later becomes a trusted adviser to Xerxes. Cleomenes 
eventually goes mad and cuts himself to pieces, the cause of which madness is told variously by 
different groups—Herodotus himself favors the explanation that the madness was punishment 
(tisis) for what he did to Demaratus (6.84.3). Thus in Herodotus’ account of events, Demaratus’ 
flight to Persia and Cleomenes’ madness and ensuing self-destruction can be traced back to 
phthonos and agê. These matters have relatively little bearing on the events of the Histories as a 
whole: it would be difficult to connect Demaratus’ advice to Xerxes to any significant Persian 
victory (and ultimately his campaign was unsuccessful), and Cleomenes’ madness, while 
alarming, is not shown to have impacted anyone other than himself. But even so, the 
                                                
46 While Herodotus generally uses basileus terminology to describe the kingship at Sparta, it is noteworthy that 
Demaratus is here described in a way that likens him to the stereotypical tyrant of Otanes’ argument: διαβολὰς δὲ 
ἄριστος ἐνδέκεσθαι (“[a tyrant] is the best at giving ear to slander,” 3.80.4). Here, acting out of envy, Demaratus is 
not merely paying attention to slander but rather is producing it himself. 
47 Scott (2005), 214.  
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unpredictable chain reaction triggered by Demaratus’ envy-fueled slander surely illustrated for 
Herodotus’ audience the tumult that can ensue when rulers succumb to phthonos, and of course, 
there is always the possibility of things turning out even worse. 
 The following two examples involve phthonos as a possible or suspected motive. In Book 
5, Darius confronts Histiaeus about the revolt Aristagoras has begun in Histiaeus’ absence from 
Miletus, warning him to see to it that he not have himself to blame (ὅρα µὴ ἐξ ὑστέρης σεωυτὸν 
ἐν αἰτίῃ σχῇς, 5.106.2). Histiaeus defends himself by saying, τί δ’ ἂν ἐπιδιζήµενος ποιοῖµι ταῦτα, 
τεῦ δὲ ἐνδεὴς ἐών; τῷ πάρα µὲν πάντα ὅσα περ σοί, πάντων δὲ πρὸς σέο βουλευµάτων ἐπακούειν 
ἀξιεῦµαι (“Seeking what in addition would I do these things, or being in lack of what? I have 
everything that you have, [and] I am deemed worthy to hear all of your deliberations,” 5.106.3). 
Neither man mentions envy by name, but Histiaeus takes it upon himself to address this first, 
even before denying his involvement in the revolt. He evidently believes that if he can 
demonstrate that he feels no envy toward Darius, this will be sufficient to establish his 
innocence. Obviously, Histiaeus is not being forthcoming with Darius, as he did in fact urge 
Aristagoras to revolt (5.35.2-4), and his statement that his possessions or means are equal to 
Darius’ serves as a red flag. As we have seen in Otanes’ argument, a king’s vast resources ought 
to make him immune to phthonos, but instead he experiences it in undue proportions (3.80.4). 
Considered against the background of the constitutional debate, this passage thus suggests that 
Histiaeus, a former ruler, may in fact harbor envious feelings toward Darius, even though, as he 
argues, he ought not to. Moreover, Herodotus reports what was believed to be the real reason 
why Histiaeus acted as he did: ταῦτα δὲ ὁ Ἱστιαῖος ἐποίεε συµφορὴν ποιεύµενος µεγάλην τὴν 
ἑωυτοῦ κατοχὴν τὴν ἐν Σούσοισι· ἀποστάσιος γὰρ γινοµένης πολλὰς εἶχε ἐλπίδας µετήσεσθαι 
ἐπὶ θάλασσαν (Histiaeus did these things because he considered his detention in Susa a great 
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misfortune, for he had high hopes that, if a revolt took place, he would be discharged to the sea, 
5.35.4). Herodotus is content to attribute the revolt to a personal motive such as wanting to return 
home, and thus it is not much of a stretch to imagine that envy could be a contributing factor.48 
Histiaeus may not have his eye on Darius’ specific role as king of Persia, but as he seems to miss 
being involved and in charge among his people, he likely envies Darius’ authority and active 
leadership.49  
In the grand scheme of affairs, Histiaeus’ envious behavior is hardly the only contributing 
factor to the Ionian revolt.50 His co-conspirator, Aristagoras, was not acting solely out of 
obeisance to Histiaeus, as he had his own motives for participating in the revolt—namely, to 
secure his own position and create as much trouble as possible for Darius, in the aftermath of the 
failed siege of Naxos (5.35.1-2, 5.37.1). Moreover, it seems likely that Herodotus includes 
Histiaeus’ personal agenda because this was something upon which his sources could agree, even 
if no consensus existed regarding other causes, overall goals, or reasons for the failure of the 
revolt.51 Nevertheless, the Ionian revolt was one of the reasons why Darius (and so too Xerxes) 
invaded Greece, and by even raising the suggestion that envy could have spurred Histiaeus to 
incite a revolt, Herodotus illustrates how an envious ruler’s reckless behavior can impact the 
lives of countless others.  
 The possibility of a trusted adviser having ulterior motives appears again in Book 7, 
when Xerxes asks Demaratus how to defeat the Spartans. Demaratus tells him to divide and 
conquer: if he sends part of his fleet to attack the coast near Sparta, this will decrease the 
likelihood that the Spartans will assist the rest of the Greeks; Xerxes can then more easily defeat 
                                                
48 Hornblower (2013), 17. 
49 We can thus consider his envy to be more of the covetous sort, rather than begrudging. 
50 Forsdyke (2002), 530. 
51 Idem, 529. 
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the others, and when he subsequently attacks the Spartans, they will be weaker at that point. 
Achaemenes, Xerxes’ brother, casts doubt upon this advice on the grounds that Demaratus may 
harbor envious feelings toward Xerxes. He cautions him, Ὦ βασιλεῦ, ὁρέω σε ἀνδρὸς 
ἐνδεκόµενον λόγους ὃς φθονέει τοι εὖ πρήσσοντι ἢ καὶ προδιδοῖ πρήγµατα τὰ σά. καὶ γὰρ δὴ καὶ 
τρόποισι τοιούτοισι χρώµενοι Ἕλληνες χαίρουσι· τοῦ τε εὐτυχέειν φθονέουσι καὶ τὸ κρέσσον 
στυγέουσι (“King, I see that you are accepting the words of a man who envies you in your 
success or even betrays your affairs. For the Greeks delight in behaving in these ways: they are 
envious of good fortune and they hate the stronger,” 7.236.1). Achaemenes does not provide any 
evidence for the claim that Demaratus envies Xerxes other than the general belief that the Greeks 
are envious by nature, but he is convinced that if Xerxes follows Demaratus’ advice, he risks 
significant damage to the Persian fleet, as well as to their overall effort. Xerxes yields to 
Achaemenes’ opinion regarding what he perceives to be the better course of action—namely, to 
keep the fleet united so as to be more secure—but disagrees vehemently with his estimation of 
Demaratus’ motives. He counters: 
οὐ γὰρ δὴ κεῖνό γε ἐνδέξοµαι ὅκως οὐκ εὐνοέει τοῖσι ἐµοῖσι πρήγµασι, τοῖσί τε 
λεγοµένοισι πρότερον ἐκ τούτου σταθµώµενος καὶ τῷ ἐόντι, ὅτι πολιήτης µὲν πολιήτῃ εὖ 
πρήσσοντι φθονέει καὶ ἐστι δυσµενὴς τῇ σιγῇ, οὐδ’ ἂν συµβουλευοµένου τοῦ ἀστοῦ 
πολιήτης ἀνὴρ τὰ ἄριστά οἱ δοκέοντα εἶναι ὑποθέοιτο, εἰ µὴ πρόσω ἀρετῆς ἀνήκοι· 
σπάνιοι δέ εἰσι οἱ τοιοῦτοι· ξεῖνος δὲ ξείνῳ εὖ πρήσσοντί ἐστι εὐµενέστατον πάντων, 
συµβουλευοµένου τε ἂν συµβουλεύσειε τὰ ἄριστα. οὕτω ὦν κακολογίης πέρι τῆς ἐς 
Δηµάρητον, ἐόντος ἐµοὶ ξείνου, ἔχεσθαί τινα τοῦ λοιποῦ κελεύω. 
 
“I will not accept that [idea] that he is not well intentioned toward my affairs, when I 
measure by the things said before by him and by the truth, that a citizen envies a citizen 
who fares well and is hostile in silence, and a man would not even suggest what seems 
best to him when a citizen of the town is asking advice, unless he has reached a high 
point of virtue; but these kinds of men are rare. But a guest-friend is most kindly of all to 
a guest-friend who fares well, and would give the best advice when he asks for it. Thus I 
order everyone to refrain hereafter from [engaging in] slander of Demaratus, since he is 
my guest-friend.” (7.237.2-3) 
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Xerxes’ speech presents a defense of Demaratus and his trustworthiness on the basis of his past 
truthfulness, as well as a theoretical discussion of which relationships do and do not tend to give 
rise to envy. Curiously, Xerxes does not contradict his brother’s claim that the Greeks are 
envious by nature, but rather, he focuses on the idea that Demaratus is not likely to envy him 
because they are guest-friends as opposed to fellow citizens. Guest-friends are supposed to have 
one another’s best interests in mind, and Xerxes (rightfully) believes that acting out of envy 
toward a guest-friend would be a violation of this special bond. Moreover, the dissimilarity 
inherent in a guest-friendship (namely that they come from different states) means that the two 
parties are not in direct competition and thus envy is unlikely. The idea that like envies like is in 
accord with sentiments found elsewhere in the Histories and in other works.52 Moreover, the 
repeated nouns and verb choice in πολιήτης µὲν πολιήτῃ εὖ πρήσσοντι φθονέει creates a strong 
resemblance to Hesiod’s πτωχὸς πτωχῷ φθονέει (Op. 26), although without any of its positive 
connotations of productivity.53 In a similar vein, Plato has Socrates quote this passage from the 
Works and Days when discussing the idea that the strength of a friendship depends on a certain 
degree of dissimilarity (Lys. 215d).54 This resemblance in turn suggests that we should take this 
as a general truth with which Herodotus’ audience would have been familiar, rather than merely 
a chance statement inserted into the speech of a Persian character.  
Xerxes does not believe that Demaratus is acting out of envy, but regardless, he claims to 
make his decision solely based on the merit of the strategies proposed (7.237.1), and for this 
reason, phthonos cannot be considered to have had any tangible effect on the development of 
                                                
52 See p. 120-21: Deioces aims to prevent envy by making himself seem different from his former peers (1.99.2). 
53 Vannicelli (2017), 590.  
54 For more about this passage, see p. 154-55. 
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events.55 Achaemenes’ concern does, however, shed light on the difficulty of a king’s position, 
for he has to weigh different sources’ credibility and evaluate their intentions and interests. This 
task must not be taken lightly, and the overall effect of Achaemenes voicing doubt is that 
Herodotus’ readers are reminded of the precariousness of a ruler’s affairs (which in turn affect 
entire populations), and how even the possibility of envy can tip the scale and lead to ruin if the 
ruler makes an error in judgment. The overall pattern that emerges from these examples, whether 
real or suspected phthonos is involved, is that while the actual repercussions tend to be relatively 
limited in scope, they nevertheless constitute a warning about potential repercussions. One 
possible exception to the pattern of localized consequences is the unnamed envy that causes 
Histiaeus to urge a revolt at Miletus, which in turn prompts Darius to retaliate and launch an 
invasion. It is clear to modern historians, however, that the Ionian revolt had various underlying 
causes that Herodotus does not identify directly (e.g. influence of democratic reforms at Athens, 
economic discontent, etc.).56 Indeed, the fact that he reports about other city-states joining or 
assisting the revolt suggests that Herodotus himself was aware of causal forces at work beyond 
Histiaeus’ personal motives. This, then, reduces the impact that Histiaeus’ envy can be 
considered to have had on the development of events. Nevertheless, taken in sum, these 
examples offer a cautionary tale about both phthonos and one-man rule: matters are always on 
the verge of ending badly whenever phthonos enters into the equation, especially when heads of 
state or other powerful individuals are involved. 
                                                
55 It is unclear from what Herodotus says whether the audience is meant to suspect Demaratus of having acting out 
of envy, as Achaemenes suggests. Demaratus is shown elsewhere to behave in such a manner (cf. 6.61.1, discussed 
above, p. 130-32), and Herodotus himself is unsure whether he subsequently sent word of Xerxes’ imminent 
invasion to the Spartans as an act of goodwill or gloating (πάρεστι δὲ εἰκάζειν εἴτε εὐνοίῃ ταῦτα ἐποίησε εἴτε καὶ 
καταχαίρων, 7.239.2). If the former, it is a distinct possibility that his advice to Xerxes about splitting the fleet was 
disingenuous (Benardete 1969, 208). 
56 Hornblower (2013), 15-17. 
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 One final example deserves mention, an unusual scenario in which Herodotus alludes to 
what might be a potential benefit of phthonos. Significantly, if we are indeed meant to 
understand envy as playing a role in this passage, it neither originates from nor is directed toward 
a sole ruler; it belongs to the people. After recounting the Athenians’ victory over the Boeotians 
and Chalcidians, Herodotus notes that their change in government was responsible for their 
increasing strength:  
δηλοῖ δὲ οὐ κατ᾽ ἓν µοῦνον ἀλλὰ πανταχῇ ἡ ἰσηγορίη ὡς ἐστὶ χρῆµα σπουδαῖον, εἰ καὶ 
Ἀθηναῖοι τυραννευόµενοι µὲν οὐδαµῶν τῶν σφέας περιοικεόντων ἦσαν τὰ πολέµια 
ἀµείνους, ἀπαλλαχθέντες δὲ τυράννων µακρῷ πρῶτοι ἐγένοντο. δηλοῖ ὦν ταῦτα ὅτι 
κατεχόµενοι µὲν ἐθελοκάκεον ὡς δεσπότῃ ἐργαζόµενοι, ἐλευθερωθέντων δὲ αὐτὸς 
ἕκαστος ἑωυτῷ προεθυµέετό <τι> κατεργάζεσθαι. 
   
It is clear that an equal voice is an excellent thing not in a single regard alone but in all 
ways, because the Athenians were better than none of their neighbors in matters of war 
while they were living under tyranny, but after they were freed from tyrants, they became 
the first by far. Therefore this makes clear that while being oppressed, they were 
deliberately slack, because they were working for a master, but each of them, after they 
were liberated, was eager to earn something for himself. (5.78) 
 
Harrison takes this as evidence for the productive side of envy, presumably along the same lines 
as Hesiod’s good Eris: namely, in democracy, envy and its requisite social comparison spurs 
individuals to work harder in order to improve their standing relative to their peer group.57 The 
Athenians’ growing power and skill in warfare does have a tremendous impact on the events of 
the fifth century, so if we can attribute the change in the Athenians’ behavior under democracy to 
phthonos, this is then perhaps the strongest example we have in order to argue in favor of the 
importance of phthonos as a driving force in the Histories. The fact that this would be a rare 
instance of positive phthonos among men, however, as well as the absence of verbal cues (such 
as we have seen in previous chapters, e.g. zêlos, eris, timê, etc.) to help confirm the presence of 
phthonos, suggests that Herodotus did not intend for this to be a programmatic statement about 
                                                
57 Harrison (2003), 154. 
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the overarching impact of phthonos on human affairs. It is a significant passage for establishing 
the benefit of political freedom, but the involvement of envy is less definite.58  
 In sum, phthonos cannot be considered the primary motivating factor of human action in 
the Histories, but it does appear repeatedly, and the collection of instances in which it is 
responsible for men’s behavior sends a persuasive message about its destructive capacity and 
about the precariousness of one-man rule. While it goes beyond the scope of the current study to 
make a case for what is the primary motivating factor, Henry Immerwahr and John Gould have 
gone to great lengths to identify and classify the various modes of causation at work in 
Herodotus’ text. Immerwahr divides Herodotean causation into three categories: immediate 
causes (vengeance is a key example), “permanently operative” causes (desire for expansionism is 
the primary cause of this type, but vengeance can also fall under this heading when it stems from 
a long-standing resentment), and metaphysical causes (such as the concept of necessity).59 Gould 
simplifies the matter even further, suggesting the “reciprocity model” as the best possible means 
of explaining any given part of the narrative—human action, divine action, and even physical 
phenomena such as the flow of rivers.60 Within this model, Gould identifies gratitude and 
revenge as the primary motives as far as human behavior is concerned. Immerwahr and Gould’s 
analyses of Herodotean causation are flexible enough to have substantial merit, and indeed, it is 
not difficult to find examples that support their validity. For instance, fueled by his desire to 
return home, Histiaeus’ envy and instigation of rebellion can be considered a response (of a 
vengeful sort) to Darius’ decision to remove him from Myrcinus (5.23-24), which Darius had 
originally granted to him as a token of gratitude for his prior service (5.11). The ensuing Ionian 
revolt in turn triggers Darius’ invasion of Greece, which results from a combination of 
                                                
58 Forsdyke (2006), 233. This passage will be discussed further below, p. 151-52. 
59 Immerwahr (2013), 178. 
60 Gould (1989), 85. 
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immediate causes (including vengeance; 5.105, 7.1) and the ever-present motive of desire for 
expansionism (3.134). This example demonstrates that while phthonos can at times fit into the 
larger schema of causation, its narrow parameters render it unsuitable for the role of a primary 
motivating factor in comparison with broader, more inclusive causal principles such as 
vengeance or gratitude. 
 
4. Divine phthonos 
 
 Herodotus presents divine phthonos as having enormous potential to affect mortals, both 
individually and collectively. Homer and Hesiod’s gods exhibit envious and jealous behavior 
(both among themselves and in relation to mortals), but the nature of the phthonos they direct 
toward mortals is significantly different from what we find in Herodotus’ Histories, where it is 
more impersonal (Herodotus’ characters at times use the neuter substantive adjective to theion) 
and often comes to signify something akin to moral censure.61 The idea of the gods taking 
punitive action against humans on account of bad behavior certainly existed in the works of 
earlier authors, but they did not use phthonos to express it; they used words like megairein, 
agaasthai, kotein, and nemesis.62 According to Walcot, the emergence and prevalence of divine 
phthonos in the works of fifth-century authors such as Herodotus, Aeschylus, and Pindar stems 
from the Greeks’ increased familiarity with larger-than-life eastern autocrats. He argues that 
before the fifth century, the gods were not widely depicted as experiencing phthonos toward 
mortals because the Greeks had not encountered mortals whose power could conceivably 
                                                
61 Sanders (2014), 42. 
62 Idem, 53; Walcot (1978), 26. In other scenarios (i.e. ones that do not involve divine action against mortals), these 
words are sometimes found in conjunction with phthonos, which helps explain how the semantic range of phthonos 
was able to expand in later centuries. 
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compete with that of the gods.63 Moreover, Konstan notes that there was a general shift away 
from the use of nemesis (and related terms) and toward that of phthonos (and related terms) 
around the end of the sixth century or the beginning of the fifth.64 This transition likely played a 
role in enabling phthonos (especially in the divine realm) to take on the meaning of indignation 
and thus moral censure as well. Regardless of this change, however, and the fact that divine 
phthonos in the Histories is frequently portrayed in an impersonal manner, Herodotus’ use of 
phthonos terminology in reference to the divine realm is still significant. Namely, despite 
variations in the nature of divine and human phthonos, Herodotus’ use of related terms to 
describe both suggests that even when the Greeks believed that divine phthonos was acting in a 
retributive or moralizing role, they conceived of the gods as having an emotional response to 
human affairs. 
 The concept of divine phthonos appears several times throughout the Histories, although 
nearly always in characters’ speeches rather than in Herodotus’ own voice. Solon is the first to 
talk about divine phthonos, and he does so in response to Croesus’ annoyance at being named 
neither the most nor the second most fortunate man Solon has met. Solon explains, ἐπιστάµενόν 
µε τὸ θεῖον πᾶν ἐὸν φθονερόν τε καὶ ταραχῶδες ἐπειρωτᾷς ἀνθρωπηίων πρηγµάτων πέρι (“You 
question me about human affairs, and I know that the divine is entirely jealous and prone to 
disturbing [them], 1.32.1). He then describes the vicissitudes that men often undergo, as a means 
of illustrating why it is necessary to wait until the end of a person’s life in order to deem it happy 
or not (1.32.2-9). To his own detriment, Croesus is dismissive of Solon’s wisdom, for Herodotus 
reports, µετὰ δὲ Σόλωνα οἰχόµενον ἔλαβε ἐκ θεοῦ νέµεσις µεγάλη Κροῖσον, ὡς εἰκάσαι, ὅτι 
ἐνόµισε ἑωυτὸν εἶναι ἀνθρώπων ἁπάντων ὀλβιώτατον (After Solon left, a god’s great anger 
                                                
63 Walcot (1978), 31. 
64 Konstan (2006), 119. 
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seized him, to venture a guess, because he considered himself to be the most blessed of all men, 
1.34.1). Herodotus describes how Croesus’ son dies shortly thereafter, despite his best attempt to 
avert the foretold disaster, and from there his fortunes continue on a downward trajectory. This is 
the only appearance of the noun form nemesis in the Histories, but elsewhere, from Homer 
onward, it often denotes the displeasure of the gods (as well as hostile reactions among men).65  
In some cases, as here (given its juxtaposition with Solon’s warnings about gods’ jealousy), its 
context also suggests phthonos.66 Konstan even goes so far as to argue that by the time Aristotle 
was writing, nemesis and phthonos were essentially the same thing, despite the distinction the 
philosopher draws between the two.67 While the warnings about the jealous nature of the divine 
and the mutability of human affairs comes from Solon, rather than from Herodotus himself, 
Herodotus’ comment about the nemesis that followed strongly suggests that Solon’s views mirror 
his own and that Herodotus too considers the gods to be highly jealous beings.68  
 The clearest statement in Herodotus’ own voice about divine phthonos appears in Book 4. 
When Pheretime, the exiled queen of Cyrene, exacts revenge on the people of Barca for 
murdering her son, she orders that the men be killed and the women’s breasts be cut off 
(4.202.1). She subsequently dies a wretched and disgusting death, of which Herodotus gives the 
following account: ζῶσα γὰρ εὐλέων ἐξέζεσε, ὡς ἄρα ἀνθρώποισι αἱ λίην ἰσχυραὶ τιµωρίαι πρὸς 
θεῶν ἐπίφθονοι γίνονται (For she boiled over with worms while still alive, since excessively 
                                                
65 Asheri, Lloyd, and Corcella (2007), 105; Sanders (2014), 52. 
66 As an example of the association between nemesis and phthonos, Penelope’s suitors grow angry (νεµέσησαν, Od. 
21.285) at the suggestion that the beggar Odysseus be allowed to try to string the bow, anxious that he may succeed 
where they failed. Phthonos is not explicitly named, but the scenario suggests it: the suitors are possessive of 
Penelope and seem to believe that only they have the right to compete for her hand. 
67 Konstan (2006), 114. In the Rhetoric, Aristotle explains that envy (phthonos) and indignation (to nemesan) have 
in common that they are set in opposition to pity (to eleein), but the difference between the two has to do with the 
issue of merit. The latter is pain at another’s undeserved success, while in the case of the former, merit appears to be 
irrelevant, for Aristotle defines envy as pain at the success of someone who is similar to ourselves (1386b16-20). 
Aristotle’s definitions will be discussed further in Chapter 5 (see p. 165-72). 
68 Shapiro (1996), 352. 
  142 
severe vengeance among mortals is regarded with jealousy by the gods, 4.205). Susan Shapiro 
notes that excessive anger and revenge were regarded as the exclusive right of the gods, and so 
Pheretime crossed a boundary by taking matters into her own hands in such an extreme 
manner.69 This interpretation, while plausible, requires a certain amount of mental flexibility to 
make the scenario fit the traditional sense of jealousy, but regardless, there is no difficulty in 
regarding Pheretime’s demise as an example of phthonos as moral censure.  
The remaining discussions of divine phthonos all appear in the speeches of various 
characters, rather than in Herodotus’ own commentary, but as we will see, these examples 
together constitute an integral part of the worldview presented in the Histories. In Book 3, 
Herodotus narrates the story of another monarch who receives a warning about the jealousy of 
the gods. Amasis, the king of Egypt, expresses concern for Polycrates, the tyrant of Samos, and 
his continuing good fortune: ἐµοὶ δὲ αἱ σαὶ µεγάλαι εὐτυχίαι οὐκ ἀρέσκουσι, ἐπισταµένῳ τὸ 
θεῖον ὡς ἔστι φθονερόν…οὐδένα γάρ κω λόγῳ οἶδα ἀκούσας ὅστις ἐς τέλος οὐ κακῶς 
ἐτελεύτησε πρόρριζος, εὐτυχέων τὰ πάντα (“Your great success does not please me, because I 
know that the divine is jealous…for I neither know nor have heard of anyone who, being 
fortunate in all respects, did not die utterly miserably in the end,” 3.40.2-3). Amasis’ warning 
runs parallel to what Solon tells Croesus, although Amasis also dispenses some practical 
advice—that Polycrates throw away his most valued possession—in an attempt to help him ward 
off unexpected misfortunes. Unlike Croesus, Polycrates takes Amasis’ message to heart, 
although the disposal of his beloved ring is not ultimately as permanent as he had planned. Much 
later in Book 3, Herodotus describes Polycrates’ death: in pursuit of funds to help him achieve 
his ambitions of ruling Ionia (3.122.2-3), Polycrates falls victim to the trickery of the Persian 
Oroetes, who kills him brutally and impales his corpse (3.125.3). Curiously, while Herodotus 
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remarks that Polycrates did not deserve such an end (οὔτε ἑωυτοῦ ἀξίως οὔτε τῶν ἑωυτοῦ 
φρονηµάτων, 3.125.2), he nevertheless refers back to the earlier story with Amasis.70 He 
narrates, Πολυκράτεος µὲν δὴ αἱ πολλαὶ εὐτυχίαι ἐς τοῦτο ἐτελεύτησαν τῇ οἱ Ἄµασις ὁ Αἰγύπτου 
βασιλεὺς προεµαντεύσατο (Indeed, the many successes of Polycrates came to this end in the way 
in which Amasis the Egyptian predicted, 3.125.4). Even if τῇ...προεµαντεύσατο ought to be 
deleted, as some editors prefer, the use of an eutuch- word in conjunction with the verb teleutan 
nevertheless recalls Amasis’ warning in 3.40.2-3.71 Once again, the statement about the jealous 
nature of the divine comes from Herodotus’ character rather than from the historian himself, but 
Herodotus’ comment at 3.125.4 suggests that he at least believes in the possibility that the gods 
and their phthonos had something to do with his unfortunate end. 
 Xerxes likewise receives a warning about the jealousy of the gods from his uncle when 
he solicits advice about his proposed invasion of Greece. Artabanus reminds him of several of 
Darius’ failures before issuing a more general statement about the gods: 
ὁρᾷς τὰ ὑπερέχοντα ζῷα ὡς κεραυνοῖ ὁ θεὸς οὐδὲ ἐᾷ φαντάζεσθαι, τὰ δὲ σµικρὰ οὐδέν 
µιν κνίζει· ὁρᾷς δὲ ὡς ἐς οἰκήµατα τὰ µέγιστα αἰεὶ καὶ δένδρεα τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀποσκήπτει τὰ 
βέλεα· φιλέει γὰρ ὁ θεὸς τὰ ὑπερέχοντα πάντα κολούειν. οὕτω δὲ καὶ στρατὸς πολλὸς 
ὑπὸ ὀλίγου διαφθείρεται κατὰ τοιόνδε· ἐπεάν σφι ὁ θεὸς φθονήσας φόβον ἐµβάλῃ ἢ 
βροντήν, δι’ ὦν ἐφθάρησαν ἀναξίως ἑωυτῶν. οὐ γὰρ ἐᾷ φρονέειν µέγα ὁ θεὸς ἄλλον ἢ 
ἑωυτόν. 
 
“You see how the god strikes prominent living beings with the thunderbolt and does not  
allow them to make a show of themselves, but the small ones do not provoke him, and 
you see how he always hurls his bolts against the greatest buildings and trees of this sort. 
For the god loves to cut down all prominent things. And so too a mighty army is 
destroyed by a small one, in accordance with this sort of [principle], when the god casts 
fear or thunder among them out of jealousy, on account of which they are destroyed 
undeservedly. For the god does not allow anyone but himself to be prideful.” (7.10.ε) 
 
                                                
70 A similar phrase appears in the next example as well (ἀναξίως ἑωυτῶν, 7.10.ε). It may be the case that Polycrates 
and the unspecified “mighty army” can be considered deserving of some deleterious effect, but that they do not 
necessarily deserve the magnitude of the punishment inflicted on them by the jealous gods.   
71 I am using the Oxford Classical Text edited by Wilson (2015), who does not place this phrase in brackets. 
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Artabanus’ advice is in accordance with that of Solon and Amasis, but he adds a higher degree of 
specificity, providing examples of natural phenomena that illustrate the principle of high stature 
attracting negative attention before pointing out how the gods bring down mighty armies (which 
is precisely what he fears will happen if Xerxes proceeds with the invasion).72 The parallels 
among the statements of Solon, Amasis, and Artabanus are impossible to overlook. While it is 
always prudent to remember that the views of characters do not necessarily reflect those of the 
author, the fact that Herodotus has multiple characters from different backgrounds (Greek, 
Egyptian, and Persian, respectively) express a similar idea about the danger of divine phthonos 
strongly indicates that it is representative of Herodotus’ own beliefs and of Greek beliefs in 
general.73 The outcomes in these three cases serve as additional evidence of this: Croesus suffers 
the nemesis of a god, Polycrates is deceived and brutally killed, and Xerxes’ campaign ends in 
disaster. It is difficult to make a definitive argument that Xerxes’ ultimate failure is solely or 
even primarily on account of the phthonos of the gods, but it is worth noting that Herodotus 
comments (in his own voice) later on that a god caused the destruction of part of the Persian fleet 
with a storm in order that it would more closely match the size of the Greek fleet (8.13).74 
 Artabanus discusses divine phthonos with Xerxes once again after leaving Susa. When 
Xerxes surveys his ships at the Hellespont and weeps, he explains to Artabanus that he was 
reflecting on the brevity of human life. Artabanus makes the point that death is not a bad thing, 
but rather a welcome respite from the inevitable misfortunes of life: ἐν γὰρ οὕτω βραχέϊ βίῳ 
οὐδεὶς οὕτως ἄνθρωπος ἐὼν εὐδαίµων πέφυκε, οὔτε τούτων οὔτε τῶν ἄλλων, τῷ οὐ 
παραστήσεται πολλάκις καὶ οὐκὶ ἅπαξ τεθνάναι βούλεσθαι µᾶλλον ἢ ζώειν (“For even in such a 
short life, no man—among these or any others—is so fortunate that he does not wish, often and 
                                                
72 Vannicelli (2017), 316. 
73 For a discussion of the slight ways in which these three views differ, see Benardete (1969), 185-86. 
74 Shapiro (1996), 355. 
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not just once, to die rather than live,” 7.46.3). He then traces this misfortunes back to divine 
phthonos: ὁ δὲ θεὸς γλυκὺν γεύσας τὸν αἰῶνα φθονερὸς ἐν αὐτῷ εὑρίσκεται ἐών (“The god is 
found to be jealous in this regard, giving [only] a taste of sweet life,” 7.46.4). Artabanus’ words 
are meant to ease Xerxes’ grief over the short lifespan of mortal men, but they contain a grim 
message nevertheless. Whereas before, Artabanus warned Xerxes about the risk of incurring 
divine phthonos on account of pride (φρονέειν µέγα, 7.10.ε), divine phthonos is here presented as 
universal, affecting any and everyone. This sentiment is similar to what Solon says to Croesus; 
neither adviser is urging a particular course of action at the time, but he is merely making a point 
about the fragility and mutability of human affairs.  
 The Persians retreat back to Asia after sustaining significant losses in battle, and 
Themistocles cautions the Athenians not to pursue them at that time. He reasons that they did not 
bring about their present success themselves, but rather, it was divine phthonos that struck down 
their enemies: τάδε γὰρ οὐκ ἡµεῖς κατεργασάµεθα, ἀλλὰ θεοί τε καὶ ἥρωες, οἳ ἐφθόνησαν ἄνδρα 
ἕνα τῆς τε Ἀσίης καὶ τῆς Εὐρώπης βασιλεῦσαι, ἐόντα ἀνόσιόν τε καὶ ἀτάσθαλον (“We did not 
accomplish these things, but the gods and heroes, who were jealous that one man should be king 
of both Asia and Europe, and an unholy and wicked man at that,” 8.109.3). Herodotus notes that 
Themistocles had ulterior motives in saying this, as he wanted to be able to use this as an 
example of his goodwill toward Persia, should he ever need to take refuge there (8.109.5), so we 
cannot tell for certain whether Themistocles truly believed that the gods and heroes were 
responsible. Regardless, the Athenians were apparently convinced (8.110.1), which shows that 
the idea of divine phthonos was a plausible enough explanation of events in Herodotus’ day, or 
at the very least, it was an explanation that no one cared to challenge openly.    
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 Lang argues that divine phthonos “has very definite rhetorical value” but “no merit for 
Herodotus as an expression of historical causation,” a claim which Gould also finds generally 
valid.75 Although I agree that the role of divine phthonos in Herodotus’ narrative is much more 
often abstract than concrete, the claim that there is no indication of divine phthonos as a causal 
force in the Histories is an overstatement in my view, in light of the comments in Herodotus’ 
own voice about both Croesus’ reversal of fortune and Pheretime’s death. Moreover, why would 
Herodotus include as many references to divine phthonos as he does, if not to suggest that it can 
at times explain historical causation? First, it will be useful to consider what Gould elsewhere 
terms the “uncertainty principle.” This principle explains that Herodotus’ hesitation to identify 
instances of divine influence on mortal affairs is an acknowledgment of his own limited 
knowledge—a limitation that all humans experience by default.76 In accordance with this 
principle, perhaps Herodotus refrains from naming divine phthonos as the cause in more 
situations because he does not want to presume a special and privileged understanding of the 
divine. We can see evidence of such hesitation in the phrase ὡς εἰκάσαι (to venture a guess, 
1.34.1) when he mentions the nemesis that strikes Croesus after Solon’s visit. The uncertainty 
principle thus offers one possible explanation: Herodotus believes in the concept of divine 
phthonos in the abstract, but is too cautious to use it frequently in determining the cause of 
specific events. Second, perhaps Herodotus does not need to be dogmatic about divine phthonos 
by repeatedly attributing outcomes to it. Given Herodotus’ use of narrative patterning, it is highly 
possible that he intended the abstract discussions of divine phthonos to signal to his readers (or 
listeners) that they should be attuned to its presence even when not named explicitly.  
                                                
75 Lang (1984), 62; Gould (1989), 80. 
76 Gould (1994), 94. 
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 The examples discussed above can be split into two categories: one in which divine 
phthonos is depicted as universal and likely to affect anyone at any time, and another in which it 
is depicted as predictable and likely to afflict those who grow too prideful or powerful. Solon’s 
advice to Croesus and Artabanus’ reasoning as to why Xerxes should not grieve the prospect of 
death fall into the first category, which showcases the vulnerability of (all) human life in a rather 
pessimistic light. Amasis’ advice to Polycrates, Artabanus’ argument against the invasion of 
Greece, Themistocles’ (somewhat less than genuine) account of Xerxes’ defeat as an act of the 
gods, and Pheretime’s punishment fall into the second category, which can be interpreted as 
providing a slightly different outlook. While divine phthonos is never a pleasant experience for 
whoever is on the receiving end, divine phthonos of the second category serves to benefit society 
as a whole.77 When acts of hubris—humans overstepping their bounds or committing 
egregiously offensive acts against one another—arouse divine phthonos, divine phthonos helps 
reestablish proper balance.78 In this regard, such phthonos is justified, and indeed, toward the end 
of the fifth century, the term more and more frequently indicated a sort of moral censure.79 This 
dichotomy between divine phthonos that strikes at random and divine phthonos that falls upon 
the overweening reflects two conflicting yet coexistent phenomena: the anxiety that the gods 
have little to no concern for the suffering of mortals and cannot be relied upon for assistance or 
good will, and the hope that the gods care enough to regulate justice in the mortal realm 
(although, of course, at-risk powerful individuals would not likely consider such punishment 
justified and thus would regard it with further trepidation).80 Thus divine phthonos is not entirely 
                                                
77 It is never good to be the victim of divine phthonos, but being marked as an individual who is at high risk and 
needs to be careful to avoid incurring it is indeed an indication of achievement, and Pindar makes frequent use of 
this paradox (Cairns 2003, 250).  
78 Plescia (1972), 311. 
79 Sanders (2014), 42. 
80 Burkert (1985), 189. 
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negative in the Histories, and as we will see in the following section, there are small indications 
that even human phthonos can at times serve a positive purpose.  
 
5. Phthonos as a positive force? 
 
Herodotus does not state explicitly the idea that either divine or human phthonos can 
have a positive effect, but one can see fairly easily from his depiction of divine phthonos how the 
gods’ punishment of overly arrogant or powerful individuals (or states) could benefit the rest of 
society. As for human envy, several scholars claim that Herodotus shows that it can serve in a 
helpful capacity, but the textual evidence is so subtle that it begs the question whether Herodotus 
intended to convey any message about such a role. I aim to demonstrate that while Herodotus 
provides material that one could use to make an argument for the existence of positive human 
phthonos, he himself refrains from making such an argument. This material is worth mentioning 
not so much because it forms an integral part of Herodotus’ overall presentation of phthonos, but 
simply because it offers an alternative to the overwhelmingly or often entirely negative image 
seen elsewhere.  
Immerwahr states, “The notion that through envy the citizens of a free society prevent the 
rise of despotism is in fact current in fifth-century political thought, but to Herodotus envy is 
rather a sign of that disunity which, as an aspect of diversity in the historical process, is so 
essential to his political philosophy.”81 Immerwahr provides no direction citations of passages 
from other fifth-century authors to vouch for the presence of the idea that envy functions as a 
safeguard against tyranny, but he does point to Herodotus’ account of the Greeks’ difficulty in 
                                                
81 Immerwahr (1966), 313-14. For the role of disunity in Herodotus’ “political philosophy” (i.e. the idea that 
disunity is what accounts for the strength of Greek states relative to the strength of those led by eastern monarchs), 
see Immerwahr (1966), 307. 
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awarding a prize of valor after the battle of Salamis.82 According to Herodotus, each man casts 
his first vote for himself and his second for Themistocles (8.123.2).83 This results in a stalemate: 
οὐ βουλοµένων δὲ ταῦτα κρίνειν τῶν Ἑλλήνων φθόνῳ, ἀλλ’ ἀποπλωόντων ἑκάστων ἐς τὴν 
ἑωυτῶν ἀκρίτων (Out of phthonos, the Greeks were unwilling to decide these matters, but each 
sailed home without coming to a resolution, 8.124.1).84 There is also a similar instance following 
the battle of Plataea, which Immerwahr does not mention. When discussion among the Spartans 
turns to the matter of who fought most bravely (γενοµένης λέσχης ὃς γένοιτο αὐτῶν ἄριστος, 
9.71.3) in the battle, they refrain from honoring Aristodemus, because he clearly wanted to die in 
battle. Herodotus adds that they might have spoken in this way out of phthonos (ἀλλὰ ταῦτα µὲν 
καὶ φθόνῳ ἂν εἴποιεν, 9.71.3). One could argue, as Immerwahr does, that these two examples 
show how widespread phthonos can maintain balance in society by preventing any one person 
from receiving too much distinction or power (and that this functions on the state level as well, 
helping maintain balance among international powers).85 On the other hand, they more clearly 
illustrate the negative side of phthonos: if the majority of men are unable or unwilling to see 
another exalted above themselves, action can grind to a halt, as it does in the first scenario, or a 
                                                
82 One of the articles that Immerwahr cites to show that this idea existed in the fifth century focuses on Plutarch’s 
Life of Themistocles (Martin 1961, 333). Plutarch attributes Themistocles’ ostracism to phthonos, noting that 
ostracism was an outlet for people to vent their envy (Vit. Them. 22), but we cannot automatically assume that 
Plutarch’s writings are indicative of fifth-century views, even if he draws from Herodotus as a source. Moreover, it 
is somewhat of a stretch to claim that phthonos, insofar as it can lead to ostracism, is a means of preventing the rise 
of tyranny. At any rate, Plutarch does not seem to regard either as a positive phenomenon. The institution of 
ostracism was more of a response to the disruptiveness of intra-elite rivalry than a safeguard against tyranny 
(Forsdyke 2005, 153). 
83 This demonstration of egoism showcases the messy side of the Greeks’ desire for honor, in contrast to the nobility 
of the Olympic ideal, which Arcadian deserters discuss with the Persians at 8.26 (Bowie 2007, 212). 
84 Since envy and jealousy may both be at work, I have chosen to leave phthonos untranslated. A man may act out of 
anticipatory envy because he imagines what it will feel like when another man receives the distinction he craved, but 
he may also act out of anticipatory jealousy because he imagines the distinction already belongs to him, and so he 
must fight all the more bravely to make sure that no potential rival takes it away from him.  
85 The aftermath of the Greeks’ indecision following the battle of Salamis somewhat negates the idea that phthonos 
is an effective equalizing force. Themistocles immediately goes to Sparta, seeking the honor he feels he deserves, 
and he is given a crown, a chariot, and an escort of three hundred men (8.124.2-3), which things in turn provoke an 
Athenian man to revile him out of envy (8.125.1). This goes to show that even if the phthonos of others denies a 
man distinction in one setting, he may still find another way to exalt himself.  
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deserving individual can be passed over, as is the case in the second.86 Herodotus merely 
provides examples that can be interpreted in a way so as to make an argument for positive 
phthonos, but this does not seem to be the point that Herodotus himself is making. It may very 
well be true in reality that envy can act as an equalizing force, preventing any one person from 
becoming too preeminent, but there are several logical steps of explanation that separate the idea 
of ubiquitous envy and a balanced society, and Herodotus opts not to emphasize this connection.  
Following in Immerwahr’s footsteps, toward the conclusion of his article on Herodotean 
eris, Joseph Plescia states, “Thus, envy and strife not only are believed to prevent the rise of 
despotism and to promote an equalitarian society in a free polis, but also, according to Herodotus, 
they surge to an international level, as indicated above, to prevent excessive accumulation of 
power and to promote a balance of powers.”87 The only passages in the Histories that he cites 
regarding envy are 3.80, in which Otanes argues that phthonos is one of the root causes of a 
tyrant’s wrongdoing, and 7.236, in which Achaemenes cautions Xerxes that the Greeks are 
envious by nature and so Demaratus may be giving intentionally bad advice on account of his 
envy of Xerxes. He uses these passages—in which phthonos has a distinctly pejorative 
connotation—to establish the idea that envy is an innate part of human nature, but then fails to 
cite any further passages to support his inference that envy not only plagues men, but it also 
benefits them by maintaining balance.  
Donald Lateiner does not argue that envy is instrumental specifically in preventing the 
rise of tyranny, but he makes a similar claim about its benefits, for which he cites both 
Immerwahr and Plescia. Lateiner argues, “The paradoxical advantage of non-autocratic 
governments is, Herodotus believes, that envy, strife, and disunity—among men and nations—
                                                
86 Herodotus states that Aristodemus was the most valiant in his opinion (ἄριστος ἐγένετο µακρῷ Ἀριστόδηµος κατὰ 
γνώµας τὰς ἡµετέρας, 9.71.2). 
87 Plescia (1972), 311. 
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promote human freedom and perpetuate a fruitful diversity for the human race.”88 He too points 
to Otanes’ speech in the constitutional debate to make the case that man is naturally envious, and 
he too neglects to offer additional textual evidence for his claim that “the agonistic character of 
Greek institutions harnesses this energy.”89  
Significantly, none of these scholars connect what Herodotus says about the change in the 
Athenians after the deposition of the Peisistratids to envy, as Harrison does.90 Herodotus writes: 
δηλοῖ δὲ οὐ κατ᾽ ἓν µοῦνον ἀλλὰ πανταχῇ ἡ ἰσηγορίη ὡς ἐστὶ χρῆµα σπουδαῖον, εἰ καὶ 
Ἀθηναῖοι τυραννευόµενοι µὲν οὐδαµῶν τῶν σφέας περιοικεόντων ἦσαν τὰ πολέµια 
ἀµείνους, ἀπαλλαχθέντες δὲ τυράννων µακρῷ πρῶτοι ἐγένοντο. δηλοῖ ὦν ταῦτα ὅτι 
κατεχόµενοι µὲν ἐθελοκάκεον ὡς δεσπότῃ ἐργαζόµενοι, ἐλευθερωθέντων δὲ αὐτὸς 
ἕκαστος ἑωυτῷ προεθυµέετό <τι> κατεργάζεσθαι. 
   
It is clear that an equal voice is an excellent thing not in a single regard alone but in all 
ways, because the Athenians were better than none of their neighbors in matters of war 
while they were living under tyranny, but after they were freed from tyrants, they became 
the first by far. Therefore this makes clear that while being oppressed, they were 
deliberately slack, because they were working for a master, but each of them, after they 
were liberated, was eager to earn something for himself. (5.78) 
 
Herodotus attributes the transformation to a change in motivation. Once again, there are several 
logical steps between the cause and effect that we have to imagine for ourselves in order to 
attribute the change to envy, but it indeed seems conceivable: once the Athenians were freed 
from tyranny and there was a chance to win honor and material goods for themselves in battle 
(rather than for a tyrant), each man fought all the more zealously, driven by the desire to 
distinguish himself relative to his peers, which is related to both envy and jealousy of an 
anticipatory sort.91 What begins as an estimation of military prowess quickly seems to take on a 
                                                
88 Lateiner (1989), 184. 
89 Idem, 184. 
90 Harrison (2003), 154. This passage is also discussed briefly above, p. 137-38. 
91 The desire for distinction relates to both envy and jealousy because all three speak to a preoccupation with what 
one has relative to what others have. See p. 149 note 84 about the anticipatory nature of phthonos in a similar 
situation. 
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more general tone.92 The standard connotation of ergazesthai is one of manual labor, but not 
necessarily of military endeavors.93 This supports the idea that the influence of this unnamed 
envy has wider applicability, which is in line with what other scholars’ general claims suggest. 
While this envy-centric interpretation of Herodotus’ statement falls within the realm of 
possibility, it is not the only explanation. A more straightforward explanation is that the 
Athenians fought and worked more assiduously after their liberation simply because they had 
more of a vested interest in the outcome: victory on the battlefield bolsters Athens’ glory, and if 
the state is thriving, its citizens profit. This is not the case under tyranny, since assumption is that 
the tyrant takes whatever is gained in battle, both in terms of spoils and the intangibles (i.e. honor 
and prestige).94  
The idea that competition or discord is beneficial for freedom appears in Federalist 
Paper No. 51, in which James Madison states, “Ambition must be made to counteract ambition.” 
He writes this in support of a system of checks and balances to help safeguard the powers of the 
various branches of government, but also it applies to his subsequent argument that the security 
of civil rights depends on the existence of numerous competing factions. Thus while it is possible 
to read a passage like Herodotus’ description of Athens after the deposition of the Peisistratids or 
of what happened in the aftermath of Salamis and Plataea as evidence of the benefits of envy, 
this may be an instance of superimposing ideas that have gained momentum in the modern 
period onto the past. For his own part, Herodotus does not go out of his way to emphasize any 
connection between human phthonos and societal balance or advancement. 
 
                                                
92 Hornblower (2013), 225. 
93 LSJ s.v. I. 
94 Lateiner (1989), 182. 
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6. Conclusions and implications 
 
 Phthonos appears in a variety of ways throughout the Histories: explicitly and implicitly, 
in the speeches of characters and in Herodotus’ own commentary, originating from the gods and 
among men, in entirely negative contexts and in contexts that point to a larger societal benefit. In 
a work of this magnitude, there are naturally some exceptions and irregularities, but the overall 
picture of phthonos that emerges can be summarized in the following way. Divine phthonos is 
conceived of as a powerful force in the universe (an idea that gains momentum in the fifth 
century among select authors), but because it is more often discussed in abstract terms than in 
specific examples, it functions primarily as a reminder of what is at stake for mortals and of the 
mutability of their fortunes. It sometimes appears to have a random element, but at other times, it 
is directed toward the dangerously preeminent, in which case it comes to signify something akin 
to moral censure, thereby providing a benefit to the rest of society. Herodotus seems aware of the 
possibility that phthonos among men as well as from the divine realm can have beneficial effects, 
but he refrains from making this a priority in his overall presentation of phthonos. Phthonos 
plays a key role in the despotic template, and the effects of it on both those exhibiting it (among 
mortals) and those toward whom it is directed are detrimental. While it cannot be considered the 
primary engine of human action throughout the Histories, as Harrison suggests, phthonos is 
shown to motivate certain actions and Herodotus uses it to remind his audience of what is at 
stake, namely that there is always the potential for it to have far-reaching consequences, 
especially given that heads of state are so prone to experiencing it.
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION 
 
 
Part I: Plato and Aristotle 
 
The views put forward by Plato and Aristotle have entered into our exploration of envy 
and jealousy at various times thus far, but I have chosen to delay treating their works more fully 
until this point—the conclusion of the study—in order to preserve a natural chronological 
progression and to avoid overemphasizing texts that may be more prescriptive than descriptive. 
As teachers and writers of philosophy, Plato and Aristotle’s works draw from and engage with 
contemporary views, but they should not be considered a mere reflection of them, as they often 
represent a more idealistic level of thinking.1 Given the prolificacy of these two authors, a 
comprehensive review goes beyond the scope of this project. This is one area in which further 
research is needed. What follows in Part I is a sampling of passages from Plato and Aristotle’s 
works that have to do with envy and jealousy, chosen for how they compare with what we have 
seen in the works of previous authors. Some of these passages illustrate general characteristics of 
these emotions and others speak directly to their association with tyrants. Part II is comprised of 
general conclusions, drawn from the works of Homer, Hesiod, Sophocles, and Herodotus. 
 
1. Plato on envy and jealousy 
 
 The principle that like envies like has been seen in numerous cases examined in this 
study.2 For example, in the Works and Days, Hesiod makes explicit the idea that people often 
                                                
1 Walcot (1978), 20. 
2 For an overview of passages that convey this idea, see p. 186. 
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envy and mark as rivals those with whom they have something in common (23-26). Plato too 
draws attention to this propensity. He cites these lines in the Lysis, in a discussion about the sorts 
of people who tend to be friends. Socrates recalls hearing a man make the argument that similar 
men are most hostile to one another by relying on Hesiod’s authority: 
καὶ κεραµεὺς κεραµεῖ κοτέει καὶ ἀοιδὸς ἀοιδῷ  
καὶ πτωχὸς πτωχῷ,  
καὶ τἆλλα δὴ πάντα οὕτως ἔφη ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι µάλιστα τὰ ὁµοιότατα <πρὸς> ἄλληλα 
φθόνου τε καὶ φιλονικίας καὶ ἔχθρας ἐµπίµπλασθαι, τὰ δ’ ἀνοµοιότατα φιλίας·  
 
“‘Potter begrudges potter and singer begrudges singer and beggar begrudges beggar,’ and 
he said that all other things [behave] in this way too, that the things most similar to one 
another are necessarily filled with envy and rivalry and hatred, while the most dissimilar 
are filled with friendship.” (Lys. 215c-d) 
 
In Hesiod’s original lines, there is some question about the exact spirit of such rivalries, as he 
inserts these examples into a discussion of the good Eris yet uses words that often have negative 
connotations (kotein, phthonein).3 Grouped together with hatred (echthra), however, there is no 
ambiguity in Socrates’ conversation: its effects are clearly detrimental. A similar sentiment can 
be found in the Philebus: Socrates names envy as an example of a pain mixed with pleasure, 
pointing out that a man who feels envy, which itself constitutes a pain, is shown to take pleasure 
in his neighbors’ misfortunes of (ὁ φθονῶν γε ἐπὶ κακοῖς τοῖς τῶν πέλας ἡδόµενος ἀναφανήσεται, 
48b). The use of pelas could indicate literal or figurative proximity, but in both cases, this shows 
that people tend to experience envy in relation to those with whom they share some kind of 
common ground, which in turn goes back to the fact that envy is rooted in social comparison.  
 Another theme we have seen throughout is that envy is often connected to issues of honor 
and reputation, and this too appears in Plato’s works.4 In the Laws, there is a discussion of the 
causes of voluntary and premeditated murder, and envy is named second only to desire or greed 
                                                
3 For the ambiguity surrounding these lines, see p. 65-66. 
4 For a summary of this idea, see p. 183-85. 
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(epithumia): δεύτερον δὲ φιλοτίµου ψυχῆς ἕξις, φθόνους ἐντίκτουσα, χαλεποὺς συνοίκους 
µάλιστα µὲν αὐτῷ τῷ κεκτηµένῳ τὸν φθόνον, δευτέροις δὲ τοῖς ἀρίστοις τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει (“A 
second [cause] is the possession of an ambitious soul, which creates feelings of envy, grievous 
associates most of all for the one who harbors these feelings, but next for the best of the men in 
the city,” Leg. 870c). By describing a soul that is ambitious—or, in other words, that loves honor 
(philotimos)—as what produces envy, Plato includes an explicit link between the concepts of 
honor and envy.5 Moreover, this confirms what we have seen elsewhere, namely that envy is 
dangerous for multiple parties. 
 According to Plato’s characters, however, envy is not only harmful for the ones 
experiencing it and the best citizens: it is also to the detriment of the state as a whole. In the 
Laws, the Athenian declares: 
φιλονικείτω δὲ ἡµῖν πᾶς πρὸς ἀρετὴν ἀφθόνως. ὁ µὲν γὰρ τοιοῦτος τὰς πόλεις αὔξει, 
ἁµιλλώµενος µὲν αὐτός, τοὺς ἄλλους δὲ οὐ κολούων διαβολαῖς· ὁ δὲ φθονερός, τῇ τῶν 
ἄλλων διαβολῇ δεῖν οἰόµενος ὑπερέχειν, αὐτός τε ἧττον συντείνει πρὸς ἀρετὴν τὴν 
ἀληθῆ, τούς τε ἀνθαµιλλωµένους εἰς ἀθυµίαν καθίστησι τῷ ἀδίκως ψέγεσθαι, καὶ διὰ 
ταῦτα ἀγύµναστον τὴν πόλιν ὅλην εἰς ἅµιλλαν ἀρετῆς ποιῶν, σµικροτέραν αὐτὴν πρὸς 
εὐδοξίαν τὸ ἑαυτοῦ µέρος ἀπεργάζεται.  
 
“Let every man among us contend for excellence, [but] without envy. For such a man 
glorifies the state, because he strives by himself and does not cut down the others with 
slanderous remarks. But the envious man, believing that he must prevail by means of 
slander of the others, exerts himself less for true excellence and disheartens his rivals by 
causing them to be blamed unjustly, and in doing so, by rendering the whole state unfit 
for a contest of excellence, he diminishes its glory for his part.” (Leg. 731a-b) 
 
It is not a coincidence that it is the Athenian who makes this point. In a democracy, the 
reputation of the state depends on the reputations of a larger number of individuals. The 
Athenian’s statement is a bold one: not only does an envious man tarnish the competition itself 
with his poor sportsmanship (as well as the status of his rivals, if his slander is accepted at face 
value), but he effectively reduces the collective renown of the entire state by failing to contribute 
                                                
5 Plato draws a connection between philotimia and phthonos at Resp. 586c-d as well. 
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(and by making it more difficult for other to contribute) to its sum total of excellence.6 In this 
way, Plato presents the full range of negative effects: envy is bad for whoever feels it, whomever 
it is directed toward, and even for those citizens’ states at large.  
 In the Menexenus, Plato has Socrates reveal another way in which envy can cause harm 
to states by identifying envy as the cause of the Peloponnesian War. In reviewing the history of 
Athens, Socrates describes how the citizens of Athens suffered negative consequences in the 
aftermath of the Persian Wars: εἰρήνης δὲ γενοµένης καὶ τῆς πόλεως τιµωµένης ἦλθεν ἐπ’ αὐτήν, 
ὃ δὴ φιλεῖ ἐκ τῶν ἀνθρώπων τοῖς εὖ πράττουσι προσπίπτειν, πρῶτον µὲν ζῆλος, ἀπὸ ζήλου δὲ 
φθόνος· ὃ καὶ τήνδε τὴν πόλιν ἄκουσαν ἐν πολέµῳ τοῖς Ἕλλησι κατέστησεν (“There was peace 
and the city was honored, [but then] that which is accustomed among men to befall those who 
are successful came upon her: admiration first, and from admiration, envy. And [envy] set up this 
city, unwilling, in a war with the Greeks,” Menex. 242a). In the Histories, Herodotus’ depiction 
of Histiaeus and his envy of Darius sheds light on envy’s potential for producings effects that 
ripple outward onto the international stage, but Plato goes a step further. Whereas additional 
contributing factors were involved in bringing about the Ionian revolt, rendering Histiaeus’ envy 
into more of a cautionary tale than anything else, Socrates’ statement in the Menexenus is no 
longer a warning: this is a concrete example of a large-scale war for which he claims envy is the 
catalyst.7  
                                                
6 The idea that personal envy is detrimental to the state can be considered a point in favor of rejecting Harrison’s 
interpretation of Hdt. 5.78, which identifies envy as the reason behind the Athenians’ advancement after the 
deposition of the Peisistratids (see p. 151-52). This passage also reiterates the association we have seen elsewhere 
between envy and slander (cf. Soph. Aj. 148-57; Hdt. 3.80.4, 6.61.1, 7.237.2-3). 
7 Socrates’ description of events also provides insight into his understanding of the relationship between zêlos and 
phthonos. Whereas the two can sometimes function interchangeably, here they necessarily refer to slightly different 
(but obviously related) phenomena. Honor and success (τιµωµένης; τοῖς εὖ πράττουσι) prompt admiration, which in 
turn mutates into envy; the progression is clear, but the point at which admiration shades into envy is not (Walcot 
1978, 15). See also Thuc. 2.64.4 (p. 119 note 16). For a fuller discussion of zêlos versus phthonos, see p. 169-72. 
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Interestingly, Socrates’ statement points to the idea that envy can be experienced on a 
statewide level. Herodotus offers a precedent for this, but only a nominal one. In his explanation 
of how Miltiades came to take control of Lemnos, which the Pelasgians inhabited at that point, 
he cites Hecataeus’ report that the Athenians, envious of the newfound fertility of the land they 
had previously given to the Pelasgians (λαβεῖν φθόνον τε καὶ ἵµερον τῆς γῆς, 6.137.2), decided 
to drive them out. The Pelasgians plotted revenge, setting in motion a series of events that led to 
the seizure of Lemnos. Herodotus also records that the Athenians told a different story in which 
they acted for just cause (6.137.3). We ought to be cautious about how much weight to give to 
this account, given that this is the only case of envy being attributed to a state rather than to an 
individual in the Histories and that it comes from another source. Indeed, the assessment of envy 
as a motive is not Herodotus’ own, as it is reported in indirect speech.8 Herodotus does not 
explicitly incorporate envy into any theory of interstate relations; to the best of my knowledge, 
neither does Thucydides, although further research is needed to confirm this.9 Plato’s revelation 
is significant: humans are susceptible to experiencing envy not only individually but also 
collectively, and clearly, the effects of statewide envy are all the more far-reaching. 
 The most obvious point of divergence between Plato’s depiction of envy and jealousy 
and what we have seen previously occurs in relation to the divine. Whereas Homer, Hesiod, and 
Herodotus offer clear examples of the gods acting out of envy and jealousy (toward each other 
                                                
8 Scott (2005), 446. 
9 One possible explanation for this is that Herodotus considered envy on the state level to fall under the heading of 
desire for expansionism. I have already discussed the difficulty of categorizing desire for expansionism as a subset 
of envy (see p. 112-13), but I see less of a problem with categorizing envy as a subset of desire for expansionism. 
Envy is more specific in the sense that it involves not only a focus (i.e. the desired good) but also an object (i.e. the 
person who currently has the good), whereas desire for expansionism only necessarily has the former. While a more 
specific thing can be subsumed under the category of a broader phenomenon, the reverse is more problematic. As 
for Thucydides, if in fact he makes no mention of statewide envy or jealousy, one possible explanation is that he 
regarded phthonos as a type of phobos. He identifies the growth of Athens and the fear (phobos) that this growth 
instilled among the Spartans as the ultimate cause of the Peloponnesian War (1.23.6), but it is not difficult to relate 
this phobos to phthonos. The Spartans likely felt a combination of envy and jealousy: envy about Athens’ increasing 
power and jealousy about their resulting decrease in relative standing. Jealousy is at its core related to a fear of loss 
(see p. 25-28), and envy too can be experienced in conjunction with fear (i.e. a fear of inadequacy). 
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and/or toward mortals) and even Sophocles alludes to such a possibility, Plato’s writings contain 
statements that categorically deny the existence of divine phthonos. In the Euthyphro, Socrates 
argues that every good that man possesses is given by the gods (14e), from which it follows that 
divine envy toward mortals simply cannot occur: of what would they be envious? Thus when 
Plato uses phthonos terminology in reference to the gods’ feelings toward mortals, it is more 
appropriate to translate as “jealousy,” since it is still plausible that the gods would want to guard 
what is theirs and prevent lesser beings from sharing in their privileges. Socrates, however, 
discounts this possibility as well. In the Phaedrus, Socrates introduce an allegory in which he 
describes human souls (in their non-corporeal state) as chariots, guided by a charioteer with one 
good horse and one disobedient horse. The human souls therefore struggle to follow the gods in 
heaven, but Socrates notes that the gods neither feel jealousy toward the human souls following 
them nor do they make any attempt to hinder them: πολλαὶ µὲν οὖν καὶ µακάριαι θέαι τε καὶ 
διέξοδοι ἐντὸς οὐρανοῦ, ἃς θεῶν γένος εὐδαιµόνων ἐπιστρέφεται πράττων ἕκαστος αὐτῶν τὸ 
αὑτοῦ, ἕπεται δὲ ὁ ἀεὶ ἐθέλων τε καὶ δυνάµενος· φθόνος γὰρ ἔξω θείου χοροῦ ἵσταται (“Many 
and blessed and divine are the passages within heaven on which the race of the gods turns about, 
each of them doing what is his, and he who is always willing and able follows: for jealousy 
stands outside the divine chorus,” Phdr. 247a). This description is often taken in close 
consideration with a passage in the Timaeus.10 Discussing the demiurge, Timaeus says, Λέγωµεν 
δὴ δι’ ἥντινα αἰτίαν γένεσιν καὶ τὸ πᾶν τόδε ὁ συνιστὰς συνέστησεν. ἀγαθὸς ἦν, ἀγαθῷ δὲ οὐδεὶς 
περὶ οὐδενὸς οὐδέποτε ἐγγίγνεται φθόνος· τούτου δ’ ἐκτὸς ὢν πάντα ὅτι µάλιστα ἐβουλήθη 
γενέσθαι παραπλήσια ἑαυτῷ (“Let us talk about the reason why the creator created generation 
and all of this. He was good, and no jealousy about anything ever occurs in a good [entity]. And 
                                                
10 Herrmann (2003), 58. 
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being devoid of this, he wanted all things to resemble himself as much as possible,” Ti. 29d-e).11 
Plato is unusual in conceiving of a world in which the gods do not feel phthonos.12 This appears 
to be a deliberate departure, one that relates back to Plato’s ideal of a non-competitive society in 
which goodness furthers the interests of the community at large, rather than just those of the 
individual.13 In such a society, there is no room for a destructive emotion like phthonos, either 
among men or among gods. Unlike Herodotus, Plato ignores the question of whether there is any 
way to avoid incurring divine phthonos; it simply does not exist. Plato’s treatment of envy and 
jealousy in relation to the divine is a prime example of a way in which his texts can be more 
prescriptive than descriptive, as it represents a significant break with popular thinking.  
 
2. Plato on envy, jealousy, and tyranny 
 
Plato’s treatment of envy and jealousy in relation to tyrants, however, is more or less in 
accordance with what we have seen. While the contexts and approaches vary, the basic premises 
remain constant: tyrants are especially prone to envy and jealousy, and a tyrant’s position—upon 
sufficient examination—is not, in fact, enviable. In Book 9 of the Republic, Plato has Socrates 
discuss the nature of the tyrant: the greater, decent part of the tyrant’s soul is enslaved to the 
smaller, worst part of itself, and as a whole it is unable to do as it pleases (577d-e). Shortly 
thereafter, he elaborates on the reality of a tyrant’s existence: 
Ἆρ᾽ οὖν οὐκ ἐν τοιούτῳ µὲν δεσµωτηρίῳ δέδεται ὁ τύραννος, φύσει ὢν οἷον 
διεληλύθαµεν, πολλῶν καὶ παντοδαπῶν φόβων καὶ ἐρώτων µεστός· λίχνῳ δὲ ὄντι αὐτῷ 
τὴν ψυχὴν µόνῳ τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει οὔτε ἀποδηµῆσαι ἔξεστιν οὐδαµόσε, οὔτε θεωρῆσαι 
                                                
11 This is similar to Socrates’ insistence that the gods are purely good in character, which serves as the basis of his 
criticism of Homer and Hesiod’s poetry and drives his desire to insulate children from the influence of such works 
(Resp. 376e-79b). 
12 According to Yunis, it is only in Plato’s conception of the world that this is the case (2011, 140), but this is not 
entirely true. Aristotle also denies the possibility of divine phthonos (see p. 167 note 24). 
13 Herrmann (2003), 76.  
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ὅσων δὴ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι ἐλεύθεροι ἐπιθυµηταί εἰσιν, καταδεδυκὼς δὲ ἐν τῇ οἰκίᾳ τὰ πολλὰ 
ὡς γυνὴ ζῇ, φθονῶν καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις πολίταις, ἐάν τις ἔξω ἀποδηµῇ καί τι ἀγαθὸν ὁρᾷ;  
 
“Hasn’t the tyrant been bound in this sort of prison, being by nature such as we have 
detailed, full of many and manifold fears and desires; and for him alone of those in the 
city, although greedy in soul, isn’t it not possible to go abroad anywhere or to see what 
the other free men also desire [to see], but for the most part he lives hidden away in his 
house like a woman, being envious even of the other citizens, if someone goes abroad 
and sees something good?” (Resp. 579b-c) 
 
Socrates illustrates here that the tyrant is not, as many would assume, the freest of men, but 
rather that he alone is restricted in ways that other men—even his own subjects—are not. He can 
hardly leave his residence, presumably on account of fear for his personal safety, for he knows 
there are those who would wish to harm him. In the phrase φθονῶν καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις πολίταις, the 
καὶ is telling: the tyrant envies even regular citizens (rather than potential rivals among the elite 
or tyrants in other cities), toward whom it is unnatural for him to feel envy, since they do not 
belong to the same class. Given how pervasive the idea that like envies like is, this paints a 
striking picture of how truly aberrant tyrants are: because their fears prevent them from doing 
ordinary things that bring people pleasure (such as travelling), tyrants are so excessive in their 
envy that they feel it not only toward potential rivals among the elite (as Otanes suggests in the 
constitutional debate, Hdt. 3.80.4), but also toward ordinary citizens. The idea that tyrants are 
beset by fear and thus cannot live freely is one that appears in earlier authors’ works as well: this 
is a common argument against the desirability of one-man rule.14 
 In the ensuing lines, Socrates makes abundantly clear that the tyrant is an intrinsically 
envious and/or jealous man. He asks, ἀποδώσοµεν τῷ ἀνδρὶ καὶ ἃ τὸ πρότερον εἴποµεν, ὅτι 
ἀνάγκη καὶ εἶναι καὶ ἔτι µᾶλλον γίγνεσθαι αὐτῷ ἢ πρότερον διὰ τὴν ἀρχὴν φθονερῷ, ἀπίστῳ, 
ἀδίκῳ, ἀφίλῳ, ἀνοσίῳ καὶ πάσης κακίας πανδοκεῖ τε καὶ τροφεῖ (“Shall we also attribute to [the 
tyrant] what we said before, that he is necessarily phthoneros, untrustworthy, unjust, friendless, 
                                                
14 Cf. Soph. OT 584-93; Eur. Hipp. 1009-20; Eur. Phoen. 549-54; Eur. Ion 621-32 (see p. 87-91). See also Appendix. 
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unholy, and a host and nurse of every evil, and that he becomes more so than before, on account 
of his rule?” Resp. 580a).15 His question is met with agreement. The initial placement of 
phthoneros emphasizes its importance in Socrates’ extensive list of traits: the tyrant embodies 
many negative qualities, but his susceptibility to phthonos is first and foremost. 
 The idea that tyrants are unable to do as they please appears in the Gorgias as well, but 
the focus in this context is more on the unenviable position of the tyrant than on the tyrant’s own 
envy of his citizens. After Socrates asserts that orators have the least power of all in the city, 
Polus counters and makes the comparison that orators are like tyrants, as they both have the 
ability to put to death, deprive of property, or banish whomever they see fit (466b-c). Socrates 
reiterates that both orators and tyrants alike have the least power, on the grounds that they act as 
they see fit, but not necessarily as they wish (466e). Polus fails to see how this is not still a great 
power, and eventually asks Socrates: 
ΠΩΛ. Ὡς δὴ σύ, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐκ ἂν δέξαιο ἐξεῖναί σοι ποιεῖν ὅτι δοκεῖ σοι ἐν τῇ πόλει 
µᾶλλον ἢ µή, οὐδὲ ζηλοῖς ὅταν ἴδῃς τινὰ ἢ ἀποκτείναντα ὃν ἔδοξεν αὐτῷ ἢ ἀφελόµενον 
χρήµατα ἢ δήσαντα. 
ΣΩ. Δικαίως λέγεις ἢ ἀδίκως; 
ΠΩΛ. Ὁπότερ᾽ ἂν ποιῇ, οὐκ ἀµφοτέρως ζηλωτόν ἐστιν; 
ΣΩ. Εὐφήµει, ὦ Πῶλε. 
ΠΩΛ. Τί δή; 
ΣΩ. Ὅτι οὐ χρὴ οὔτε τοὺς ἀζηλώτους ζηλοῦν οὔτε τοὺς ἀθλίους, ἀλλ᾽ ἐλεεῖν. 
 
Polus: So you, Socrates, would refuse the ability to do what seems fit to you in the city, 
rather than not [refuse], and you would not feel envy when you see someone putting to 
death a man whom he saw fit or depriving him of his property or fettering him.16 
Socrates: Do you mean justly or unjustly? 
                                                
15 I have chosen not to translate phthoneros here, since it is ambiguous (perhaps intentionally) whether it means 
“envious” or “jealous” or both: the tyrant is envious of his citizens’ freedom (as Socrates has just said), but he could 
simultaneously be jealously protective of his position. See Otanes’ speech for comparison (Hdt. 3.80.4, p. 117). 
16 Plato’s use of zêloun rather than phthonein is surely deliberate, since the focus here is on the alleged desirability 
of the tyrant’s position rather than on any danger the tyrant faces. Furthermore, Polus does not wish to impute 
anything negative about the mental state of the subject feeling the emotion, since in fact he is all but admitting to it. 
While zêlos sometimes indicates a milder form of phthonos, there is nevertheless something sinister in English about 
the prospect of admiring the power to imprison, banish, or put to death. Accordingly, I have chosen to translate 
zêloun here as “envy” rather than “admire,” since the Greek term reflects this multivalence in the first place. For 
more on zêlos versus phthonos, see p. 169-72. 
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Polus: Whichever way he does it, is [his condition] not enviable in both cases? 
Socrates: Hold your tongue, Polus! 
Polus: Why? 
Socrates: Because we must not envy the unenviable or the wretched, but pity them. (Grg. 
468e-69a) 
 
In its most basic sentiment, Polus’ stance represents that of the average man: it was a common 
view in Greek society that positions of power are fundamentally desirable and thus enviable as 
well.17 By the fifth century, however, arguments that challenge this view were becoming 
increasingly common in educated circles, as we can see in the tragedies of Sophocles and 
Euripides.18 By having a boorish character such as Polus express the assumption that a tyrant’s 
position is an enviable one, and by having him do so in a crass manner (i.e. by naming first and 
foremost his power to spill blood), Plato draws an exaggerated contrast between this basic belief 
and the more well-reasoned, sophisticated one held by Socrates, thus casting the former in a 
pedestrian light. Indeed, Polus cannot engage with Socrates on the theoretical level, but resorts to 
questioning Socrates about how he personally would behave.19 Socrates goes on to justify his 
statement that tyrants are not enviable by arguing that the worst of evils is to do wrong and to go 
unpunished (which he likens to having an illness and not seeking treatment), and Polus 
reluctantly agrees: 
ΣΩ. Κάκιστα ἄρα ζῇ ὁ ἔχων [ἀδικίαν] καὶ µὴ ἀπαλλαττόµενος. 
ΠΩΛ. Φαίνεται. 
ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν οὗτος τυγχάνει ὢν ὃς ἂν τὰ µέγιστα ἀδικῶν καὶ χρώµενος µεγίστῃ ἀδικίᾳ 
διαπράξηται ὥστε µήτε νουθετεῖσθαι µήτε κολάζεσθαι µήτε δίκην διδόναι, ὥσπερ σὺ φῂς 
Ἀρχέλαον παρεσκευάσθαι καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους τυράννους καὶ ῥήτορας καὶ δυνάστας; 
ΠΩΛ. Ἔοικε. 
 
Socrates: Then the man who has [injustice] and who is not delivered from it lives the 
worst life. 
                                                
17 Wohl argues that although the official stance toward tyranny in Athens was one of hostility, the figure of the 
tyrant nevertheless represented the autonomy and dominance that every Athenian desired (2002, 185).  
18 The counterargument to the idea that a tyrant’s position is enviable subsequently receives even more extensive 
treatment in Xenophon’s Hiero (see Appendix). 
19 Dodds (1959), 237. 
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Polus: It appears so. 
Socrates: Therefore this man happens to be the one who, committing the greatest wrongs 
and practicing the greatest injustice, manages to not be admonished or to be punished or 
to pay the penalty, as you say that Archelaus has contrived, and the other tyrants and 
orators and dynasts? 
Polus: It seems so. (Grg. 478e-79a) 
 
As mentioned above, the conclusion that a tyrant’s position is the opposite of enviable is one that 
various characters in tragedy have promulgated, but the approach to forming this conclusion 
differs significantly in Plato’s Gorgias. Rather than focusing on the external threats that 
endanger a tyrant, Socrates highlights the internal wretchedness created by the tyrant himself for 
his own soul. Thus the Gorgias puts forward ideas about envy and tyranny that follow in the 
footsteps of those expressed by authors in the previous century, but with a distinctly 
philosophical flavor. The same can be said generally of the collection of passages discussed here: 
despite the fact that Plato’s works belong to a separate and distinct genre, there is a high degree 
of continuity regarding envy and jealousy. Although differences exist—e.g. Plato’s characters 
seem to stress more vehemently and explicitly the detrimental effects that envy can have on the 
state as a whole, and there is greater attention paid to the question of the tyrant’s own well-
being—these differences reflect a natural development and progression of ideas over time, as 
well as the philosohical nature of Plato’s works. The most notable difference is that Plato 
represents the divine as being free from phthonos, which stems more from Plato’s own ideals 
than a change in popular societal beliefs. Plato has various characters espouse a view of the 
divine that admits of no wrongdoing or negative traits, which relates to Socrates’ statement in the 
Republic that poets such as Homer and Hesiod propagate falsehoods by depicting the gods as 
flawed or as responsible for human suffering (376e-79b). By having Socrates challenge the 
fitness of such canonical works, however, Plato implicitly acknowledges that Socrates’ is not the 
majority or popular opinion. 
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3. Aristotle on envy and jealousy 
 
 Aristotle discusses emotions more extensively and directly than Plato or any of the other 
authors included in this study. Even in Aristotle’s treatment, however, the emotions as such are 
not the main focus, but rather, he includes them in his accounts of other topics, such as rhetoric 
or morality, and accordingly, he does not provide an entirely systematic exposition.20 Most of the 
passages in this section come from the Rhetoric, which contains the fullest analysis of emotions, 
although certain emotions (e.g. jealousy) are largely absent. 
 Conceptually, Aristotle groups together the emotions of pity, indignation, and envy, and 
after establishing that pity is a pain experienced in relation to the undeserved misfortunes of 
another (Rh. 1385b13-14) and that indignation is a pain experienced in relation to the undeserved 
successes of another (Rh. 1386b9-11), he defines envy: δόξειε δ’ ἂν καὶ ὁ φθόνος τῷ ἐλεεῖν τὸν 
αὐτὸν ἀντικεῖσθαι τρόπον, ὡς σύνεγγυς ὢν καὶ ταὐτὸν τῷ νεµεσᾶν, ἔστι δ’ ἕτερον· λύπη µὲν γὰρ 
ταραχώδης καὶ ὁ φθόνος ἐστὶν καὶ ἐπὶ εὐπραγίᾳ, ἀλλ’ οὐ τοῦ ἀναξίου ἀλλὰ τοῦ ἴσου καὶ ὁµοίου 
(Envy would also seem to lie in opposition to feeling pity in the same manner, on the grounds 
that it is similar and the same as feeling indignation, but it is different: for envy is also a 
troublesome pain and [experienced] in relation to success, but not [the success] of an 
undeserving man, but an equal and similar man, Rh. 1386b16-20).21 Three pieces of information 
emerge from this definition that are important for our purposes, and each will be examined in 
                                                
20 Ben-Ze’ev (2003), 105. 
21 Aristotle defines envy similarly in the Nicomachean Ethics: ὁ µὲν γὰρ νεµεσητικὸς λυπεῖται ἐπὶ τοῖς ἀναξίως εὖ 
πράττουσιν, ὁ δὲ φθονερὸς ὑπερβάλλων τοῦτον ἐπὶ πᾶσι λυπεῖται (For the indignant man is vexed at those who have 
success undeservedly, while the envious man, surpassing him, is vexed at all [those who have success], 1108b3-5). 
So too in the Eudemian Ethics: φθονερὸς δὲ τῷ λυπεῖσθαι ἐπὶ πλείοσιν εὐπραγίαις ἢ δεῖ (καὶ γὰρ οἱ ἄξιοι εὖ 
πράττειν λυποῦσι τοὺς φθονεροὺς εὖ πράττοντες) (The envious man [is characterized] by being vexed at more 
successes than one ought to be, for even those who are worthy of having success vex the envious when they have 
success, 1221a38-40). In this definition, the comparative phrase ἐπὶ πλείοσιν εὐπραγίαις ἢ δεῖ points to the idea that 
envy is a deviant and improper emotion (see p. 173-74). 
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turn: the idea that indignation and envy are distinct emotions, the idea that envy is not concerned 
with desert, and the idea that envy has to do with individuals similar to oneself. 
 According to Aristotle, the key difference between indignation and envy is that the 
former is concerned with undeserved good fortune, while the latter pays no attention to whether 
the good fortune is deserved. This distinction is more pronounced in Aristotle’s works, however, 
than elsewhere. First, Aristotle is unique in employing the phrase to nemesan, and he also uses 
the noun form nemesis significantly more than other classical authors; its relative scarcity in 
Herodotus’ Histories has already been noted.22 Second, as both Konstan and Sanders suggest, 
outside of the Aristotelian corpus, phthonos can at times convey a sense of righteous 
indignation.23 The examples they cite come from authors not treated here (e.g. Isocrates 8.124, 
4.184; Demosthenes 28.18), but Herodotus’ portrayal of the type of divine phthonos that targets 
the arrogant points in a similar direction. By the fifth century, phthonos had begun to have an 
occasional moral aspect in certain contexts, thus aligning it more closely with Aristotle’s concept 
of indignation than his own discussion would lead us to believe. 
 If envy and indignation are not entirely distinct, the claim that only indignation pays 
attention to whether the object deserves his or her good fortune begins to collapse. At any rate, 
let us ignore this complication for the moment and independently evaluate the idea that envy has 
nothing to do with the object’s desert. This seems to be valid, for the most part.24 For example, 
Oedipus imagines that others envy him because of his position (OT 380-89). There is no 
difficulty in having Oedipus himself label it as envy, because doing so implies nothing about his 
worthiness to rule, an issue about which he is evidently sensitive, because in the same passage, 
                                                
22 Konstan (2006), 114; Sanders (2014), 76. For Herodotus’ use of nemesis, see p. 141. 
23 Konstan (2006), 121; Sanders (2014), 77. 
24 Of course, a subject may try to justify or mask his or her feelings by insisting that the object does not deserve the 
good (Sanders 2014, 18, 24). If a neutral third party agrees that the object does not, the emotion is more akin to 
indignation (see p. 24). If the third party disagrees, the subject is likely misrepresenting the situation in some way.  
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he emphasizes that he did not seek out the position, but rather, it was offered to him. Where this 
claim falters is in the case of divine phthonos. As we have seen, there are two types of divine 
phthonos in Herodotus’ Histories: one that is believed to afflict humans more or less at random, 
and one that strikes the overly prideful or presumptuous. With the latter type, there is a definite 
element of desert: such individuals have transgressed social and cosmic norms and do not 
deserve to succeed (further). To be fair, Aristotle is not discussing the phthonos of the gods 
specifically in the Rhetoric, so perhaps we should not expect his definition to take this 
phenomenon into account.25  
There is still, however, an element of desert involved in envy—that of the subject—and 
this does not enter into Aristotle’s basic definition.26 Indeed, the perception that the subject him 
or herself ought to possess the good or quality in question is crucial to the essence of envy: this is 
at the root of Sanders’ third requisite condition, namely the wrongness of the disparity.27 If 
someone notices that another person has a possession or quality that he or she lacks but does not 
consider him or herself deserving of the same, it is difficult to imagine that he or she will 
conceive of the situation as wrong, given that the desert of the other person is not relevant. There 
can be no envy where there is no sense of personal merit. For example, when Odysseus’ men 
surreptitiously open the bag of winds from Aeolus to inspect its contents, he imagines that they 
do so out of envy, believing that since they have toiled alongside him, they deserve a share of the 
riches (Hom. Od. 10.34-45).28 Aristotle hints at the involvement of the subject’s desert elsewhere, 
                                                
25 In his discussion of the wisdom of first causes and principles, Aristotle addresses the idea of divine phthonos, but 
only to deny that what Simonides and other poets have said is true: Simonides wrote that the gods alone possess this 
gift of wisdom, and other poets state that the divine is jealous by nature (Met. 982b28-83a3). Thus Aristotle, like 
Plato, refutes the possibility of divine phthonos, but in doing so, Aristotle acknowledges that belief in its existence 
was part of an established tradition. 
26 Ben-Ze’ev (2003), 110. 
27 See p. 23; Sanders (2014), 15.  
28 See also Hom. Il. 4.51-67 (p. 39-40). Hera seems to feel a preemptive sort of envy at Zeus’ suggestion that Troy 
be spared and Menelaus return home with Helen (although she says that she will not feel phthonos toward Zeus if he 
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but he does not dwell on it. After describing the types of things that tend to elicit envy, he writes, 
καὶ µάλιστα ὧν αὐτοὶ ἢ ὀρέγονται ἢ οἴονται δεῖν αὑτοὺς ἔχειν (and especially in the case of those 
things that [people] themselves reach for or think they ought to have, Rh. 1388a3-4). The 
presence of malista is curious, however, as it implies that there are in fact some scenarios in 
which envy arises over something that the subject does not aim to attain or think that he or she 
deserves. The first part of this statement—that envy is especially likely in the case of those 
things that people themselves reach for—may refer to the question of specificity. Envy is 
generally less specific in terms of the desired good than jealousy, but perhaps Aristotle’s point 
here is that when someone else possesses the exact good we desire, the envy we feel is stronger 
than when someone else has something merely akin to what we desire.29 If this is indeed what 
Aristotle means, then that part of his assessment is sound (since there are instances in which this 
applies and other in which it does not), but to the best of my knowledge, there is no scenario in 
the works examined here in which the second part—that envy is especially likely in the case of 
those things that people think they ought to have—does not apply. Aristotle’s definition of envy 
seems accurate in its emphasis of the idea that the object’s desert is irrelevant, but it largely 
neglects to mention the key role of the subject’s desert.  
 The third salient piece of information in Aristotle’s definition is that people feel envy 
toward those who are similar to them. He later elaborates on what forms of likeness he means: 
κατὰ γένος, κατὰ συγγένειαν, καθ’ ἡλικίας, κατὰ ἕξεις, κατὰ δόξαν, κατὰ τὰ ὑπάρχοντα (birth, 
relationship, age, habit, reputation, [or] property, Rh. 1387b26-28). The idea that like envies like 
                                                                                                                                                       
destroys her three favorite cities in return for the destruction of Troy). Hera argues that it would not be right for her 
efforts to help the Greeks to go to waste, given that she shares Zeus’ parentage and also deserves honor as his wife. 
Thus we can see that she believes she is deserving of that which she envies, namely the power to protect (and the 
worship received in exchange for protection).    
29 For the idea that envy is generally less specific than jealousy, see p. 26. 
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is prominent and widespread, and has been noted previously.30 Aristotle goes one step further 
than his predecessors, however, and explains the reason behind this tendency: δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι παρ’ 
αὐτοὺς οὐ τυγχάνουσι τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, ὥστε τοῦτο λυποῦν ποιεῖ τὸν φθόνον (It is clear that they do 
not attain the good because of themselves, with the result that this [failure], causing pain, creates 
envy, Rh. 1388a19-21). In essence, when those who are in some way similar to us meet with 
success, it forces us to confront the truth, namely that we too could have the same success, but 
our own shortcomings have prevented us from achieving it. If someone with whom we have 
nothing in common meets with success, the comparison does not arise as naturally, and so we are 
generally spared the pain of envy.  
 In the Rhetoric, Aristotle not only compares envy with pity and indignation, but also with 
emulation (zêlos). He describes the distinction between the two:  
εἰ γάρ ἐστιν ζῆλος λύπη τις ἐπὶ φαινοµένῃ παρουσίᾳ ἀγαθῶν ἐντίµων καὶ ἐνδεχοµένων 
αὐτῷ λαβεῖν περὶ τοὺς ὁµοίους τῇ φύσει, οὐχ ὅτι ἄλλῳ ἀλλ’ ὅτι οὐχὶ καὶ αὑτῷ ἔστιν (διὸ 
καὶ ἐπιεικές ἐστιν ὁ ζῆλος καὶ ἐπιεικῶν, τὸ δὲ φθονεῖν φαῦλον καὶ φαύλων· ὁ µὲν γὰρ 
αὑτὸν παρασκευάζει διὰ τὸν ζῆλον τυγχάνειν τῶν ἀγαθῶν, ὁ δὲ τὸν πλησίον µὴ ἔχειν διὰ 
τὸν φθόνον) 
 
For if emulation is some pain at the apparent presence of goods [that are] honored and 
possible for a person himself to gain in the possession of those similar [to him] in nature, 
not because they belong to another, but because they do not also belong to him (and for 
this reason, emulation is decorous and characteristic of decorous men, while feeling envy 
is base and characteristic of base men: for on account of emulation, the one man prepares 
to obtain the goods for himself, while the other, on account of envy, [tries to arrange that] 
his neighbor not have them)… (Rh. 1388a32-38) 
 
The crucial difference, then, is one of action tendency (i.e. the impulse to behave in a particular 
way in reaction to an emotion). According to Aristotle, emulation motivates subjects to acquire 
the desired good for themselves, while envy motivates them to deprive the objects of the good, 
and this difference is what leads him to categorize emulation as a virtuous emotion, whereas 
                                                
30 For the appearance of the same in Plato’s works, see p. 154-55. For a summary of its appearances elsewhere, see p. 
186. 
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envy is base. Such an explanation seems plausible enough at first glance, but upon closer 
scrutiny, the distinction between phthonos and zêlos is often more complicated.31 In some cases, 
it holds true. For instance, when Hesiod writes, ζηλοῖ δέ τε γείτονα γείτων / εἰς ἄφενος 
σπεύδοντ᾽ (the neighbor emulates the neighbor who strives for wealth, Op. 23-24), the point is 
that the first neighbor, seeing the second, takes it upon himself to work harder so that he too can 
amass wealth; he is not actively seeking to take away from what his neighbor has.32 When 
Metaneira attempts to persuade the disguised Demeter to look after her infant son, she promises 
her gifts that will cause other women to feel zêlos (τίς σε ἰδοῦσα γυναικῶν θηλυτεράων / 
ζηλώσαι· τόσα κέν τοι ἀπὸ θρεπτήρια δοίην, Hom. Hymn Dem. 222-23). Their intent is to 
convince her of the value of what she will be receiving by emphasizing that other women will 
want to acquire the same for themselves, not that she will have to worry about other women 
taking away what she has been given. Even so, however, Helene Foley translates, “any woman 
who saw you would feel envy at once.”33 Similarly, Susan Shelmerdine translates, “surely any of 
the tender women, seeing you, would feel envy.”34 I prefer this translation of zêlos as well, 
because “emulation” is a relatively archaic term in English (in a way that zêlos for the hymn’s 
audience would not have been).35 Moreover, in common English usage, “envy” can—but does 
not always—carry with it a destructive sense, and that is precisely the point: zêlos seems 
innocent enough in this context, but there is always still the possibility of a more dangerous 
                                                
31 Walcot (1978), 14-15. For an evaluation of the claim that envy drives subjects to deprive the objects of the good 
rather than to acquire it for themselves, see p. 174-75. The question at hand in what immediately follows is whether 
phthonos and zêlos are in fact separate entities. 
32 Curiously, several lines later, Hesiod says that beggars envy beggars and singers envy singers, using a form of 
phthonein. It appears that zêloun and phthonein are working synonymously, but the fact that phthonein typically 
carries a negative connotation raises questions, to such a degree that some editors suggest removing the lines with 
phthonein. At any rate, the use of zêloun is clearly intended to be virtuous, given the context.  
33 Foley (1994), 10, 12. 
34 Shelmerdine (1995), 42, 45. 
35 Schoeck (1969), 16. 
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meaning lurking beneath the surface. There is enough fluidity between the concepts of zêlos and 
phthonos to justify translating either one as “envy.”  
There are cases in which zêlos has a clearly pejorative connotation and others in which 
phthonos and zêlos shade into one another, making it difficult to tell where one ends and the 
other begins. In describing the horrors that will come to afflict men living in the Age of Iron, 
Hesiod laments, Ζῆλος δ᾽ ἀνθρώποισιν ὀιζυροῖσιν ἅπασι / δυσκέλαδος κακόχαρτος ὁµαρτήσει 
στυγερώπης (Discordant, horrible Envy who rejoices in misfortunes will walk beside all of 
miserable mankind, Op. 195-96). Zêlos is obviously more nefarious in this instance than 
Aristotle’s definition of emulation suggests, and accordingly must be translated as “envy” rather 
than “emulation.” The zêlosunê that causes Hera to keep the goddess of childbirth away from 
Leto in her time of need is similarly less about virtuous emulation than it is about aggravated 
envy or jealousy (Hom. Hymn Ap. 99-101). Sanders notes that zêlos’ meaning was less sharply 
distinguished in the archaic period and thus could appear in more detrimental contexts, but even 
in the classical period a close connection remained between zêlos and phthonos.36 Oedipus’ 
musings provide a glimpse into this connection: ὦ πλοῦτε καὶ τυραννὶ καὶ τέχνη τέχνης / 
ὑπερφέρουσα τῷ πολυζήλῳ βίῳ, / ὅσος παρ᾽ ὑµῖν ὁ φθόνος φυλάσσεται (“Wealth and kingship 
and skill surpassing skill in the much-admired life, how great is the envy stored up in you,” Soph. 
OT 380-82).37 Clytemnestra speaks and acts in a duplicitous manner, but she nevertheless sheds 
light on the idea that phthonos and zêlos—while not identical—are inseparable: ὁ δ᾽ ἀφθόνητός 
γ᾽οὐκ ἐπίζηλος πέλει (“The unenvied man is not admirable,” Aesch. Ag. 939).38 Plato too 
highlights the natural progression from zêlos to phthonos in the Menexenus, when describing 
                                                
36 Sanders (2014), 47. Grimaldi notes that this pejorative meaning can be found in later authors as well, such as 
Diogenes Laertius and Stobaeus (1988, 173). 
37 For the full discussion of this passage, see p. 84. 
38 For the full discussion of this passage, see p. 97-98. 
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how Athens became embroiled in the Peloponnesian War (242a).39 Zêlos may at times indicate a 
milder, less invidious emotion than phthonos, but nevertheless, these cases collectively raise the 
question of whether zêlos is ever wholly positive, thus complicating the neat division that 
Aristotle sets out. 
One final, related emotion deserves mention, and this is jealousy. Jealousy does not enter 
into Aristotle’s discussion in the Rhetoric as a separate emotion from envy, nor does it appear 
elsewhere in his works.40 Aristotle does, however, address one important element of its nature 
under the heading of envy, which in turn reaffirms what we have already seen, namely that 
phthonos covers scripts that correspond to both envy and jealousy in English.41 He writes,  
καὶ οἷς µικρὸν ἐλλείπει τοῦ µὴ πάντα ὑπάρχειν (διὸ οἱ µεγάλα πράττοντες καὶ οἱ εὐτυχοῦντες 
φθονεροί εἰσιν)· πάντας γὰρ οἴονται τὰ αὑτῶν φέρειν (Those who fall a little short of having 
everything also [feel envy], and this is why those who do great things and those who are 
successful are envious: for they think that everyone [wants] to carry off what is their own, Rh. 
1387b28-30). Aristotle here reveals the dual nature of phthonos: it can indicate either a pain over 
what you do not have but wish to have, or a pain over what you already have but are concerned 
about losing. I have chosen to translate phthoneroi here as “envious” because it derives from the 
same word that Aristotle uses throughout to mean envy, but the idea expressed—that some 
people are concerned with losing what they have—clearly points to the mentality that we 
associate with jealousy. 
 Beyond providing basic definitions, Aristotle’s treatment of envy touches on several 
notable features. First, the relationship between envy and honor is evident in his summary of the 
things about which people feel envy: ἐφ’ οἷς δὲ φθονοῦσι, τὰ µὲν ἀγαθὰ εἴρηται· ἐφ’ οἷς γὰρ 
                                                
39 For the full discussion of this passage, see p. 157-58. 
40 Konstan (2006), 222. 
41 Sanders (2014), 39, 44. 
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φιλοδοξοῦσι καὶ φιλοτιµοῦνται ἔργοις ἢ κτήµασι καὶ ὀρέγονται δόξης, καὶ ὅσα εὐτυχήµατά ἐστιν, 
σχεδὸν περὶ πάντα φθόνος ἔστι (The good things which people envy have been stated: for the 
deeds and possessions for whose sake people love fame and honor and grasp for fame, and as 
many things are pieces of success, there is envy concerning nearly all of them, Rh. 1387b35-
88a3). Aristotle also says that those who are especially concerned with honor tend to be more 
envious: καὶ οἱ φιλότιµοι φθονερώτεροι τῶν ἀφιλοτίµων (And the ambitious [are] more envious 
than the unambitious, Rh. 1387b31-32). This accords with what we have seen elsewhere.42 We 
should not, however, take this verbal association with timê to mean that he considers envy a 
justified or noble emotion. He goes on to say that the small-souled (µικρόψυχοι, b34) are also 
prone to it and that it is characteristic of base men (Rh. 1388a35-36, quoted above).43 
 Envy is the only emotion discussed in the Rhetoric that Aristotle depicts as 
unconditionally negative.44 As mentioned above, Aristotle considers envy unlike pity and 
indignation, both of which are suggestive of good character (Rh. 1386b11-12); in the case of 
envy, the object’s desert is irrelevant, which paints the emotion in a bad light. Moreover, in the 
Eudemian Ethics, envy is defined as excessive by its very nature: φθονερὸς δὲ τῷ λυπεῖσθαι ἐπὶ 
πλείοσιν εὐπραγίαις ἢ δεῖ (καὶ γὰρ οἱ ἄξιοι εὖ πράττειν λυποῦσι τοὺς φθονεροὺς εὖ πράττοντες) 
(The envious man [is characterized] by being vexed at more successes than one ought to be, for 
even those who are worthy of having success vex the envious when they have success, 1221a38-
40). The comparative phrase ἐπὶ πλείοσιν εὐπραγίαις ἢ δεῖ is a clear indication that Aristotle 
regards envy as inappropriate by definition. Indeed, Aristotle posits that indignation is the mean 
                                                
42 Cf. Eur. Phoen. 528-48 (p. 90). For the relationship between envy and honor (or more specifically, ambition) in 
Plato’s works, see p. 155-56. See also p. 183-85. 
43 Theophrastus’ use of phthonos in his description of the man who finds fault with everything is in keeping with 
Aristotle’s view. According to Theophrastus, such a man complains upon receiving a portion of meat from a friend 
that the friend has begrudged him (Ἐφθόνησάς µοι) soup and wine (Char. 17.2). Theophrastus does not label the 
complainer himself as phthoneros, but it seems clear that he is prone to envy, even as he accuses another of being 
stingy out of jealousy.  
44 Konstan (2006), 113. 
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(i.e. the proper amount of an emotion), with envy and an unnamed emotion (something akin to 
malice or spite) as the excessive and defective vices, respectively. He explains, νέµεσις δὲ 
µεσότης φθόνου καὶ ἐπιχαιρεκακίας...ὁ µὲν γὰρ νεµεσητικὸς λυπεῖται ἐπὶ τοῖς ἀναξίως εὖ 
πράττουσιν, ὁ δὲ φθονερὸς ὑπερβάλλων τοῦτον ἐπὶ πᾶσι λυπεῖται, ὁ δ’ ἐπιχαιρέκακος τοσοῦτον 
ἐλλείπει τοῦ λυπεῖσθαι ὥστε καὶ χαίρειν (Indignation is the mean between envy and malice…for 
the indignant man is vexed at those who have success undeservedly, while the envious man, 
surpassing him, is vexed at all [those who have success], and the malicious man falls so far short 
of being vexed that he even rejoices [at undeserved misfortunes], Eth. Nic. 1108b1-6).45  
Aristotle not only finds fault with envy on the grounds that it pays no heed to desert and 
is fundamentally excessive, but also on the grounds that, in his view, the subject is concerned 
with depriving the object of the good, rather than acquiring it for him or herself, as is the case 
with emulation (Rh. 1388a36-38). As we have already seen, the distinction between envy and 
emulation is not as straightforward as Aristotle presents it to be, but let us now look more closely 
at the idea that envy drives people to deprive others of the good. William Grimaldi states that 
Aristotle is incorrect and that envy’s aim is not to deprive others of what they possess.46 Finding 
middle ground, Sanders concludes that phthonos covers a range of scripts, including both 
begrudging and covetous envy, which differ in terms of whether the ultimate goal is to deprive or 
to acquire, respectively.47 I agree with Sanders, and thus I find Aristotle’s claim overly simplistic 
in its denial of covetous envy, which seems arguably more common than begrudging, especially 
in the political realm. For example, in Oedipus’ estimation of Creon’s motives, Creon envies 
Oedipus’ position and aims to occupy it himself, rather than simply to remove Oedipus from the 
throne (Soph. OT 380-89). Despite the absence of explicit phthonos terminology, I have argued 
                                                
45 Cf. Eth. Eud. 1233b16-26. 
46 Grimaldi (1988), 174. 
47 These goals can also coexist, although typically one is more pressing than the other. See p. 24. 
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previously Histiaeus’ suspicious defense of his motives suggests that he feels envy toward 
Darius. Herodotus’ revelation that he ultimately just wants to leave Susa and return to his seat of 
power points to covetous rather than begrudging envy (Hdt. 5.35.4, 5.106.3).48 If his primary 
goal were to remove Darius from power or to reduce his holdings drastically, inciting rebellion in 
Miletus would not be the most direct or effective course of action. These figures act as they do 
not because they are set on depriving a particular individual of his power, but because they are 
determined to increase their own, thus running counter to Aristotle’s characterization of envy.49 
 In comparing Aristotle’s treatment of envy and what Homer, Hesiod, Sophocles, and 
Herodotus say and reveal about it, various points of divergence appear. The distinction between 
envy and indignation and the distinction between envy and emulation are not as straightforward 
as Aristotle makes them out to be, and moreover, the idea that envy’s aim is to deprive others 
rather than to acquire for oneself is representative of begrudging envy, but to the exclusion of 
covetous envy. Some differences are to be expected, however, given that the nature of Aristotle’s 
Rhetoric is prescriptive, rather than descriptive: Aristotle’s goal in discussing the emotions is to 
enable the orator to arouse and capitalize on the emotional response of the audience, and 
detailing all their various complexities and idiosyncrasies is not necessarily conducive to this 
goal. On the other hand, Aristotle’s points about the relationship between subject and object (i.e. 
that they are alike in some respect) and about the centrality of honor are consistent with earlier 
authors’ depictions. Moreover, the way in which Aristotle regards envy as an indicator of a base 
or flawed character hearkens back to what we have seen in the works of Sophocles and 
                                                
48 See p. 132-33. 
49 It is possible that Aristotle would have seen in these situations an overlap of envy and a desire for power 
(something akin to greed or covetousness). If this is the case, situations like these highlight one of the inherent 
limitations of classifying emotions in such a delineated fashion: in reality, emotions often occur in combination with 
one another and it is difficult (if not impossible) to disentangle them. Thus classifications of emotions are useful for 
illustrating general characteristics, but we run into difficulties if we disallow any flexibility and expect them to 
present binary rather than prototypical categories.  
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Herodotus in particular, where envy and jealousy are used to characterize various figures in a 
negative and/or dangerous light. 
 
4. Aristotle on envy, jealousy, and tyranny 
 
 Similar to the way in which Plato’s representation of envy and jealousy harmonizes with 
that of previous authors to a greater degree when we look at passages relating to tyranny, 
Aristotle too paints a familiar picture of envy, jealousy, and tyranny. Plato and Aristotle differed, 
however, in the approaches they took to studying constitutions; whereas Plato developed his 
views in a more abstract manner, Aristotle was drawing on information that he and his students 
collected from over one hundred city-states.50 In this way, Aristotle’s works can be considered 
more well-informed, but he too presents idealized or theoretical arguments at times. In 
Aristotle’s view, there are six possible constitutional forms: three proper ones, namely kingship, 
aristocracy, and polity, and three deviant forms, namely tyranny, oligarchy, and democracy (Pol. 
1279a33-b10). Of these, he labels kingship as the best and most divine and tyranny as the worst 
(Pol. 1289a39-b5). The difference between the two, in Aristotle’s view, comes down to the 
question of whose interests receive precedence: καλεῖν δ᾽εἰώθαµεν τῶν µὲν µοναρχιῶν τὴν πρὸς 
τὸ κοινὸν ἀποβλέπουσαν συµφέρον βασιλείαν…ἡ µὲν γὰρ τυραννίς ἐστι µοναρχία πρὸς τὸ 
συµφέρον τὸ τοῦ µοναρχοῦντος (We are accustomed to call the type of monarchy that is 
attentive to the common interest “kingship”…For tyranny is monarchy according to the interest 
of the one who is sovereign, Pol. 1279a33-b7).51 Phthonos does not play an explicit role in his 
                                                
50 Lewis (2009), 89-90. 
51 Aristotle subsequently expands on this definition, but the question of whose interests reign supreme remains a 
central issue: τοιαύτην δ’ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τυραννίδα τὴν µοναρχίαν ἥτις ἀνυπεύθυνος ἄρχει τῶν ὁµοίων καὶ 
βελτιόνων πάντων πρὸς τὸ σφέτερον αὐτῆς συµφέρον, ἀλλὰ µὴ πρὸς τὸ τῶν ἀρχοµένων (The monarchy that rules, 
unaccountable, over all equal and better men, according to its own benefit, but not to that of the ruled, must be 
tyranny, Pol. 1295a19-22). 
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basic definition, although it is not difficult to see how it could fit into this and how it could 
contribute to the portrayal of tyranny as a loathsome form of rule. Tyranny is rule according to 
the interest of the ruler, which means that he has the license to indulge his vices, such as 
phthonos.52 Moreover, Aristotle notes elsewhere that the affairs of powerful individuals tend to 
have consequences that ripple outward: ὅλως δὲ αἱ τῶν γνωρίµων στάσεις συναπολαύειν ποιοῦσι 
καὶ τὴν ὅλην πόλιν, οἷον ἐν Ἑστιαίᾳ συνέβη µετὰ τὰ Μηδικά, δύο ἀδελφῶν περὶ τῆς πατρῴας 
νοµῆς διενεχθέντων (On the whole, the discord of the notables makes the whole city share in its 
consequences, such as happened in Hestiaea after the Persian Wars, when two brothers quarreled 
about the distribution of their patrimony, Pol. 1303b31-34). Thus if a tyrant experiences and acts 
out of phthonos, that phthonos can lead to stasis on a statewide level.53 
 Aristotle’s description of the traditional characteristics of tyranny (Pol. 1314a1-29), 
which is embedded within his discussion of how to preserve various types of rule, has much in 
common with Otanes’ speech from Herodotus’ constitutional debate, although the terminology 
differs. For example, both accounts mention that tyrants associate with worthless men. Otanes 
argues, χαίρει δὲ τοῖσι κακίστοισι τῶν ἀστῶν (“he delights in the worst of the citizens,” Hdt. 
3.80.4). Similarly, Aristotle writes: πονηρόφιλον ἡ τυραννίς…καὶ χρήσιµοι οἱ πονηροὶ εἰς τὰ 
πονηρά (Tyranny is friendly to the base…and the base are useful for base things, Pol. 1314a1-4). 
Tyrants’ fondness for praise appears in both descriptions as well, and this is one of the examples 
that Otanes lists after stating that tyrants do many reckless deeds out of hubris and/or phthonos 
(Hdt. 3.80.4). Otanes notes that tyrants grow aggravated if they are flattered only moderately (ἤν 
τε γὰρ αὐτὸν µετρίως θωµάζῃς, ἄχθεται ὅτι οὐ κάρτα θεραπεύεται, 3.80.5); Aristotle says that 
they delight in being fawned over (κολακευόµενοι γὰρ χαίρουσιν, Pol. 1314a2). Conversely, 
                                                
52 McGlew (1993), 29-30. 
53 For an explicit link between stasis and phthonos, see Pol. 1304a33-38 (p. 179-80). 
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tyrants cannot tolerate the powerful or prominent. For Otanes, this idea is also closely connected 
to phthonos: φθονέει γὰρ τοῖσι ἀρίστοισι περιεοῦσί τε καὶ ζώουσι (“For he feels phthonos toward 
the best men because they excel and [even] exist,” Hdt. 3.80.4). Aristotle does not mention 
phthonos by name, but he writes, καὶ τὸ µηδενὶ χαίρειν σεµνῷ µηδ’ ἐλευθέρῳ τυραννικόν (αὑτὸν 
γὰρ εἶναι µόνον ἀξιοῖ τοιοῦτον ὁ τύραννος, ὁ δ’ ἀντισεµνυνόµενος καὶ ἐλευθεριάζων ἀφαιρεῖται 
τὴν ὑπεροχὴν καὶ τὸ δεσποτικὸν τῆς τυραννίδος· µισοῦσιν οὖν ὥσπερ καταλύοντας τὴν ἀρχήν 
(And it is a tyrannical trait to not delight in anyone proud or free, for the tyrant considers himself 
alone worthy of being such, and the man who meets pride with pride and acts like a free man 
takes away the superiority and imperiousness of tyranny. Accordingly, tyrants hate such men as 
if destroyers of their rule, Pol. 1314a5-10). In Aristotle’s estimation, a tyrant views pride and 
freedom as his own exclusive prerogative that he is unwilling to share with others. This points to 
a jealous state of mind, as does the mention of detracting from his superiority (τὴν ὑπεροχὴν), a 
primary concern in jealousy.54  
The suggestion of envy and jealousy—especially the latter—permeates Aristotle’s 
description of tyrants. In addition to the points of comparison with Otanes’ arguments noted 
above, Aristotle states that tyrants are more likely to invite foreigners to dine with them than 
citizens, on the grounds that citizens are hostile while foreigners do not contend against them (ὡς 
τοὺς µὲν πολεµίους τοὺς δ᾽οὐκ ἀντιποιουµένους, Pol. 1314a11-12), which relates back to the 
idea that like envies like. This is similar to the defense of Demaratus that Xerxes presents to his 
                                                
54 The tyrant’s preoccupation with superiority appears in the exchange between Thrasybulus and Periander as well, 
both in Herodotus and Aristotle’s versions (which have the tyrants’ roles reversed; for a discussion of the former, 
see p. 123). In both depictions, the first tyrant cuts down the tallest stalks of grain (τῶν ἀσταχύων ὑπερέχοντα, Hdt. 
5.92.ζ2; ὑπερέχοντας τῶν σταχύων, Arist. Pol. 1284a30), which the second interprets to mean that he should destroy 
the outstanding citizens (τοὺς ὑπειρόχους τῶν ἀστῶν, Hdt. 5.92η.1; τοὺς ὑπερέχοντας ἄνδρας, Arist. Pol. 1284a33), 
presumably on the grounds that their prominence threatens his own superiority. Curiously, Aristotle does not 
condemn outright the practice of eliminating the prominent, as this issue troubles all forms of government (Pol. 
1284b3-4), but it is clearly unjustifiable in the case of the tyrant, who by definition acts in his own interest rather 
than in the state’s. For more on Aristotle’s treatment of Thrasybulus and Periander and the differences between his 
account and Herodotus’, see Forsdyke (1999). 
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brother, when he warns Xerxes that Demaratus may be acting out of envy. While Xerxes 
recognizes that citizens envy one another, he argues that this is not the case with guest-friends 
(Hdt. 7.237.2-3). Aristotle goes on to say that these tactics (e.g. dining with foreigners) are 
characteristic of tyranny and provide security for their rule, but not in a morally defensible way 
(οὐθὲν δ᾽ ἐλλείπει µοχθηρίας, Pol. 1314a13-14). In what follows, he identifies three overarching 
aims of tyranny: to keep its subjects’ spirits impoverished, to prevent its subjects from banding 
together in confidence, and to deprive them of political power (Pol. 1314a14-29). Given that 
Aristotle has already at the outset labeled such aims as morally bankrupt, it should not be a 
stretch to construe of all three as stemming from a jealous paranoia about retaining power, rather 
than as legitimate strategies for safeguarding one’s rule.55  
 While phthonos does not enter explicitly into the description of tyrannical behavior 
discussed above, Aristotle occasionally points to the impact that the phthonos of the citizens can 
have, either on the state in general or on an individual’s rule. For example, he posits a causal 
relationship between phthonos and stasis: οἱ δυνάµεως αἴτιοι γενόµενοι, καὶ ἰδιῶται καὶ ἀρχαὶ 
καὶ φυλαὶ καὶ ὅλως µέρος καὶ πλῆθος ὁποιονοῦν, στάσιν κινοῦσιν· ἢ γὰρ οἱ τούτοις φθονοῦντες 
τιµωµένοις ἄρχουσι τῆς στάσεως, ἢ οὗτοι διὰ τὴν ὑπεροχὴν οὐ θέλουσι µένειν ἐπὶ τῶν ἴσων 
(Those who are responsible for [increasing a state’s] power cause division, whether private 
citizens or magistrates or tribes or, on the whole, any part or multitude: for either the ones who 
envy these men because they are honored begin the division, or these men [begin it themselves 
because they] are unwilling to remain on an equal level with others, on account of their 
                                                
55 As I have noted above (p. 124), concern about security does not by itself indicate a jealous mindset, but there is a 
difference between defensive and offensive strategies. Aristotle’s judgment of a tyrant’s methods here as employing 
every type of baseness places them solidly in the offensive category. Moreover, this entire description of tyrannical 
traits appears within his discussion of how there are two ways to preserve a tyranny, one good and one bad. The 
tactics listed in Pol. 1314a14-29 are representative of the first way, whereas the second and good way is to make the 
regime less authoritarian, and he explains how to do this at Pol. 1314a30-15b10.  
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superiority, Pol. 1304a34-38).56 Aristotle thus draws a connection between power, honor, 
phthonos, and stasis: increasing the state’s power either leads to honor, which causes others 
people to feel phthonos (thus leading to stasis), or else it causes those responsible to demand a 
privileged status (which also leads to stasis). This demand can be considered a variant on the 
“jealous of my position” script: they expect a privileged status that they clearly do not want 
others to share. We have seen any number of times the connection(s) between power, honor, and 
phthonos, but stasis is a new part of this equation.57 This brings with it implications for the state 
as well, especially when we consider this statement in conjunction with the one mentioned above 
about how instances of stasis among the notables tend to affect the entire city (Pol. 1303b31-34). 
Furthermore, the fact that this passage links phthonos and stasis makes it even more plausible 
that phthonos may be implied in the earlier one. 
 Aristotle also draws a specific connection between constituents’ envy and the downfall of 
monarchy. In discussing the strategies by which constitutions may be preserved, he writes, 
Σῴζονται δὲ δηλονότι ὡς ἁπλῶς µὲν εἰπεῖν ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων, ὡς δὲ καθ’ ἕκαστον τῷ τὰς µὲν 
βασιλείας ἄγειν ἐπὶ τὸ µετριώτερον. ὅσῳ γὰρ ἂν ἐλαττόνων ὦσι κύριοι, πλείω χρόνον ἀναγκαῖον 
µένειν πᾶσαν τὴν ἀρχήν· αὐτοί τε γὰρ ἧττον γίγνονται δεσποτικοὶ καὶ τοῖς ἤθεσιν ἴσοι µᾶλλον, 
καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν ἀρχοµένων φθονοῦνται ἧττον (Clearly, to speak simply, [monarchies] are preserved 
by the opposites, but more precisely, by drawing them into a more moderate form. For the fewer 
                                                
56 For the idea that acting out of concern for superiority (τὴν ὑπεροχὴν) is indicative of a jealous mindset, see the 
above discussion of Pol. 1314a5-10 (p. 178).  
57 In Herodotus’ constitutional debate, Darius speaks to the danger posed by factions in his argument against 
oligarchy. He reasons that strong personal enmities arise on account of various men’s desire to be supreme and to 
prevail in their opinions, and these enmities lead to factions, which in turn lead to bloodshed (ἐν δὲ ὀλιγαρχίῃ 
πολλοῖσι ἀρετὴν ἐπασκέουσι ἐς τὸ κοινὸν ἔχθεα ἴδια ἰσχυρὰ φιλέει ἐγγίνεσθαι· αὐτὸς γὰρ ἕκαστος βουλόµενος 
κορυφαῖος εἶναι γνώµῃσί τε νικᾶν ἐς ἔχθεα µεγάλα ἀλλήλοισι ἀπικνέονται, ἐξ ὧν στάσιες ἐγγίνονται, ἐκ δὲ τῶν 
στασίων φόνος, 3.82.3). The hostility and desire for supremacy hints strongly at the possibility of envy, but no 
explicit connection is made; Otanes alone discusses envy and Darius alone discusses factions. Asheri notes that it is 
a prevalent view in fourth-century rhetoric and political philosophy that personal enmities among the elite and/or 
factions can destroy the state (2007, 475). 
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things over which they have authority, the longer the whole rule must last: for they themselves 
become less despotic and more equal in character, and they are envied less by the ruled, Pol. 
1313a18-23). This indicates that the envy of one’s constituents can be a contributing factor to the 
instability or downfall of one-man rule.58 Conversely, when Aristotle comes to the discussion of 
how to preserve a tyranny (rather than monarchy in general, as is the case in the quote above), he 
states that a tyrant who is more moderate will have a rule that is more virtuous and worthy of 
emulation (ζηλωτοτέραν) (Pol. 1315b4-6).59 As we have already seen, the distinction between 
phthonos and zêlos is more complicated in other authors’ works than one would think on the 
basis of Aristotle’s treatment, but in the context of Aristotle’s own texts, it is nonetheless 
significant that he uses a word related to zêlos here: if a ruler is not moderate, his subjects will 
feel phthonos toward him and this may contribute to his downfall, but if he is moderate, he will 
inspire others with zêlos, which poses no such threat and is in fact a mark of a worthy rule.  
Given that Aristotle is very careful to distinguish between kingship and tyranny as the 
correct and deviant forms of monarchy, it may seem strange at first that he takes the time to 
detail how to safeguard a tyranny. While he was antagonistic toward tyranny in writing, however, 
he was perhaps more lenient in real life.60 Aristotle and Plato both lived in a time when one-man 
rule was making a resurgence; philosophers at times had the opportunity to influence these 
powerful individuals (either directly or else through other people), and so Aristotle likely hoped 
                                                
58 Given that Aristotle does not condone tyranny, one may be tempted argue that this is an example of how envy can 
actually benefit the state, but Aristotle himself does not go so far as to make this claim. Indeed, we should not expect 
him to: his focus in this section is how to preserve various types of rule, and he is talking about monarchy in general 
at this point, rather than about tyranny specifically. Moreover, making such an argument would entail casting the 
people overthrowing the tyranny in a negative light, as he has elsewhere made the case that envy is a wholly 
negative and unbecoming emotion. 
59 It is unclear whether Aristotle means that a moderate ruler’s subjects will want to emulate his rule (which seems 
somewhat dangerous) or his character in general (in which case we can consider ζηλωτοτέραν a transfered epithet), 
or perhaps that other rulers will want to emulate his rule. At any rate, the general sense is clear: he is doing 
something right. 
60 Lewis (2009), 92. 
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to be able to offer insight into how a ruler who was closer to the tyrant end of the spectrum could 
transform his rule for the better.61 Thus while in these passages Aristotle depicts the relationships 
between envy, jealousy, and one-man rule in a way that accords with what we have seen 
elsewhere (especially in the case of Herodotus), Aristotle is unusual in offering explicit advice 
on how tyrants can improve themselves and thereby their regimes as well.  
What I have provided here is a selection of and commentary on significant passages, but 
there is still much to explore regarding envy and jealousy in Plato and Aristotle’s extensive 
writings, particularly as they relate to constitutions, not just to sole rulersthip but to any form of 
government. Although Plato does not offer extended narratives about phthonos and Aristotle 
does not mention it explicitly in his discussion of tyrannical traits, I hope to have shown that 
phthonos is nevertheless a pervasive and powerful force in their works, and as such, that it is ripe 
for and deserving of future study.62 
 
Part II: General Conclusions 
 
1. Envy and jealousy: general characteristics and beliefs 
 
Envy and jealousy were predominantly and nearly exclusively negative emotions in the 
ancient Greek world, and this is especially true in the political realm. In the works of the authors 
surveyed here—Homer, Hesiod, Sophocles, and Herodotus—several examples do exist of 
phthonos that has the potential to bring about positive effects, but even these are understated and 
not without complication. They are also so uncommon that they can be easily listed here: 
Hesiod’s discussion of the good Eris depends on envy as a motivating factor; in the Homeric 
Hymn to Demeter, the hypothetical envy of other women is touted as a reason to accept the gifts 
                                                
61 Idem, 100-1; Simpson (1998), 411. 
62 Sanders uses the lack of extended narratives about phthonos as his justification for choosing not to devote a 
chapter or any amount of focused attention to Plato’s works (2014, 8). 
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offered by Metaneira, because it functions as an indicator of high value; and divine phthonos in 
Herodotus’ Histories can sometimes act as an agent for reestablishing justice, as is the case with 
Pheretime, who died a terrible death after taking extreme vengeance against the people of Barca. 
Hesiod is the only author who deliberately draws attention to a positive effect, but significantly, 
this benefit belongs to the economic realm and not the political. Moreover, his diction 
(specifically, his use of the verb kotein) suggests a certain ambiguity, raising the question: even 
if it can have positive effects in some cases, does it ever come without negative ones? The 
answer, it seems, is no. Phthonos is, at its core, a pain, and whether both the person experiencing 
it and the person toward whom it is directed suffer ill effects or just one of the parties, there is no 
situation involving phthonos in which everyone stands only to gain. Moreover, within the human 
realm, the envy and jealousy that sole rulers feel or receive are not shown in any circumstances 
to bring about positive effects for anyone. 
Given the overwhelmingly negative picture of phthonos that has emerged over the course 
of this study, it is not surprising that there have been no firsthand admissions.63 Indeed, more 
often than not, we cannot rely on the presence of words such as phthonos, zêlos, or cognates to 
alert us to the presence of such emotions, which is why it is so important to go beyond a lexical 
approach. By examining the passages in which these words do appear in the early material 
(namely in the works of Homer and Hesiod), we have been able to identify both the types of 
scenarios (or scripts) that these terms describe as well as associated words (e.g. eris, megairein, 
agaasthai) that can signal the presence of envy or jealousy when they are not named explicitly. 
Many of the instances of envy and jealousy that Homer and Hesiod depict can be traced back to 
issues of honor or reputation, an association that is evident in the clustering of terms such as timê, 
                                                
63 Two of Sophocles’ characters admit (or come close to admitting) that they feel zêlos, but never phthonos (see p. 
81 note 34). 
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kleos, and kudos. Honor and reputation continue to be a point of contention when envy and 
jealousy arise in the works of Sophocles and Herodotus, despite relatively less frequent 
appearances of words such as those listed above.  
Envy and jealousy may be more difficult or elusive to study than other emotions on 
account of the social taboo surrounding them, but that has no bearing on their actual incidence. 
As is the case with any other emotion, they affect every demographic and no one is immune to 
their influence: immortals, mortals, men, women, the elite, the commoners, etc. Greek gods are 
far more powerful than mortals and do not face the same realities (such as death, poverty, old age, 
etc.), but they experience envy and jealousy nonetheless. The role and nature of divine phthonos, 
however, differs considerably from author to author (to be discussed in section 2 below). Just as 
the gods are subject to feeling the pangs of envy and jealousy, so too all mortals can experience 
these emotions. In Herodotus’ constitutional debate, Otanes makes the case that envy is born in 
mankind from the start: ἐγγίνεται µὲν γάρ οἱ ὕβρις ὑπὸ τῶν παρεόντων ἀγαθῶν, φθόνος δὲ 
ἀρχῆθεν ἐµφύεται ἀνθρώπῳ (“For hubris is bred in him from the good things at hand, while 
phthonos grows in man from the start,” 3.80.3). He draws a contrast (men...de) between hubris, 
which is brought on by circumstances, and phthonos, which is an innate and universal 
characteristic of the human condition (although as we have seen, it affects immortals as well). 
Indeed, anyone can experience phthonos, and Otanes’ use of anthrôpos (as opposed to 
anêr) indicates that this applies to women as well. Of course, this is not Otanes’ point in the 
debate, and women have been almost entirely absent from the present study by virtue of the fact 
that the focus has been on envy and jealousy in the political realm, but small pieces of evidence 
do suggest that women’s experience of envy and jealousy is not significantly different from that 
of men. For instance, in the Homeric Hymn to Demeter, Metaneira offers the goddess gifts that 
  185 
will cause other women to feel envy (222-23). It is possible that these other, hypothetical women 
will be envious simply because of the intrinsic beauty of the gifts, but a gift is, among other 
things, a token of esteem or honor, and it is likely that women will feel envy on account of what 
the gifts signify about the status or reputation of the nurse relative to themselves. We see a 
comparable scenario in the Odyssey, when Odysseus’ men are thought to have succumbed to 
envy (and curiosity) regarding the gifts given to Odysseus (Od. 10.34-45); this too relates back to 
honor.64 Moreover, in Euripides’ Ion, Creusa acts out of jealousy on account of the perceived 
threat to her standing in the royal household that Ion poses, both as an interloper and as a stepson 
(808ff., 1025). The fact that so many examples of envy and jealousy—regardless of whether an 
immortal or a mortal, a man or a woman is feeling the emotion—can be traced back to issues of 
status or reputation strengthens the argument that envy and jealousy are intimately and perhaps 
even necessarily connected with honor.  
With this association in mind, it makes perfect sense that there is such a wealth of 
examples of envy and jealousy that relate to rulers, since rulers typically have an elevated 
awareness and concern for their image.65 Moreover, being in a position of power increases the 
likelihood of attracting the envy of others and of experiencing jealousy oneself. Sophocles makes 
the former clear with statements such as the chorus’ explanation of what they perceive to be 
slander directed at Ajax (πρὸς γὰρ τὸν ἔχονθ᾽ ὁ φθόνος ἕρπει, “For envy advances upon the one 
who has,” Aj. 157) and Oedipus’ complaint against Creon (ὦ πλοῦτε καὶ τυραννὶ καὶ τέχνη 
τέχνης / ὑπερφέρουσα τῷ πολυζήλῳ βίῳ, / ὅσος παρ᾽ ὑµῖν ὁ φθόνος φυλάσσεται, “Wealth and 
kingship and skill surpassing skill in the much-admired life, how great is the envy stored up in 
                                                
64 For the idea that honor is a key issue for Odysseus’ men, see p. 52-53. 
65 For example, Agamemnon cannot tolerate the idea of not having a prize woman when all the other leaders at Troy 
do; Creon stands firm in his resolution to punish Antigone because he is afraid to lose face; Croesus is not beset by a 
particular desire to amass more power or riches or to deprive others of theirs, but he very much cares that others 
regard him as the most fortunate. 
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you,” OT 380-82). As for the jealousy of rulers, we have seen this borne out in any number of 
cases, notably Cronus and Zeus among the gods and Oedipus and Periander among men. 
One additional characteristic of envy and jealousy that deserves mention is that people 
are most likely to experience these emotions in relation to those in their own peer group or those 
with whom they have something in common. We can see this belief expressed in the abstract in 
Hesiod’s Works and Days (καὶ κεραµεὺς κεραµεῖ κοτέει καὶ τέκτονι τέκτων, / καὶ πτωχὸς πτωχῷ 
φθονέει καὶ ἀοιδὸς ἀοιδῷ, And potter begrudges potter and craftsman begrudges craftsman, and 
beggar envies beggar and singer envies singer, 25-26) and in Xerxes’ discussion with his brother 
(πολιήτης µὲν πολιήτῃ εὖ πρήσσοντι φθονέει, “a citizen envies a citizen who fares well,” Hdt. 
7.237.2), as well as in the preemptive actions of figures such as Oedipus and Periander, who take 
steps to neutralize the threats of their rivals. Tyrants and kings have no true peers, but they often 
perceive potential rivals among the elite. Indeed, Oedipus suspects Creon, another member of the 
royal household (OT 380-89), and Periander kills the leading citizens of Corinth (Hdt. 5.92.η1). 
Deoices also illustrates this belief that similarity lays the groundwork for envy: to discourage the 
envy of his former peers, he makes himself seem as dissimilar as possible (Hdt. 1.99.2). 
 
2. The overall role(s) of envy and jealousy 
 
 Homer, Hesiod, Sophocles, and Herodotus are more or less in agreement about the 
association between honor and the emotions of envy and jealousy, the tendency of positions of 
power to increase the likelihood of incurring envy and exhibiting jealousy, and the idea that like 
envies like. Thus we can say that the scripts are fairly consistent among these authors. There is 
significant variation, however, in terms of the overall roles the authors assign to these emotions.  
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Divine envy and jealousy 
Let us consider the role of the envy and jealousy of the gods first, before evaluating these 
emotions more generally. In epic, the majority of instances of divine envy and jealousy occur in 
relation to other deities, and honor is the central issue at stake. For example, Hera feels slighted 
at the prospect of Zeus getting to keep his beloved Troy at the expense of the Greeks whom she 
has been helping (Il. 4.25-29, 4.51-67), Hermes endeavors to carve out a niche for himself like 
his older brother Apollo has (Hom. Hymn Herm. 163-81), and Cronus and Zeus each go to 
extreme lengths to protect their position as king of the gods (Hes. Theog. 459-62, 888-93). There 
are only a few references to the idea of gods feeling envy or jealousy in relation to mortals: 
Poseidon complains to Zeus about the Greeks’ wall and how it will eclipse the fame of his own 
(Il. 7.446-53), Menelaus mentions that a god must have begrudged Odysseus’ homecoming (Od. 
4.181-82), and Penelope tells Odysseus that the gods begrudged them enjoying their youth 
together (Od. 23.210-12). In contrast, Sophocles only seldom alludes to divine envy or jealousy, 
and when he does, the comments are made in passing.66 This is not to say that the gods are not 
involved or that they do not cause harm to mortals; they certainly do.67 The gods punish 
violations of nomoi and acts of hubris, as we would expect, but Sophocles rarely connects these 
acts of punishment to an envious or jealous state of mind among the immortals. In Herodotus’ 
Histories, divine phthonos constitutes a powerful force in the universe, and it is directed solely 
toward mortals. He has characters discuss it in the abstract (as a warning or lesson) more often 
                                                
66 In Sophocles’ Electra, upon hearing the news that Orestes is dead, Aegisthus proclaims that he must have been 
brought down by phthonos (presumably of the divine sort, although he does not explicitly mention the gods) (1466-
67). This remark is inconsequential in terms of sending a message about the dangers of incurring divine phthonos, 
considering Aegisthus is obviously misinformed—Orestes is not dead at all, and certainly not by the gods’ doing. 
Philoctetes also refers to phthonos when, giving his bow to Neoptolemus, he warns him to take care to avoid the 
phthonos that (Philoctetes implies) he himself has suffered (Phil. 776-78). Again, he does not specifically make 
reference to the gods, but the way in which he talks about the bow elsewhere suggests that he considers it to attract 
divine jealousy on account of its supernatural powers (Schein 2013, 241). 
67 For an extensive list of examples, see Mikalson (2012), 431. 
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than he identifies actual examples of it, and moreover, no particular deities are named as the 
responsible parties.68 Whereas the (very few) Homeric mortals who are suggested to have 
suffered on account of the gods’ envy or jealousy (namely, Odysseus and Penelope) are not 
represented as having done anything to deserve it, this is not always the case in Herodotus’ 
depiction. Herodotean examples of divine phthonos fall into two categories: one in which divine 
phthonos strikes randomly or in an otherwise unpredictable manner (which highlights the general 
vulnerability of human affairs), and one in which misfortunes befall prominent individuals 
because they incited divine phthonos with their (mis)behavior.69 Thus Herodotus and his 
characters point to the idea that divine phthonos sometimes works as a balancing force or a force 
of justice; whereas divine retribution certainly exists in the world of Homer and Hesiod, it is not 
explicitly or systematically connected with the concept of phthonos.  
Walcot has argued that this depiction of divine phthonos as an agent of divine 
punishment appears in the fifth century—not just in the work of Herodotus, but also in those of 
Aeschylus and Pindar—because it was then that the Greeks endured increased contact with 
eastern monarchs, whose opulence could for the first time be legitimately construed as rivaling 
that of the gods.70 This explanation seems plausible enough for the change in how divine 
phthonos is represented, but it does not touch upon the differences in treatment among fifth-
century authors. A more comprehensive survey of fifth-century literature is necessary in order to 
account for the fact that Herodotus includes numerous significant passages about divine 
                                                
68 The lack of specificity concerning the responsible party is also the case in the examples of Odysseus and Penelope, 
and this is in accordance with Jörgensen’s rule, as these assessments of a begrudging god are made by characters in 
direct speech rather than by the narrator (Jörgensen 1904, 364). Herodotus is not inspired by the Muses and cannot 
be considered an omniscient narrator, so it is not surprising that he refrains from naming individual gods even when 
he identifies divine phthonos at work. 
69 Sophocles includes several messages about the unpredictability of human affairs (which effectively constitute an 
argument about the pointlessness of envying others, since their fortunes could still be reversed), but he does not 
introduce the idea of divine phthonos in these cases (OT 1524-30; Ant. 1156-65).  
70 Walcot (1978), 31. 
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phthonos while Sophocles largely ignores it; of course, we should not discount the possibility 
that it appeared more prominently in plays that no longer survive. At any rate, this is a 
noteworthy point of divergence, especially given that the two authors were contemporaries and 
even friends.71  
 
Envy and jealousy in general 
 The appearances of envy and jealousy in epic are generally less pronounced than in the 
other genres examined here. Taken in aggregate, they seem to have an anecdotal tone: they do 
not naturally coalesce into a profound or intentional message about the nature or role of these 
emotions, nor are they used to showcase rulership in a negative light. Nevertheless, they reveal 
the dangerous nature of envy and jealousy. In the Iliad, Odysseus quickly silences Thersites’ 
envious outburst against Agamemnon and orders him not to compete with kings (Il. 2.246-64). 
Left unaddressed, Thersites’ complaint could lead to the development of more widespread 
resistance to Agamemnon’s leadership, which would derail the Greeks’ war effort. Another 
example of the harm that envy can cause appears in the Odyssey: in Odysseus’ understanding of 
events, it is his men’s envy over the gifts given to him by Aeolus that incites them to open the 
bag of winds, an act which not only fails to lead to their enrichment (as they had hoped) but also 
thwarts their homecoming once again (Od. 10.34-45). Hesiod also contributes to the depiction of 
envy and jealousy as disruptive emotions (although he also highlights the potential economic 
benefit of envy, as discussed above). In the Theogony, Cronus and Zeus both commit violence 
against family members in order to secure their kingship, and they do so out of jealousy; while 
there is no indication that Hesiod’s contemporary audiences are supposed to think that Zeus’ 
continued reign is wrong in some way, it is significant nonetheless that the current hierarchy was 
                                                
71 Scodel (2012), 32. 
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established only through a series of turbulent upheavals among the immortals. If the immortals 
can fall victim to such vicious power struggles, surely mortals are at risk of the same. 
 In Sophocles’ plays, envy and jealousy represent great potential for danger. It would be 
inaccurate and in any case overly simplistic to say that these emotions constitute the driving 
force behind the plays in which they appear (namely the Theban plays), but they do have a 
significant impact on the characterization of several figures and the nature of their leadership, 
and they make for a highly unflattering depiction of one-man rule. For example, it is Oedipus’ 
jealousy that causes him to turn on Creon in the Oedipus Tyrannus, which marks the beginning 
of his descent into anger and suspicion; Creon’s insistence that the city belongs to him alone and 
his refusal to consider the will of the people marks him as a jealous and autocratic ruler in the 
Antigone; and Polyneices’ willingness to risk so many lives for the sake of his personal honor 
reveals his envious disposition in the Oedipus at Colonus. Oedipus in the Oedipus Tyrannus and 
Creon in the Antigone are well aware that rulers are at risk of harm from envious or otherwise 
discontent constituents, but they fail to realize that being overly preoccupied with this and trying 
to circumvent it (i.e. becoming a jealous ruler) likewise places them in harm’s way. We also see 
Creon making an impassioned case to Oedipus about why he does not envy him (OT 584-93), the 
Theban elders announcing Oedipus’ unenviable downfall to the city (OT 1524-30), and a 
messenger proclaiming Creon’s similarly unenviable reversal of fortune (Ant. 1156-65). Taken 
together, these passages convey a resounding message that feeling envy and jealousy is in some 
cases pointless and in others destructive (both to others and oneself); being suspected of feeling 
these emotions is also dangerous, as is being the object of them. In short, Sophocles presents 
envy and jealousy in the political realm as entirely negative. The instances vary in terms of the 
severity of consequences, but there are no positive effects.  
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 Like Sophocles, Herodotus too includes a clear warning about the potential consequences 
when envy or jealousy is involved. As indicated above, however, Herodotus’ message is not 
solely concerned with effects of mortal envy and jealousy, as Sophocles’ is, but it encompasses 
divine phthonos as well. Phthonos is one of the most prominent and significant components of 
Otanes’ description of the negative aspects of rule by a single individual, and he identifies it as 
one of two root causes of the evils committed by tyrants (3.80.3-4). The information Herodotus 
provides about various rulers throughout the Histories reaffirms this description (although 
naturally not every ruler fits the mold), including the close association drawn between rulers and 
phthonos.72 For example, Herodotus explicitly identifies phthonos as the reason why Cambyses 
removes his brother from Egypt and sends him back to Persia (3.30.1) as well as the reason why 
Demaratus maligns his fellow king Cleomenes (6.61.1); he also has Xerxes’ brother cast doubt 
on Demaratus’ motives on the grounds that he feels envy toward Xerxes (7.236.1). Collectively, 
the instances of phthonos among men (both explicitly identified and implied) remind Herodotus’ 
audience that envy and jealousy always carry with them the possibility of harm, and given that 
heads of state are especially prone to these emotions, there is increased potential for their effects 
to ripple outward. Moreover, the proclivity of sole rulers to these emotions constitutes a serious 
warning about the innate hazards and instability of autocracy. 
In the case of divine phthonos, it is clear from Herodotus’ work that it is always in an 
individual’s best interest to avoid incurring divine phthonos, even if divine phthonos in general 
can at times provide a benefit to society as a whole. While divine phthonos can sometimes be 
avoided by being careful not to overstep boundaries or become too powerful, there is always the 
                                                
72 Gammie (1986), 195; Lateiner (1989), 165. For the idea that Greek tyrants deviate more from the despotic 
template, see Dewald (2003), 44, 47. 
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possibility that it may strike at random.73 There is therefore a certain degree of inevitability 
concerning both divine and human phthonos. Among men, phthonos is a part of human nature 
and so cannot be avoided entirely; there are, however, ways to minimize its impact, such as by 
eschewing autocratic rule, which itself inevitably changes even the best of men (3.80.3). Otanes 
argues this explicitly, but it seems likely that the examples of envious or jealous rulers 
throughout the Histories are intended to steer readers to the same conclusion about the dangers 
of sole rulership. Indeed, the warnings about overweening individuals incurring divine phthonos 
point in the same direction, indicating that the gods too find fault with such concentrated power. 
There is a higher incidence of explicit discussions about envy and jealousy and about 
their association with rulers in the works of Sophocles and Herodotus than in those of Homer or 
Hesiod. Moreover, the idea that power attracts envy had apparently become such a commonplace 
by the fifth century that it gave rise to a sizable number of arguments that acknowledge the 
existence of the idea but challenge it (i.e. by highlighting the undesirable aspects of rule or by 
showing how such envy is ultimately pointless).74 There have of course always been individuals 
who resisted the desirability of tyranny or kingship (e.g. Archilochus, the historical figure of 
Solon), but the more frequent occurrence of such reactions suggests a shift away from—or 
perhaps more accurately, a nervousness or discomfort about—the original basic idea (i.e. that 
power attracts envy) as it appears in the works of Homer and Hesiod. 
 This growing focus on the association between the emotions of envy and jealousy and 
one-man rule stems from the change in political climate that took place in the Greek world in the 
late archaic and early classical periods, which included a heightened aversion to tyranny, as well 
                                                
73 For the idea that anyone can be a victim of divine phthonos, see Solon’s advice to Croesus (Hdt. 1.32.1-9) and 
Artabanus’ response to Xerxes (Hdt. 7.46.3-4). 
74 In addition, we see examples in fifth-century literature of rulers who suspect envy where there is none and those 
who take advantage of the idea to cast their opponents as envious and themselves as blameless. 
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as an increased experience with and distrust of envy and jealousy. In the second half of the sixth 
century, when eastern Greek city-states were being incorporated into the Persian Empire, 
attitudes toward tyranny began to change and sour.75  Condemnation of tyranny grew more 
intense and pervasive in the aftermath of the Peisistratids’ rule and the Persian Wars; in Athens, 
this antagonism became part of the mainstream ideology, and dissenters kept their opinions to 
themselves.76 Effectively, this anti-tyranny ideology helped to foster cohesion in a society that 
was heading into uncharted territory after its inauguration of democracy.77 Although it is difficult 
to find evidence in Sophocles’ works of his own political preference between democracy and 
oligarchy, he clearly represents one-man rule as a baser and more problematic option.78 
Likewise, Herodotus does not state an explicit preference between democracy and oligarchy, but 
his narrative reveals a more favorable stance toward institutionalized forms of government as 
opposed to autocracy.79 Thus we can see the validity of the idea that tyranny continued to loom 
large in the fifth century in part because democrats and oligarchs alike viewed it as a flawed and 
alarming form of rule.80 Despite not knowing with certainty Sophocles’ or Herodotus’ own views 
regarding the issue of democracy versus oligarchy, nevertheless it is clear from their repeated use 
of envy and jealousy (among other things) to characterize sole rulers and their affairs that they do 
not condone one-man rule, and in this way they represent a departure from the worldview that 
prevails in epic poetry. 
 Democracy created an environment that likely prompted or at least allowed for the 
proliferation of envy and jealousy, and accordingly, we encounter explicit discussions about 
                                                
75 Anderson (2005) 210-11. 
76 Lavelle (2005), 7. 
77 Raaflaub (2003), 83. 
78 For the idea that Sophocles does not openly endorse specific policies or even a specific form of government, see 
Scodel (2012), 33. 
79 Lateiner (2013), 195. Some scholars have gone further and argued that Herodotus is in fact deliberately engaging 
with and privileging democratic ideology (see Forsdyke 2002, 542-45). 
80 Forsdyke (2009), 237. 
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these emotions more frequently after its emergence.81 The establishment of political equality 
paved the way for the masses over time to become more aware of and upset by inequalities in 
other aspects of their lives (e.g. in the socioeconomic realm) and to feel envy as a result.82 
Conversely, as envy and jealousy are in many ways two sides of the same coin, while many 
Athenians were likely feeling envy and wanting more for themselves, others who found the 
leveling of the playing field disagreeable—namely the elite—likely experienced increased 
jealousy and fought to retain their privileged status. This is not to say that people who live under 
kings or tyrants do not experience envy or jealousy, or that they experience it less intensely, 
since we have seen plenty of evidence to the contrary in the works of Homer and Hesiod. Rather, 
this offers a possible explanation of why there is an elevated focus on the dangers of these 
emotions in the works of Sophocles and Herodotus: they lived in a time when envy and jealousy 
(or awareness of them) were especially prevalent because civic consciousness was burgeoning, 
and as a result, so were many citizens’ hopes of attaining greater equality and prestige in other 
avenues of life. This was the case not only in the democratic city-state of Athens but anywhere 
that the base of political power was expanding (such as in a city-state where an oligarchy 
replaced a tyranny).  
Moreover, Sophocles and Herodotus’ audiences had a greater vested interest in the well-
being of a state in whose government they could participate, and this too helps explain the 
elevated focus on the dangers of envy and jealousy. As we have seen, these emotions are rarely 
portrayed as leading to positive effects, and this is particularly true in civic and political contexts. 
Envy and jealousy had always been regarded as potentially dangerous, but this conviction grew 
                                                
81 Furthermore, the early years of democracy coincided with the Persian Wars, which facilitated the interactions 
between Persians and Greeks that Walcot believes inspired the concept of divine phthonos (1978, 31).   
82 Idem, 64. Walcot suggests that democracy intensified feelings of envy, but it is unclear whether by this he means 
that they increased in degree or frequency. I believe that the latter is the case, since the degree of envy that an 
individual experiences is difficult to measure (and likely has much to do with the individual’s own temperament). 
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even stronger in the fifth century. In a time when civic-mindedness (and not simply loyalty to 
philoi) was an increasingly celebrated virtue, envy and jealousy—emotions that failed to benefit 
the state and that led almost exclusively to detriment—would naturally be discouraged, and 
indeed this is what we find in the works of Sophocles and Herodotus. 
The association between sole rulers and the emotions of envy and jealousy existed well 
before the development of widespread hostility toward one-man rule in the late archaic period. 
Already in the works of Homer and Hesiod we see various examples of envy and jealousy’s 
tendency to afflict rulers’ affairs. The first extant use of the word turannis in the verses of 
Archilochus again points to this connection, even though the term did not carry a pejorative 
meaning at that time. Over time, however, as Greeks’ antagonism toward tyranny and other 
forms of sole rulership increased, so did the repetition of this association, which supporters of 
democracy or of oligarchy could use to help justify their position. The effects of this pairing 
were bidirectional: envy and jealousy were generally regarded as precarious and unwelcome 
already at a time when kingship was still a neutral form of rule, but because later Greeks were 
able to draw on this association in order to justify their aversion to tyranny, not only did the 
stigma attached to these emotions contribute to the negative characterization of tyranny in the 
fifth century, but hostile attitudes toward tyranny also contributed to the more vehemently 
negative characterization of these emotions that appears in the works of Sophocles and 
Herodotus. 
 
3. Future research 
 
 The present study has focused on the works of select authors in the hopes of providing 
insight into the complexity of the relationship between rulership and the emotions of envy and 
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jealousy in the overall corpus of Greek literature. There are, of course, many genres and authors 
that I have been unable to include. For scholars with a continuing interest in the role of envy and 
jealousy in relation to kings and tyrants, I hope that my research can serve as a starting point 
from which to explore the works of Aeschylus, Euripides, Thucydides, and Xenophon in 
particular. Comprehensive studies of these authors’ texts will enable us to draw broader 
conclusions that are representative of the genres of tragedy and historiography as a whole. 
Moreover, lyric and elegiac poetry, epinician poetry, old comedy, and oratory have much to offer 
in advancing our understanding of the nuances of these emotions. Additional research on the 
precise difference between phthonos and zêlos is also needed. In many cases the two seem more 
or less synonymous or shade into one another, yet not so in others. Certain authors also display a 
preference for one term over the other; for instance, Herodotus uses forms or cognates of 
phthonos more than thirty times, but zêlos appears only once (apart from its formation of proper 
names). Native speakers likely understood a semantic distinction, but this remains somewhat 
unclear for us at present. Intimately entwined with issues of reputation and status, the topics of 
envy, jealousy, politics, and leadership are of ongoing importance and intrigue even in today’s 
world; this continuity suggests that there is pertinent material to be found in the literature and 
culture of any time period. I have focused on texts of authors in the archaic and the first half of 
the classical period, but extending the chronological parameters through the end of the classical 
and beyond will surely make for a fruitful and illuminating study as well.  
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APPENDIX: XENOPHON’S HIERO 
 
 
Xenophon was an Athenian and a student of Socrates, like Plato. He wrote works of 
various genres, but a common theme emerges from many of them, namely an interest in 
government and styles of leadership.1 The Hiero is believed to have been written after Plato’s 
Republic, which also treats the topic of the relative happiness of the tyrant, but Xenophon brings 
a tyrant directly into the dialogue, a choice that likely resulted from his conviction that a tyrant’s 
firsthand remarks could make the most effective argument that a tyrant’s position does not 
intrinsically bring him joy.2 It is simultaneously a story about the meeting of a wise man (the 
poet Simonides) and a ruler (Hiero I, the tyrant of Syracuse)—a commonly depicted interaction, 
such as we have seen in Herodotus’ account of Solon and Croesus—and a variation on a Socratic 
dialogue. Perhaps the most obvious departure from the typical Socratic dialogue is the fact that 
Socrates himself does not appear in the Hiero; but moreover, it is the wise man figure of 
Simonides whose knowledge seems to be put to the test, at least initially.3 After Hiero has 
demonstrated how the poet’s original statements are flawed, Simonides switches into a different 
mode and gives the tyrant advice. Xenophon thus presents three different views: the popular 
view (i.e. that tyranny is enviable, which Simonides pretends to espouse in the beginning), 
Hiero’s own view of the misery that tyranny entails, and Simonides’ view of how a tyrant can 
maximize and enjoy his privilege.4  
                                                
1 Gray (2007), 2. 
2 Gray (1986), 117, 123. 
3 Idem, 116. 
4 Idem, 117. 
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The dialogue consists of two parts. In the first (sections 1-7), Hiero lists the ways in 
which a tyrant’s life is worse than a private citizen’s. In the second (8-11), Simonides details 
how Hiero can achieve happiness, which involves securing his position by ruling moderately and 
benefitting the people, similar to what Aristotle mentions in his discussion of how to preserve a 
tyranny (Pol. 1314a30-15b10).5 Simonides knows his audience well and caters his questions and 
suggestions accordingly. In the beginning, his feigned ignorance and astonishment are meant to 
elicit reactions from Hiero, and to guide him to the realization that he has nothing to lose by 
considering what Simonides has to say about how to improve his situation. When Simonides 
transitions into the role of the adviser, he does not belabor issues of justice or righteousness, 
opting for pragmatism rather than idealism. The measures he proposes will indeed benefit the 
people, but their happiness is merely a means to the end of the tyrant’s own happiness rather than 
an end in itself.6  
 Explicit mentions of the envy directed at tyrants appear in both the first section and the 
last—in fact, the very last word of the dialogue is a form of phthonein—and this makes 
abundantly clear that Xenophon considers envy a major theme or concern when it comes to 
tyranny. In the opening of the dialogue, after Hiero states that tyrants experience fewer pleasures 
and more pains than private citizens, Simonides counters, εἰ γὰρ οὕτως ταῦτ᾽ εἶχε, πῶς ἂν πολλοὶ 
µὲν ἐπεθύµουν τυραννεῖν…πῶς δὲ πάντες ἐζήλουν ἂν τοὺς τυράννους; (“If these things were so, 
how would [it be the case that] many men desire to be tyrant…how would [it be the case that] 
everyone envies tyrants?” 1.9). Significantly, Xenophon has Simonides use a form of zêloun 
instead of phthonein, since his point here is not about the dangers that such a desire poses to the 
tyrant, but rather it is about the desirability of his position. Moreover, he does not intend to 
                                                
5 Gray (2007), 38. 
6 Luccioni (1947), 102. 
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denigrate those feeling the emotion, since technically he too is included in this group of 
“everyone.” Leo Strauss believes that these questions set Hiero on edge and that all of Hiero’s 
subsequent arguments against the desirability of tyranny are aimed at dissuading Simonides from 
harboring envious feelings toward him.7 More recently, however, Vivienne Gray has argued that 
there is no indication that Hiero’s unhappiness is less than genuine.8 Indeed, his impassioned and 
thorough description of all the ways in which tyrants are disadvantaged seems more likely to be 
the result of sincere discontent rather than practiced rhetorical skill (if for no other reason than 
that this would encroach upon the wise man’s domain). 
 At the conclusion of the dialogue, Simonides assures Hiero that if he follows his 
instructions, he will obtain the most noble and blessed possession among men, namely happiness 
unmitigated by envy (κἂν ταῦτα πάντα ποιῇς, εὖ ἴσθι, πάντων τῶν ἐν ἀνθρώποις κάλλιστον καὶ 
µακαριώτατον κτῆµα κεκτήσει· εὐδαιµονῶν γὰρ οὐ φθονηθήσῃ, 11.15). The prominent 
placement of a form of phthonein at the very end reiterates the stakes involved if Hiero does not 
heed Simonides’ advice and change his ways: as we have seen, phthonos is no trivial matter, 
especially when it comes to tyrants, and they would do well to avoid it. Strauss argues that we 
must be careful about taking this statement at face value, since Xenophon surely knew that in 
reality, political power inevitably subjects its holder(s) to incurring envy.9 This is likely true, but 
the fact that envy cannot be wholly eradicated does not mean that a ruler cannot or should not 
still undertake measures to minimize it.10 In any case, Simonides advises Hiero in order to help 
him improve his situation, even if there is no way to perfect it.11 In addition to highlighting the 
                                                
7 Strauss (2013), 45. 
8 Gray (2007), 38, 211. 
9 Strauss (2013), 83. 
10 This is what Deioces seems to do (Hdt. 1.99.2, discussed above, p. 120-21).  
11 Dillery notes that the advice that Xenophon has Simonides give anticipates the sort of leadership embodied by 
rulers in the Hellenistic period (2017, 208). 
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general assocation between tyranny and envy, the Hiero also names specific things that cause a 
tyrant’s subjects to feel envy. They are envious of a tyrant’s ability to help their friends and 
defeat their enemies (ὃ δ᾽ ἐζήλωσας ἡµᾶς ὡς τοὺς µὲν φίλους µάλιστα εὖ ποιεῖν δυνάµεθα, τοὺς 
δὲ ἐχθροὺς πάντων µάλιστα χειρούµεθα, 6.12), which Hiero argues is unfounded. They are also 
envious if a tyrant competes with and triumphs over private citizens in a chariot race, because 
they believe the tyrant’s funds are coming from their own households (νικῶν µὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἂν 
θαυµάζοιο ἀλλὰ φθονοῖο, ὡς ἀπὸ πολλῶν οἴκων τὰς δαπάνας ποιούµενος, νικώµενος δ᾽ ἂν 
πάντων µάλιστα καταγελῷο, 11.6), and Simonides thus cautions Hiero to avoid competing with 
his citizens. 
 Xenophon has Hiero give a wide variety of reasons why a tyrant’s life is not better than a 
private citizen’s life (and thus ought not to be envied), and in doing so, he engages with ideas 
about the relationship between tyranny and envy that appear in other authors’ works. Otanes lists 
the tyrant’s need for admiration but irritation with false flattery as one of the behaviors that stem 
from hubris and/or phthonos (Hdt. 3.80.5).12 Hiero makes no mention of his own phthonos, but 
he echoes the sentiment that flattery brings a tyrant no true pleasure (1.15). Herodotus also has a 
character name phthonos as a reason not to trust Demaratus or heed his advice, but Xerxes insists 
that he need not doubt Demaratus, as he is a guest-friend: πολιήτης µὲν πολιήτῃ εὖ πρήσσοντι 
φθονέει…ξεῖνος δὲ ξείνῳ εὖ πρήσσοντί ἐστι εὐµενέστατον πάντων (“a citizen envies a citizen 
who fares well, but a guest-friend is most kindly of all to a guest-friend who fares well,” 2.237.2-
3). Similarly, Hiero notes that he is better off trusting foreigners than citizens, but with a much 
more pessimistic conclusion: ἔτι δὲ ξένοις µὲν µᾶλλον ἢ πολίταις πιστεύειν…οὐ πάντα σοι ταῦτα 
δοκεῖ ψυχῆς ὑπὸ φόβων καταπεπληγµένης τεκµήρια εἶναι; (“And moreover, to trust foreigners 
                                                
12 Subsequently, Aristotle discusses tyrants and flattery as well (Pol. 1314a2), but without highlighting the 
emptiness of the experience for the tyrant. 
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more than citizens…do all these things not seem to you to be evidence of a soul stricken by 
fears?” 6.5). The contexts of these two scenarios necessitate different translations of xenos, but 
regardless, the point is still that it is safer for a tyrant to trust people other than his own citizens.13 
Moreover, Hiero’s point about being plagued by fear accords with the general arguments 
made in Sophocles and Euripides’ tragedies by characters who either deny that they have any 
desire to occupy the throne or want to convince others to set aside their designs on the kingship. 
When Creon defends himself against Oedipus’ accusations of plotting against him, he asks 
whether anyone would good sense would choose to have power, given the fears (φόβοισι) that 
come with it, and points out that he already enjoys all the same advantages on account of his 
association with Oedipus, yet without any of the fears (Soph. OT 584-93). Similarly, Hippolytus 
claims to be happier without the danger (κίνδυνός) that kingship entails (Eur. Hipp. 1009-20); 
Jocasta cautions Eteocles that holding a tyranny means enduring many hardships 
(πολλὰ µοχθεῖν) (Eur. Phoen. 549-54); and Ion justifies his aversion to living in the royal house 
by twice pointing out how fearful (δεδοικὼς, φοβούµενος) kings are (Eur. Ion 621-32).14  
Fear is indeed a common theme in Hiero’s description of the tyrant’s life. As noted above, 
Hiero argues that a tyrant does not have a greater ability to defeat his enemies than the private 
citizen (6.12), and he elsewhere points out that putting to death the men whom he fears actually 
makes him feel more anxious than before (καὶ ὅταν ἀποθάνωσιν οὓς ἐφοβήθη, οὐδέν τι µᾶλλον 
τοῦτο θαρρεῖ, ἀλλὰ φυλὰττεται ἔτι µᾶλλον ἢ τὸ πρόσθεν, 2.18). This leads to the same 
conclusion to which Socrates guides Polus in Plato’s Gorgias, namely that a tyrant is not 
enviable on account of his ability to put men to death, but Socrates makes his argument in a 
different manner: he is concerned about the inner turmoil that doing wrong and going 
                                                
13 Aristotle likewise notes that tyrants are more likely to dine with foreigners than with their own citizens (Pol. 
1314a11-12, discussed above, p. 178-79). 
14 For a more detailed discussion of these passages, see p. 87-91.  
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unpunished causes to the tyrant’s soul.15 Xenophon, however, has Hiero focus on a more 
practical aspect—how killing one’s enemies actually undermines a tyrant’s position (because he 
rules over fewer people, 2.17) and causes him to fear future consequences of his actions (2.18). 
 In arguing so vehemently that tyranny is not enviable, Hiero effectively gives us insight 
into the reasons why a tyrant himself might be envious of private citizens, although no phthonos 
or zêlos terms are applied to Hiero’s mental state. He laments that he is unable to enjoy 
sightseeing or attend festivals abroad because of the lack of security (1.12), a limitation that 
Socrates identifies as a cause for envy among tyrants in the Republic (579b-c). Moreover, while 
discussing honor, Hiero states that he considers happy (µακαρίζω) the man who is honored freely 
for being a benefactor, which is not the case for tyrants. He explains that such a man is not being 
plotted against, people are concerned for his well-being, he is untroubled by fear, envy, and the 
possibility of danger, and he lives a prosperous life (αἰσθάνοµαι γὰρ αὐτὸν οὐκ ἐπιβουλευόµενον, 
ἀλλὰ φροντιζόµενον, µή τι πάθῃ, καὶ ἀφόβως καὶ ἀνεπιφθόνως καὶ ἀκινδύνως καὶ εὐδαιµόνως 
τὸν βίον διάγοντα, 7.10). In essence (and ironically), Hiero envies that such a man is not 
envied.16  
 The Hiero is the earliest surviving Greek text that focuses exclusively on sole rulership, 
and the prominent role that Xenophon gives to phthonos (both implicitly and explicitly) in this 
dialogue reiterates the importance, intimacy, and inevitability of the association between envy 
and tyranny in the Greek worldview. The most maleficent and selfish of tyrants face envy in 
abundance, but even the most beneficent and selfless of tyrants have to employ constant care so 
as to minimize the amount they incur.
                                                
15 While we do not have an absolute date for either the Hiero or Plato’s Gorgias, if it is in fact true that Plato’s 
Republic predates the Hiero and that the Gorgias belongs to the early group of Platonic dialogues (Dodds 1959, 18), 
whereas the Republic belongs to the middle, we can then conclude that the Gorgias also predates the Hiero. 
16 Gray (2007), 134. 
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